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## **Inauguration Note**

In January 2008, the University of Hargeisa and Eastern Mennonite University (EMU) together launched the establishment of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) at the University of Hargeisa. This initiative is funded through Higher Education for Development (HED) by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). IPCS was born from the need to address, in depth, the conflict and violence that has engulfed Somalia for generations, and has led to the collapse of the state; a situation that has deprived Somalis of security and stability. Addressing this conflict is a key ingredient for sustainable development in the region. IPCS is the first institute of higher learning and research in the field of peace and conflict studies within the entire Somali-speaking community in the Horn of Africa.

IPCS's core mission is to enhance understanding of peace and conflict management through education, training and research. Through its holistic and multidisciplinary approach to teaching and research, the institute aims to increase the capacity of people to analyse and better understand the fundamental causes of social, economic and environmental challenges through the facilitation of healthy and intellectual discussion. Towards this goal, IPCS is launching the first volume of its annual academic journal, the *Somaliland Journal of Peace and Development* (SJPD), with the following objectives:

- To foster dialogue between academics, practitioners and policymakers inside and outside of Somaliland on a number of national issues related to peace, security and development.
- To serve as a vehicle for broader dissemination of research findings to help inform policy making.

It is a great pleasure for IPCS to issue this first volume of SJPD. We would like to thank USAID and HED for funding the printing and publication of this volume of the journal and Eastern Mennonite University for their assistance with developing and editing the articles.

Abdullahi Mohammed Odowa

Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

University of Hargeisa

### **Message from the Funding Partner (HED)**

All of us at Higher Education for Development (HED) would like to extend our heartfelt congratulations to the University of Hargeisa, and more specifically the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, on the publication of its inaugural issue of the new Somaliland Journal of Peace and Development. One of the original goals of this partnership project between the University of Hargeisa and Eastern Mennonite University, we are extremely pleased to see that it has come to fruition, despite the sometimes daunting challenges the partners have had to overcome over the course of the past 4 years. We look forward to the Journal making an enduring contribution to fostering meaningful dialogue on peace and conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa and even beyond. Once again, congratulations.

Charlie Koo

Program Officer

### **Message from the ProjectPartner (EMU)**

The partnership between the University of Hargeisa and Eastern Mennonite University (EMU) has been exciting and enlightening for both universities, as mutual learning and support have occurred through all phases of the partnership. EMU is very gratified to have been able to be part of the development, implementation and maturation of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies as the leading academic institution within the Somali speaking community in the Horn of Africa.

This journal will contribute much to the knowledge of Somali peacebuilding and development for both academics and practitioners at a time that this knowledge is sorely needed. Congratulations to the University of Hargeisa for the success of the ICPS and of this journal.

Janice Jenner

EMU Partnership Director

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## Can Somalis make peace without justice?

Mohamed DiriyeAbdullahi, PH.D.

*Formerly a journalist in Somalia, Mohamed DiriyeAbdullahiemigrated to Canada, where he earned a Master's degree and a Ph.D. in linguistics from the Université de Montréal in Montreal. He also earned a higher diploma in the instruction of French as a second language at the Université de Franche-comté in Besançon, France. His research interests include the study of the Afro-Asiatic languages in general (particularly its Cushitic branch), as well as Somali history and culture. He has also written among others, notably Culture and Customs of Somalia published by Greenwood Publishing Group in 2001, in which he addresses the origins, culture, and history of the Somali people, among other topics.*

### Abstract

This paper examines the grounds for establishing a justice tribunal, international or otherwise, for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Somalia. It is argued that even a tribunal with a limited mandate, despite expected protestations from those liable to such crimes, would further peace and contribute towards healing wounds and bringing a closure to a painful era.

### Can Somalis make peace without justice?

Scene one: Government soldiers in battle fatigue, reinforced by paramilitaries and the National Security Service (NSS), appear at a small village, line up all the adult men, and spray them with bullets. These men are guilty of belonging to the same clan as the guerrillas who ambush government soldiers and loyal militia members along the highways. Scene two: Government soldiers led by officers with pistols go from house to house in a large provincial city, knock down the doors, and kill anyone, even infants, found inside. They are following orders from high places to sweep the region clean of members of the insurgent clan. Scene three: A colonel with soldiers, guns at the ready, go from house to house in the dead of the night in a part of the capital inhabited mostly by a clan known to sympathize with the rebels that now control many rural areas. The colonel collects forty-three civilians, mostly college teachers, students and civil servants, takes them to a sandy beach and orders, "Fire!" Scene four: A ragtag guerrilla army, hot on the tails of fleeing Barre loyalist soldiers, arrives at a village where some of the inhabitants are from the same clan as the fallen dictator. Just to be sure they are getting people from the target group, the guerillas sort the population into clan groups; they then

let loose a salvo upon those from the same clan group as the fallen dictator. This time their motive is revenge killing. Scene five: A band of armed men (no one knows if they belong to a large, organized militia) shows up early one morning at a farming village populated by a minority ethnic group with no armed militia of its own. They tell everyone to immediately vacate the village, and just to show how serious they are, they murder eight children and four women, rape seven young women and burn sixteen houses. They then promise to come the next day and finish off any villager who would dare remain behind. The villagers' crime: They own fertile land.

Countless massacres have happened in Somalia—some of them over two decades ago. International human rights organizations have documented some of them, while the existence of others is known only to Somalis in the locality where the crimes were perpetrated. As is evident from reports of human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International and Africa Watch, the largest number of massacres occurred in the period between 1988 and 1993. Before 1991, government forces committed most of the massacres in the name of fighting the various insurgencies in the country; after 1991, however, indiscriminate massacres and revenge killings followed the collapse of the regime as various clan militias, ex-rebels and ex-government soldiers fought territorial wars mostly in the southern regions. Since then, peace has eluded Somalia despite a plethora of conferences, and current events suggest that the ongoing civil war will continue for some years.

The reasons for this self-perpetuating situation, as often cited in publications or deduced by the media, are: Barre's clan/ethnic cleansings, bungled UN efforts, ecological degradation and competition for scarce resources, and even the bellicose nature of Somali nomads! However, one important aspect of the enduring Somali conflict that has not received much attention is the question of justice. The Somali crisis began initially as a failure of justice and human rights. Moreover, its continuity is due, in large part, to a lack of solutions for these issues.

Unluckily, international actions in favor of a settlement in Somalia have so far not included the question of responsibility for the massacres and clan/ethnic cleansings that occurred in Somalia. Instead, major international efforts including Operation Restore Hope (the code name of the US mission in November 1992), UNITAF (the acronym for the international military mission after Operation Restore Hope), and UNOSOM (the United Nations Operation in Somalia which succeeded UNITAF) put Somalia on the wrong track by dealing and negotiating with publicly known war criminals and individuals strongly liable for war crimes. Consequently, all the UN-

sponsored peace negotiations had one major flaw: they ignored completely the question of war crimes and crimes against humanity and at the same reinforced the power of publicly known war criminals and individuals potentially guilty of atrocious human rights abuses and, in some cases, even genocide.

Ostensibly, the reason UN, US and EU representatives never sought to charge war criminals or try, at least, to banish them from the forums they were sponsoring was the assumption that all Somali leaders were criminals and that there was a dearth of able leadership among Somalis. "They're the players. We've got to play ball with them," (Parmelee, 1993) was the predominant message from the international community. Additionally, Western media, with its monopoly on information, helped bury the issue by relentlessly conveying images of a country filled with crooks, cutthroats, famine victims and pirates, and with illiteracy rates as high as 98%.<sup>1</sup> The resulting impression was that justice and war crimes tribunals would be frills in a land of famine and evil militias. Unlike in the ex-Yugoslavia or in Rwanda, where one politico-ethnic group decisively took over the affairs of the country, in Somalia the emphasis of the international community was and still is on food aid and on getting the different factions to agree to form a joint government.

Since the international community has, so far, shown little interest in human rights issues in Somalia, the question, then, is: Can Somalis on their own do themselves justice by confronting this thorny issue? No one can foretell how Somalis will deal with the issue of justice and accountability, and they face formidable obstacles in that direction. First, there are vocal groups both abroad and inside Somalia, including many militia and faction leaders, who would like to be forgiven and forgotten—and they definitely have something to hide. Second, there is fear among some clan groups, especially those whose members may have committed more war crimes than others, that probes into war crimes and genocide will become witch-hunts directed at their group. Thus, if one listens to debates among Somalis on this issue, one quickly notices the gulf of disagreements that the subject brings to the surface. With clan/ethnic fears still running high among Somalis, one person's war criminal is easily regarded as a hero by another person. Third, there is international apathy on the issue. International actors seem disinterested in the issue of justice in Somalia and invested only in the restoration of a government they can work with. Fourth, there is no visible regional support for the idea. Neighboring countries that have held peace conferences have not even brought up the subject. In this regard, Ethiopia's stance is particularly difficult to understand: The current Ethiopian

government is running its own tribunals to investigate human rights abuses committed under the Mengistu Regime while at the same time embracing—and sometimes even rearming—some of Somalia's most notorious militia commanders, the very men who were reportedly involved in some of the worst massacres.<sup>2</sup>

More specifically, among Somalis, those who would prefer not to see a meaningful discussion of war crimes use the following rhetorical devices either to make light of the matter or to oppose any ideas for proceeding toward an accountability project:

- *The victim-and-perpetrator thesis*: Every group or community is both victim and perpetrator of war crimes. Thus, justice has been rendered, albeit in a macabre way, and there is no need to bring up the subject in Somali peace talks.
- *The inflame-and-worsen scenario*: The subject of war crimes and crimes against humanity will only increase suspicions, inflame tempers, worsen the situation, and sabotage ongoing peace negotiations.

Undoubtedly, the above two arguments are powerful. The problem, though, is they do not deal with communal tensions and suspicions. They are not arguments for restoring confidence between Somalia's social groups, for healing the psychological wounds of Somalis, for bringing closure about the past, and for laying the foundations of a durable peace.<sup>3</sup> War criminals themselves, clearly fearful of accountability, are actively engaged in feeding these mention-and-worsen scenarios and nurturing the climate of communal suspicion and fear.

However, accountability is not an anathema to Somalis *per se*. Somalis as a people, like all other peoples, have values. What they need is to find ways of overcoming their differences on this issue. The right educational package, using the most effective means available (media, traditional leaders, religious leaders), is perhaps the best way to dispel mutual fears, foster understanding and loosen the grip war criminals have on their kinsfolk. Further public discussions and responsible media coverage would do the rest.

The main educational message that must be spread widely is simple: The social group did not and could not commit war crimes. War crimes were committed by individuals in informal or formal hierarchical organizations (roving bands, militias, the regular army, the government, etc.), and ultimate responsibility falls on the commanders and leaders who planned, commanded and executed summary killings of innocent civilians. The ordinary person can only benefit from a settling of war related grievances



through judicial means and therefore should welcome a war crimes probe. The ordinary person is not best served by mob justice and by the settling of blood accounts through vicious cycles of ethnic violence, revenge and counter revenge.

### **Who should be probed?**

After addressing reticence and fears of witch-hunts, another major problem comes into view: How does one look for possible war criminals in a country like Somalia with a civil war two decades old? From a feasibility standpoint, pursuing every possible war criminal (defined, simply, as anyone who killed or tortured civilians, or issued orders to kill and torture civilians) is not possible. Even if, by some miracle, a virtuous government is installed tomorrow, there are probably several thousand people open to such charges in Somalia, and verifying the validity of every possible case would be an arduous task. On the other hand, a limited and practical gesture is needed to clarify the responsibilities of the following category of persons: a) military and militia/faction officers; b) security operatives and chiefs of the former regime; c) top, influential ex-government officials.

However, even starting from the narrow categories above does not guarantee a workable list: Friends and sympathizers of war criminals could maliciously suggest names for inspection in order to choke the would-be judicial process. Therefore, a modest and practical method must be developed to pursue the accountability of only those people suspected of the most heinous crimes and known to the public and to human rights organizations. At the same time, allowing lesser war criminals to go free in exchange for information about the organizers of large scale massacres would also prove useful. Above all, procedures that create lists of suspects according to the criteria of association, job title, or membership in a political or clan/ethnic organization should be avoided.

It is important that the educational process be repeated at every stage in the search for accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity and in the restoration of public confidence in judicial institutions. Criminal elements will tug again and again at the hearts of members of their clan/ethnic group by saying that they did what they did to help and protect the clan/ethnic group. The truth that cannot be overemphasized is that war criminals and their accomplices never helped anyone; it is they who brought destruction and death to their communities. Somalis will rally to the principles of justice and accountability if they are given the benefit of information and freed from the misinformation of war criminals and criminal bands.

## The usefulness of accountability

Two additional questions need to be answered. First, given the fact that war crimes trials do not always achieve their objectives even in countries where prosecuting parties have all the necessary resources of a functioning justice apparatus, what can Somalis achieve by themselves? Considering that the UN war crimes tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda have not yet produced the expected results, one is tempted to say that Somalis cannot achieve much. The second question, then, is: Why waste the limited resources of Somalis on a mock pursuit of justice while the daunting task of reconstruction lies ahead? Why not let the dead lie in their graves—mass or individual—and let the living go on with their lives?

The first and the main reason for attempting, at least in principle, to do something about war crimes and crimes against humanity in Somalia comes down to cultural, moral and ethical values. The Barre regime, which destroyed the country physically, also ruined the cultural, moral and ethical values of Somalia through its systemic massacres and clan/ethnic cleaning campaigns. A Somali proverb says: The evil locusts are gone, but they left their eggs buried (*Ayax tag eelnareeb*). The evil Siad Barre is gone, but the shock waves of his tyranny are still reverberating in Somalia in the form of extrajudicial killings, clan/ethnic cleansing, torture, rape and looting. To get back to the former foundations of society and recreate societal bonds, Somalis need a sound beginning that marks a break with the recent past.

Second, recreating a vanished state in the territory of “ex-Somalia” supposes that its would-be citizens have confidence in the institution of the new state and its instrumental means to affect justice. Today in Somalia that confidence does not exist. With militia and former top military commanders vying for slots in a future government, and with UN and other well-wishers trying to jumpstart the fallen state, nothing yet suggests that Somalis are ready to invest their confidence in a new republic. Justice and support for the state as an institution, it seems, are inseparable ideas—and more so in Somalia now than ever before. Therefore, bringing the messy issues of justice for war crimes to the forefront is one way to promote support for the rebirth of a future Somali state.

Third, ordinary Somalis are not just going to forget the massacres and human rights abuses. Unless these matters are treated in a lawful way they will not fade from collective memory as the war criminals wish they would. The discovery of mass graves at Hargeisa in the north, now the capital of the seceded republic of Somaliland, and the emotions they stirred among the local population are ample proof that these issues will not evaporate from

the minds of the victims' relatives.

Therefore, no matter how difficult the question of war crimes is, and no matter how derisory the outcome might be, even a modest measure of justice for war crimes in Somalia will produce the following beneficial results:

1. Therapeutic effects for victims' families. The feeling of catharsis at the sight justice is a universal one.
2. Forestalling of revenge killings. Justice delayed breeds the psyche of revenge.
3. Removal from positions of authority or prominence those persons suspected of having committed war crimes as military or militia commanders, mob organizers, or as policy coordinators and formulators. More than the subject of accountability, it is the very presence of such persons in visible positions on the political spectrum that continues to inflame communal passions today.

## **Conclusion**

International organizations (UN, NGOs, etc.), regional organizations (AU, IGAD, AL, etc.), Somalia's regional neighbors (notably Ethiopia, Egypt and Kenya) and Somalia's many well-wishers among the international community at large (US, EU, and Italy, among others) have shown more interest in a quick-fix government in Somalia than in the question of justice for war crimes and crimes against humanity.<sup>4</sup> Their position is understandable: The world deals with governments and needs an interface in Somalia. That might be so, but for Somalis it is more essential to find ways of restoring a state that embodies justice first and foremost, no matter how difficult or slow that task might be. This is necessary not only to secure support for the idea of a viable Somali state but also to send the right message to the younger generation which includes thousands of war orphans. Horrible war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed in Somalia, and the perpetrators must not be allowed to prosper and govern.

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### (Footnotes)

1 Northern: Northern Republic of Somalia

(Endnotes)

- 1 Ahtner(1993), for example, wrote: “The Italians even established a University of Somalia—despite the fact that 98 percent of the population is illiterate.” He was wrong on both counts: The Italians did not build a university in Somalia; Somalis built a university that expanded from a tiny one in the sixties to a large national university. Of course, the Italians helped in the system but so did others. As for the 98% illiteracy rate, the figures are far from right: At least 5% of Somalis are literate in the foreign languages especially English, while literacy rates in the Somali language are double digits. By any yardstick, the 2% literacy rate given by the article in the Washington shows how some journalists tend to be flippant about African facts. Unluckily, ignorance when disseminated becomes information—I saw a scholarly article quoting Ahtner’s figures (See Ayittey, 1994).
- 2 See, for example, “Somalia: UN recommends”.
- 3 Many sources speak of “clans” and “clan wars” in reference to the communal strife and civil war in Somalia. Here, no distinction is made between a “clan” and an “ethnic group.” In Somalia, even if no dialect or religion parameters for ethnic group distinctions are discernible, with other parameters, such as geography and mythical group origins, particular histories, etc., operative, the clan is the equivalent of an ethnic group. Somalia has also its minority ethnic groups that not related linguistically or ethnically to the extended ethnic group—the Somali, notwithstanding the propaganda of past Somali regimes, which portrayed Somalia as Africa’s most monolithic nation, linguistically, religiously and ethnically.
- 4 AU (African Union); IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) is a subregional organization grouping Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Uganda, Sudan and Eritrea; AL (Arab League). Somalia is theoretically a member of these organizations.

# Dwindling Traditional Governance: Proliferation of Clan Leaders in Somaliland

Ahmed Adan Mohamed Jama

*Ahmed Adan Mohamed is the Head of Policy and Programmes of ActionAid International Somaliland. He has worked with ActionAid Since May 1993 at different capacities, mostly managerial positions. He is also a deputy chair of Resource Management Somaliland Network (RMSN) and member of various social groups. During 1991 – early 1993, he participated clan reconciliation processes in Sanaag region where four rival clans resolved their differences and returned assets to each other. During 1989-1990, he lectured at the department of agriculture of the Lafole faculty of Education, Somali National University, where though titled assisting lecturer, he worked as full lecturer. He also taught in secondary schools as biology teacher*

## **Introduction**

This paper analyzes the evolution, coronation, roles and proliferation of Somaliland clan leaders. The information herein was synthesized from diverse literature reviews and from interviews with titled clan leaders, intellectuals, politicians and members of other social segments.

## **Background**

Somaliland is located in the horn Africa and borders the Gulf of Aden to the north, Djibouti to northwest, Ethiopia to south and west, and Somalia to the east. The total area of the country is 137,600 square kilometers, and the coastline is 850 kilometers long. The government estimates the Somaliland population to be over 3 million (*Somaliland in Figures*, 2000) while the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates it at about 1.9 million (UNDP, 2005). Somaliland society is predominantly made up of nomadic pastoralists who rear sheep, goats and camels. To the west of Hargeisa, and in small pockets in Togdheer and Sanaag, people grow sorghum and maize on rain-fed farms (Gundel, 2006).

Somaliland won its independence from Britain on June 26, 1960, but united with Italian-colonized south Somalia after four days in pursuit of a greater Somalia. In May 1991, after three decades of development marginalization and brutal repression, Somaliland proclaimed its independence from the rest of Somalia.

Somalis make up an egalitarian society with no tradition of a centralized state. This is due to an economic lifestyle in which society is segmented into a patrilineal clan system (Shivakumar, 2005). The clan ensures the security and the property rights of its members, and it collectively retaliates for the seizure of properties and for murder committed by other clans if immediate resolutions are not made. Historically, clans raid camels from each other or fight over water and land tenure.

The major clans in Somaliland include *Isaks*, *Samaroon*, *Issa* and *Harti* (*Warsangeli* and *Dhulbahante*). According to Lewis (1961), Somalis are structured into clan families, clans, sub-clans, primary lineage and *mag*-paying groups (*mag*, or *diya*, in Arabic, is translated into English as “blood compensation”). The *diya*-paying group occupies the structural level of society in which the collective actions of social groups are presided over by an *akil*, or chief. Lewis (1961) writes that “the segmented clan system remains the bedrock foundation of the pastoral Somali society, and ‘clannishness’ — the primacy of clan interest — is its natural divisive reflection on the political level” (p. 4). The *sultan* (also known as *garad*, *boqor*, *ugaas*, etc.) presides over clan or sub-clan meetings. (The title “sultan” will be used in this research to represent titles of similar clout, as the people of Somaliland did not have unified leadership at the clan family level in recorded history.)

Nomadic pastoralism necessitates loose traditional governance. In search of pasture and water, the clan is dispersed over an extended area with poor mechanisms for transportation and communication. Hence, physical offices for administration do not serve the purposes of the clan (Puntland Development Research Centre, 2002). Social disputes are resolved through consensual decision making processes during which adult males meet under a tree and reach amicable compensatory decisions. Individual perpetrators always go unpunished in these clan negotiations; instead, the clan pays the price collectively.

The nomadic people of Somaliland are dispersed and deeply divided into clans in order to adopt a viable political system that serves the priorities of the citizens. Hence, the borders between formal and informal systems have never been fixed. Somalis are always suspicious of central government because of the limited relationship between the nomadic pastoralists, who contribute very little to national revenues, and the urban-based government institutions that provide negligible services to rural dwellers.

Clans cohabiting in any given locality craft social contracts or customary law (*xeer*) relevant to their socio-economic situations. As such, pastoralists, farmers, fisher folk and frankincense producers have discrete *xeer* suitable to



their mode of production and socialization. Specific penalties and sanctions are applied and enforced through arbitration (*gar*) by a jury of elders (*xeerbeegti*) whereby the wisest elders preside over any final judgments (Prior, 1994). The *xeer* is neither static nor codified; rather, it is dynamic within the framework of the lineage system (Gundel, 2006) and is handed down through practical exposure and verbal narration. Islamic *Sharia* law is the major source used to adjudicate criminal acts, and the codes in the *xeer* that are not compatible with *Sharia* gradually die out (CRD, 2005).

The *akil* office was a more definitive jurisdiction, according to the memorial of Richard Burton edition 1894. Successive colonial powers including the Egyptians (1875-85) and the British recognized the *akil* as spokesman for the Somali pastoral lineage groups (Farah & Lewis, 1993). Beginning in 1950, British administrations paid *akils* small but steady stipends to retain their loyalty and authorized them to arrest members in their constituencies for not complying with clan decisions or *diya*-payment.

Military rule, colonial powers and civil war adversely affected the *xeer* through patronage, dissolution and inflation. Though the colonial powers accommodated some traditional offices, such as the *akil*, they largely introduced an alien system of governance to Somali society. After independence, nationalists viewed the traditional leaders as an impediment to the creation of modern Somali state. Ambitious politicians, however, inflated the *akil* posts in order to canvass support from their respective clans. In the early 1970s, the military government abolished the offices of the *akil* and of the village headman and replaced them with the offices of *nabadoon* ("peace-seeker") and *samadoon* ("promoter of wise judgment") (Farah & Lewis, 1993). In 1971, the regime symbolically burned effigies representing tribalism, corruption, nepotism and misrule (Lewis, 2002). However, the same regime armed the traditional leaders of loyal clans against the regime's opponents, and recruited civil servants on clan basis rather than merits.

The military regime and opposition movements exploited the authority of the clan leaders to promote their military and political agendas. For instance, Isak clan leaders were instrumental in mobilizing moral, logistical and military support for the Somali National Movement (SNM) resistance against the SiadBarre regime in 1980s. In exchange, a council of elders (*guurti*) was constituted in the movement to serve as an advisory board (Renders, 2007).

Failure of central Somali government brought about resurrection and expansion of the clan leaders in Somaliland (Farah & Lewis, 1993; Renders, 2007). These leaders played a vital role in reconciling the warring clans in Somaliland, proclaiming self-determination, and initiating ceasefires and

reconciliation meetings both at the grassroots and at the national level. The deliberations of these meetings were recorded (minutes were taken)—a practice which is strange in the traditional peace process. Conference resolutions were legitimized by the unanimous consensus of delegates from the reconciling parties. In the Borama Grand Conference in 1993, both traditional and modern principles of majority vote were applied to legitimize the resolutions (Farah & Lewis, 1993).

Since the culmination of the reconciliation process, traditional leaders have maintained peace and stability, and they resolve family-related and land tenure disputes. The incorporation of the national council of elders, or GUURTI, into the bicameral legislature formally recognized the indispensable role elders play in the restoration of peace and stability to Somaliland. However, while the Somaliland constitution recognizes the Guurti, it does not say anything about the power of clan leaders such as the sultan and akil.

### **Selection and coronation of traditional structures**

In order to be a symbol for peace and social harmony, the office of the titled clan leader is supposed to be neutral and acceptable to the majority. Thus, candidates for clan leadership are validated with other clans in the area. The gender of the clan leaders is always male. When a leader passes away the office is inherited vertically or horizontally. The predecessor is chosen from the sons, brothers, and occasionally the cousins of the deceased leader.

The criteria for traditional leadership include wealth, age, political acumen, strength, courage, the ability to compromise and persuade, and cultural values such as expertise in the xeer and in religion, generosity, fairness, impartiality, probity, seniority, and skill in oral discourse (Farah & Lewis, 1993; Hagmann, 2005). There is no age restriction on candidates, though senior elders who meet the above criteria are preferred.

The coronation is usually held under a tree during the wet season when pastoralists have spare time due to the availability of water and pasture. Delegations are invited from all the clans in that region to witness and bless the ceremony. Green leaves and milk are poured on the new leader as symbols of peace and prosperity.

In the era of clan leadership inflation, ambitious men often self-crowned. Sub-clans and minority groups produced leaders to assert their independence in resource sharing. Most of the new leaders lobbied in the clans for acceptance. In some instances, close cousins competed over the same title, forcing clan members to choose between competitors, and resulting in a split within the

clan. Often, clan members ended up crowning both competitors.

The sultans wear special attire that includes a cloak (*ma'awis*) on the lower body, a scarf on the shoulders, a rounded cap, and a curved stick. Clan leaders do not usually do physical activities or cater services to the public. In days past, the clan donated animals to the sultan to pay for royal expenses. Today, though business people and Somalis of the diaspora make ad hoc token donations to new sultans, social resource mobilization for the clan leaders has been diminishing. Lack of systemic social support has led the leaders to seek patronage in the political establishment.

Some clans had a venerated monarchy for over century, and the colonial powers originally extended their rule through these local structures (though they later pushed them aside). For instance, the British government negotiated with the Warsangelisultanate, then the most powerful in the Sanaag region, to establish administrative offices in the region. In addition, during negotiations for independence with the British government, two sultans were included in the six member Somaliland delegation to England.

Political leaders endorse or initiate new clan leaders to weaken the authority of the existing leaders or solicit social support for their political survival (Academy of Peace and Development, 2010). Since colonial times, successive governments created titled leaders as a way of eliciting support from clans and organizing the rural population. The financial benefits accruing from government patronage created stark competition within the clans. However, the proliferation of the titled clan leaders makes power and resource sharing more cumbersome because emerging leaders seldom coordinate with their primary clan.

### **Roles and responsibilities of traditional leaders**

Traditional leaders have been vital for peace and stability in Somaliland. They have played a commendable role in clan reconciliations and in the rebirth of Somaliland. It took months of reconciliation meetings to heal the wounds of the conflict and reach a stage where people could put the past behind them and look toward the future.

Social institutions are prescriptions that humans use to advance structured institutions such as families, neighborhoods, markets, and private associations (Ostrom, 2005). In the context of Somaliland, the *xeer* functions as such by providing local solutions to problems that confront society in particular circumstances. Within the social contract of the *xeer*, sultans advocate for peace and stability, discourage violence, adjudicate social

disputes and make final decisions which are mostly binding. As two Somali proverbs attest: “*Sultanwaasumadqabiil*,” (“A sultan is a sign of the clan); and, “*Ugaaswaaoodqabiil*” (an Ugaas is the fence of the clan) (Hohne, 2006). (Ugaas is a word similar to sultan and is used by some clans in the east of Somaliland.) Playing a different role, clan elders (*odayaal*)—who symbolize a “social imaginary” in which the old dominate the young and men dominate women (Hagmann, 2006, p. 6)—represent their constituencies in conflict negotiations and make decisions between families and clans rather than between individuals (Hart and Muhyadin, 2010). (While elders issue collective compensatory decisions, they rely on the government for punitive actions against individual perpetrators.)

Since the failure of the strong central government in 1991, clan elders have also assumed administrative and security responsibilities. For instance, elders move between warring clans to promote ceasefires and peaceful negotiations. They assemble in councils (*shir*) to deliberate on matters affecting the clan, such as bilateral peace negotiations, and diya-payment. (The reason behind the expensive diya-paying is to deter committal of crimes.) Due to the absence of physical offices and a rudimentary communication system, elders generally respond to incidents rather than prevent them from happening. As such, the local *xeeris* effective in producing conflict resolutions but weak in preventive mechanisms. The *xeer* is also ineffective in service provision, sustainable resource management and joint development (Shivakumar, 2005). In this way, the elders fall short of making laws and enforcing them or providing health, water and education services to the population (Renders, 2007).

However, clan elders do promote the interests of their people in political and legal contexts. The civil strife that led to the failure of the central Somali government divided the society into clan based enclaves with no formal administrative structures. The elders filled the vacuum and nominated people or represented the clan at all formal discussions. The emerging regional governments capitalized on the elders’ influence to constitute national institutions, demobilize militias, elicit votes and lessen social tensions. As such, politicians, professionals and militia leaders staged their political marathons through the clan system. Unfortunately, however, politicians often manipulated the agenda and the outcomes of the clan discussions as well (Farah & Lewis, 1993).

Since 1940, the concentration of traditional leaders and other social powerful groups in the urban centers shifted power away from rural nomadic groups (Farah & Lewis, 1993). Today, clan leaders spend most of their time in urban

centers and visit the rural areas only when addressing a serious issue. Yet the rural people trust and respect the traditional leaders, whose services are accessible and affordable unlike the services of modern systems.

### **The proliferation of traditional structures**

The population of Somaliland was too small during the colonial period to sustain multiple leaders, and the clans had fewer sub-clans or diya-paying groups. During the era of the British protectorate, the akils served as an interface between the administration and the clans, chairing the decisions of the diya-paying group and liaising with the government authorities. (The sultan, on the other hand, blessed the clan meetings and represented it in the high level negotiations.) Each diya-paying group was allowed to have only one akil, and the regional office paid these akils a stipend. The SiadBarre regime replaced the akil with the nabadoon, or “peace-seeker,” who reported to the ministry of interior and the security apparatus (Farah, 1993). As was mentioned above, the collapse of the Barre regime revived the role of the titled clan leaders to reconcile warring groups and establish viable national government. The number of titular clan leaders in Somaliland has increased from eight in 1960, to twenty in 1993 (Farah & Lewis, 1993). Today, in 2011, there are over eighty clan leaders. (The number of Habar-yoonis sultans alone has increased from two in 1993 to twenty-seven in 2011.)

These numbers have multiplied in the last four years due to self-nomination and to sub-clans contending for political representation. Other factors that have contributed to the proliferation of titled clan leaders include:

- A weakened traditional xeersince the colonial era due to urbanization, increased educational levels, use of other legal systems and exposure to other cultures;
- The politicization of the clan system which began when sultans were asked to nominate the national legislature in 1993 and 1997, and as clans filled national and regional offices;
- Increase in the population of Somaliland since independence;
- The seeking of social recognition and political participation by minor sub-clans;
- Anarchy and the absence of a strong central government to regulate the system;
- The seeking self-actualization and economic gain by individuals;

- Common addictions to a mild narcotic stimulant called *cathaedulis*, or *qaad*.

As the clans fragmented, the need for coordination and cooperation led to a proliferation of clan leaders in Somaliland to mediate intra- and inter-clan disputes. Since 1991, many clans have anointed sultans as a way of enhancing their political weight in national and regional power and resource sharing (Farah & Lewis, 1993). The proliferation of titled clan leaders gave voice to the minority clans who were not represented in the clan meetings (Bradbury, 2008).

This proliferation has undermined the social respect of the titled clan leaders. While the sultan should not openly associate with one political group regardless of his political orientation in order to preserve the trust of the clansmen, sultans from the same clan may send contradictory messages or pull the clan into difference political parties or associations. Clan leaders sometimes dispute over their seniority and their subsequent authority to preside over clan meetings. In a recent incident, several sultans walked out of a clan meeting to protest another sultan who had been invited to close the meeting—despite the fact that the later was from the oldest sultanate.

### **Challenges of and public perception towards the proliferation of traditional structures**

As discussed earlier, Somaliland's traditional governance has loopholes such as the absence of selection criteria, inheritance of the office, poor accountability, and vulnerability to external and political influences that have contributed to the proliferation of traditional structures. The traditional offices of sultan and *akil* have quadrupled over the past two decades, and ambitious leaders have either self-crowned or mobilized sympathizers to organize their inaugurations. Politicians originating from the same clans have also distorted the fragile system by crowning supporters—especially when they differ with the existing structures. Many people argue that these new coronations have mostly occurred because of personal or group interests or as an assertion of independence. Corruption in the national institutions, they suggest, might have attracted unemployed men to claim titles in order to receive attention. Somaliland government is yet to come up with regulatory framework to manage this absurd proliferation.

There is growing public concern about the ripple effects of these proliferating traditional leaders on social cohesion, political direction and conflict resolution. Women and youth are particularly disgruntled about lack of representation in this social platform, as clans are usually represented by

adult males when it comes to conflict resolution, resource mobilization and distribution, and political discourse.

In 2006, Oxfam's Dutch affiliate, NOVIB, commissioned the Danish Refugee Council (RDC) to convene the akils and other influential elders of Somaliland to review the xeer and make necessary amendments that would align it with human rights conventions and with Somaliland's constitution. The elders' declaration is pending for government application and dissemination to the general public.

The majority of the clan leaders are not schooled, which marginalize them in high level discussions where foreign languages such as English or Arabic are often used for written communication, research and other documentation. Absence of forums for traditional leaders and the existence of a national Guurti with no specific clan titles have attenuated the authority of the clan leaders.

Clan leaders resolve inter- and intra-clan disputes and advocate peace and stability. However, the clan system masks other criteria for the power and resource sharing necessary for nation building. It divides the society into enclaves that stereotype each other in instances of social discord and bad conduct. Young urbanized people are becoming less attached to their culture and regard traditional governance as backward and as an obstacle to successful implementation of modern policy measures.

Multiplication of sultans and akils within a clan undermines their cohesion and solidarity in practice. The heads of sub-clans vie with each other for dominance in the affairs of the clan (Farah & Lewis, 1993). The diya-paying groups fragment into smaller segments vying for political participation. The office of sultan does not appraise the selection and performance of the akils, and the functions of the akil do not complement the office of sultan—a necessity for retaining social credit.

### **Mechanisms of regulating selection and coronation of clan leaders**

The major difference between Somaliland and the rest of Somalia has been the role of the traditional leaders in the peace process and in nation building. The uncontrolled proliferation of titles has weakened the social respect and the capacity of the elders to make collective decisions. Hence, there is a need to regulate the crowning and functioning of clan leaders. The ministry of interior should spearhead a regulatory framework to control social degeneration due to multiple titled clan elders. The role of the clan leaders should be recognized in the future national constitution.

The clan leaders (sultans and akils) should maintain neutrality in political contexts to retain social respect. Politicians must refrain from sponsoring the emergence of new clan leaders in order to counter the influence of the existing ones. Political parties should not seek the patronage of clan leaders to elicit supporters.

Somaliland should establish a mechanism for dethroning clan leaders who do not serve social expectations or respect the norms and rules of their titles. Since many young people are holding the title of sultan, and since the social support system is weakening, the traditional leaders should be permitted to engage in productive activities. This would minimize the temptation to seek political patronage.

### **Conclusion and recommendations**

Traditional governance is viable in nomadic pastoralist communities where conventional administrative systems are impractical. Clan elders are accessible and affordable when it comes to responding to societal conflicts.

There is a need for externally enforceable rules that regulate the criteria of new traditional leaders. The conduct and performance of the existing leaders should be appraised periodically. The ministry of interior should regulate the coronations and sensitize the public about the implications of multiple clan leaders. The merits and demerits of Somaliland's traditional systems of governance should be properly researched and documented for future generations.

The elders' declaration of 2006 should be disseminated widely and amendments to the xeer recognized in the legal documents of Somaliland. To discourage recurrence of the crimes, the customary law should punish individual perpetrators and stop collective reparations of criminal acts.

Women and youth demand space in the traditional governance system. Clan elders should recognize the number and potentiality of women and youth and accommodate them. Younger generations should purposefully invest in learning the xeer and adapt it to changing socio-economic situations.



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# **Participation through Peacebuilding: Somaliland Women's Experiences Of Peace Initiatives in Somaliland since 1991**

Siham Rayale

*Siham Rayale is a PhD Candidate at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Her research currently focuses on the intersection between women's peace activism and political participation in Somaliland. Her interests include: Women's empowerment; African women's movements; state-building; women's rights; peacebuilding; political economy of post-conflict reconstruction*

## **Abstract**

This research paper looks at Somaliland women's experiences of consolidating and sustaining peace in Somaliland since the cessation of conflict in the early 1990s. It addresses the history of women's participation in formal political institutions to establish a foundation for their experiences in pursuing and sustaining peace. It seeks to establish an understanding of women's participation in the public sphere through peace initiatives. Somaliland women's emphasis on the need to reestablish personal security in their communities and their use of informal networks enabled them to contribute in significant ways to the early peace processes in Somaliland. This research seeks to enforce a framework for participation that encompasses everyday life.

## **Introduction**

This paper analyzes Somaliland women's experiences in peace initiatives since 1991—the end of the Civil War in Somalia and the establishment of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. Researchers in gender and conflict/post-conflict studies often cite the significant impact of conflict on changing gender relations at the micro and macro levels of society. Women in Somaliland contributed significantly to the liberation of northern Somali tribes from the dictatorial rule of General SiyadBarre who initiated a campaign to brutally suppress dissent and opposition. Very few women carried arms during the civil war, but many acted as conduits for northern clansmen targeted by the regime, ferrying them from house to house until they reached their clan territories in Somaliland. Twenty years have passed since the cessation of conflict, and Somaliland has engaged in a process of

bottom-up state building that has consolidated peace among neighbouring clans and instituted a bicameral legislative system incorporating traditional clan elders in the upper house (senate), or *guurti*.

Research conducted on the process of state and nation building in Somaliland has highlighted women's roles and their contributions through their participation in the immediate post conflict context. This includes during the peace processes of Burao (1992) and Borame (1993) and in Hargeisa. Somaliland women held public demonstrations, developed a document detailing a women's agenda for reconciliation, and acted as observers to the peace conferences. Ongoing research continues to describe their expanding roles and how the civil war has changed the socio-economic conditions for Somaliland women (Gardner & El Bushra, 2004; Hodgson, 2000; Warsam, 2002; Ford, Adam & Ismail, 2004).

Practitioners (NGOs, INGOs, peace activists) and researchers of programs aimed at women's participation and empowerment (and also more broadly at development) outline the many ways in which conflict can change gender roles—particularly within and outside of households. The case of Somaliland women offers interesting insight into the impact of changing gender roles on post-conflict reconstruction, particularly on the use of public spaces largely occupied by men. There is now an increase in women seeking gainful employment, pursuing civil service posts or emerging as community leaders in NGOs.

This paper will evaluate how Somaliland women's participation in the public sphere/space has, a) been shaped by peacebuilding activities; and b) allowed women to assume roles outside of the household or private sphere. The first part of the paper outlines women's participation in the public sphere during the Barre regime. The second part analyzes the impact of conflict on gender relations, including the rise of new roles for women in the public sphere. The third section looks at Somaliland women's experiences in constituting peace during the early peace processes, their participation in the public sphere, and the ongoing changes in women's roles in the self-declared Republic of Somaliland.

### **Women's Political Participation during the Barre regime**

Women played an integral part in colonial resistance by joining the Somali Youth League (SYL), an organization founded in 1947. Their mandate involved advocating for independence and promoting a Somali national identity across British and Italian-held Somali territories. *Somalnimoo* as a political movement, particularly

during the colonial period, stressed commonalities within the clan system working to maintain a balance-of-power amidst the divisiveness of clan loyalties. The Somali nationalist movement and discourse of Somalinimoo had a two-pronged objective: to resist further colonial dominance from two colonial powers with separate styles of administration, and to forge a discourse for nationalism that reflected the direct contrast between urban and modernist attitudes, on one hand, and the hegemony of the pastoral society in describing Somali culture (*daqaan*), on the other. The first objective was a project of colonial resistance, while the latter emphasized nationalism in a unified Somali state (Lewis, 2010; Lewis, 1999; Kapteijns, 2009). Somalinimoo took on varied meanings at each stage and became quite perverse as the military rule of Siyad Barre failed to retain the character of the anti-colonial movement and fused with anti-clan rhetoric that proved itself contradictory based upon his own actions. In a speech delivered to judges, Barre remarked, "It is unfortunate that our nation is rather too clannish: if all Somalis are to go to Hell, tribalism will be their vehicle to reach there" (Lewis, 2010, 78).

### **Somali Women's Political Participation**

In 1959, prior to the Barre regime, Somali women (comprising northern and southern clans) established the Somali Women's Association (SWA) out of a growing frustration over a lack of political representation within the Somali Youth League. The organization, led by middle class urban women, transformed itself into the Somali Women's Movement (SWM) by 1960. Both of these organizations were short lived as the dictatorship incorporated the SWM as the Women's Section within the Political Office of the Presidency of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). Thereafter, the Women's Section transformed itself in 1977 into the Somali Women's Democratic Organization (SWDO). It drew its members from the SWM and was led by Barre's wife, Khadija Ma'alim. Its political and ideological project became less about women's socio-political and economic conditions and more about co-opting women's issues by serving as a monitoring outpost for maintaining the hegemony of state ideology (Gardner & El Bushra, 2004).

The Barre regime worked hard to advance the material conditions of women by first establishing the Family Law of 1975, which guaranteed women equitable distribution of property through inheritance and divorce (Kapteijns, 2009; Gardner & El Bushra, 2004). For the first time, women were provided with government scholarships to study abroad and were incorporated into the formal labor sector. Opposition to the Family Law of 1975 largely came from religious leaders who saw it as an affront to Islamic principles. Barre executed ten religious leaders for openly opposing the changes to the Family Law, and

as a result, women's rights as a campaign became closely associated with the Barre regime's oppressive practices (Kapteijns, 2009).

Consequently, women's rights occupied an ambivalent position in the public discourse on nationalism. From 1960 to 1990 Somali women composed poems promoting and later deriding Somalimoo as defined by Barre. They popularized their poetry through songs over radio, and discursively shaped the ambitions, as well as the eventual discontent, of Somali society in general. These songs also reinforced attitudes regarding women's roles and were layered with symbolisms and meanings. They had at least three characteristics: they were mainly enjoyed and popularized by urbanites; they were largely performed by youth; and they discursively shaped what it meant to uphold both morality and modernist attitudes and behaviors (Kapteijns, 2009).

At the time, morality and conceptualizations of proper gender roles were heavily influenced by Islamic principles and urban elites preaching socialist ideologies that were in need of constant legitimizing. Barre recognized this, and in daily radio programs that inculcated listeners about the teachings of scientific socialism, he often began with a Quranic recitation, followed with commentary on a particular issue, a Somali proverb, and ending with speeches prepared by Barre and his peers (Lewis, 2010). Kapteijns (2009) claims that little can be gleaned about the transformation of gender ideology during this period—except in regards to the interplay between the hegemony of Somalimoo and Islam's effects on women's lives as a guideline for moral womanhood.

Discontent grew with Barre's oppressive regime and he, in turn, sought to subdue dissent through military and violent means. The present Somali political landscape shows the legacy of the Siyad Barre regime through splintered political and clan-based factions. To reclaim the northwest (Somaliland), Barre sought to subdue the newly reconstituted Somali National Movement (SNM) comprised of mainly Isaq clan members. During this period, women living in major towns including Hargeisa and Gabilay supported the movement through clandestine tactics including intelligence gathering, material and financial support for weapons, as nurses and caregivers, and occasionally as combatants (Kapteijns, 2009). The regime executed Isaq men and women en masse. The brutality of the military was documented through firsthand accounts of women who were raped throughout the Somali territories. The SNM eventually pushed Barre's supporters out of the northwest and rebel factions in the south overwhelmed the military regime, forcing Barre and his supporters to flee

in 1989. Somaliland's independence was reaffirmed in 1991, and an arduous peace process began among northern clans, establishing peace and helping constitute new roles for women in society, albeit rather hesitantly. Discourses on gender roles have certainly changed, and given the historical impact of socio-political and economic processes on Somali gender norms, it will be important to ask how Somaliland women have construed their gender roles and identities during and after the peace processes.

## **Gender, Peacebuilding and Somaliland's self-declared Independence**

Gender relations changed as women took on new roles as a consequence of the conflict in Somaliland and their participation in the peace movement. The nature of the Somaliland state in international relations is a precarious one: It is lauded for its peace efforts, yet it remains unrecognized despite its best attempts to stress its socio-political and economic differences from its warring neighbour to the south. Consequently, peacebuilding in Somaliland has been driven entirely by grassroots efforts, unlike peacebuilding from above that is driven by the "liberal peace" discourse and operationalized by the United Nations (UN) it seeks to establish liberal market democracy (Liden, 2009, p. 617).

### Liberal Peace and Gender

Discussions regarding liberal peace discourse and gender dynamics refer to the norms generated by the UN peacebuilding operations, which view societies with greater gender equality as less likely to enter into wars or conflicts. Liberal peace interventions often encompass security, economic development, democratization, and transitional justice—all of which comprise a human rights perspective. They diverge from past peacebuilding discourses by emphasizing social and economic rights "as a source of peace" (Liden, 2009, p. 621). The significance of this can be felt in how peacebuilding as part of the liberal peace discourse seeks to institute a language of inclusivity in gender relations and state-society relations, while remaining "neutral" in terms of a given state's political project (i.e., in relation to market-oriented political reforms). Yet, the aims and objectives of peacebuilding mechanisms driven by international organizations (including the UN) have very clear political objectives that often obscure local priorities (Liden, 2009).

Participation and economic independence are cited as central tenets that contribute to human security for the most vulnerable in society, including women (Gizelis, 2009; Nakaya, 2003). UN Resolution 1325 (affirmed in 2000) is largely referenced on issues relating to women, peace and security, and



it supports intervention on the basis of humanitarian grounds in hopes of ensuring the prominence of development projects that emphasize women's representation at all levels of decision making in peace processes (Nakaya, 2003). While the benefit of UN Resolution 1325 is the recognition that women are inversely impacted by war and conflict, it relies on normative assumptions regarding women's inherent peacefulness and the need to tap into that peacefulness as a source of social capital that will propel women into leadership roles already supported by the necessary legal and structural frameworks of democratization and decentralization (Pugh, 2005; Nakaya, 2003). Somaliland women's experiences are unique in that they have drawn upon their traditional roles within the kinship structure, yet also participated in the political establishment of the state in innovative ways well before UN Resolution 1325.

Conflict changes or suspends gender roles as a consequence of widespread violence, and it impacts men and women differently (Gardner & El Bushra, 2004; El Bushra, 2003; El Bushra, 2007; Shepherd, 2008; Warsame, 2002). National and international policies aimed at enhancing women's rights in a post-conflict setting are guided by a set of normative assumptions regarding women as victims and as inherent peacemakers and nurturers (El Bushra, 2007; Shepherd, 2008). While women are severely impacted by the outbreak of civil war the essentialization of women's roles (as peacemakers) during and after conflict masks their contributions during conflict as combatants and in rallying networks to support the conflict. This is certainly true of Somaliland women who supported the SNM by providing channels of escape through southern Somalia, and who dispensed with jewelry and other assets to provide financial support for the war effort (Gardner & El Bushra, 2004).

The efficacy of international policies aimed at enhancing women's rights in the post-conflict aftermath (such as UN Resolution 1325) operate under a set of assumptions that are less progressive than the new roles women often envision for themselves (El Bushra, 2007; El Bushra, 2003; El Bushra & Mukaburuga, 1995). International policies (Beijing Platform for Action, 1995; UN Resolution 1325) frame women's status in terms of low representation in official policy settings at the national level, while at the same time ignoring the structural impediments that contribute to a lack of visibility for women at local levels (Nakaya, 2003). The grassroots nature of women's peace activism is rarely referenced by international policies that provide strategies for incorporating women into formal decision-making processes (McKay & Rey, 2006).

## **Women's Peace Activism and Somaliland Women**

Women's peace activism in the hopes of resolving conflicts and engendering durable peace is directly related to the insecurities they face during conflict. El Bushra (2007) refers to this as a "pragmatic response to desperate situations," as opposed to assuming the pacifist nature of women's peace work (p. 135). Women reconstitute social life through maintaining households—but also by drawing upon their resilience to undertake new roles as required. These efforts contribute to a rise in women's participation in formal and informal markets and civil society organizations (El Bushra, 2007). The dynamic between women's roles prior to the outbreak of conflict and in a post-conflict setting suggests that conflicts can enhance existing power differentials while simultaneously providing women with opportunities to participate outside of the domestic sphere (household). This participation is often an added burden, but it does contribute to the ongoing peace activism that easily correlates with the discourse on women's rights and the pursuit of peacebuilding.

Among the issues women encounter in the context of post-conflict social relations is whether to reconstitute pre-conflict roles or to pursue new arrangements all together. Women in Sierra Leone, Mozambique and Eritrea provide useful examples of this dilemma. In these countries, women have been seen in an ambivalent light regarding their roles in new political climates. While political leaders recognize women's contributions, they are remiss to state the extent women should be involved in post-conflict reconstruction. To cement their roles in post-conflict reconstruction, women in Rwanda and Namibia arduously sought quotas to reserve a certain number of seats for women in parliament. This has radically transformed women's presence in the public sphere (George-Williams, 2005).

Women often have competing interests and priorities: some may wish to maintain pre-conflict gender roles; others seek a more radical transformation of roles; and some women aim to ensure "cultural continuity" while working for peace. El Bushra and Mukaburuga (1995) point out that many women who have experienced conflict will also invariably reference the conflict and its impact, thereby sustaining the memory of the conflict for younger generations.

### **Peacebuilding from below: Somaliland Women's experiences**

Somaliland women have harnessed grassroots methods for promoting conflict and for pursuing a cessation to major and minor conflicts through the use of *baraanbur* (Somali women's poetry). In these poems women express their insecurity by drawing on their vulnerable socio-economic status as a

consequence of displacement, the death of male family members, and the collapse of social infrastructures (the *xeer*) that has thus far ceased to provide protection for women. Women also draw upon their roles as mothers.

### **Somaliland's Peace Process**

Since the SNM forces reclaimed territories in what is now Somaliland, the Northwest has been a relatively peaceful independent state. The peace process in Somaliland may be understood through the process of state building. Somaliland is touted for its “bottom-up” approach to constituting peace with little outside intervention. Contrast this with the fourteen international peace conferences aimed at securing peace for southern Somalia—conferences established by the UN, United States (US), African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and hosted by the Ethiopian, Kenyan and Djiboutian governments (Kibble & Walls, 2010; Ahmed & Green, 1999; Walls, 2009; Lewis, 2010).

In Somaliland, peace was built through ongoing conferences (*shiiir*) in Borame, Berbera and Burao and through the transition from a military administration to a civilian government (facilitated by SNM leadership). As a result of this ten year process, President Mohamed Hajji Ibrahim Igal (1999-2002) helped establish the first civilian government through popular consensus rather than electioneering. This civilian government sought to fuse traditional and modern systems of governance and envisioned the elevation of clan elders (as traditional sources of political authority) to the Guurti, or senate, as unelected members. These grassroots state building and peacebuilding process in Somaliland benefitted women greatly by providing a decentralized system of authority in which security was managed locally and civil society organizations were able to target their efforts locally.

### **Activism through Poetry: Somaliland women and Baraanbur**

During these peace conferences Somaliland women composed poems to express their frustration at the ongoing conflict between related clans—but also gave indications of the exclusion women faced. Observer status (rather than the right to vote) was afforded to ten Somaliland women (Gardner & El Bushra, 2004). While their participation was limited to more traditional roles, including providing food for the conference attendees, women also exercised more formal agency and expressed their political views. Indeed, the kinds of subjectivities women drew upon to claim their rights in the formal peace discussions drew heavily on their traditional roles. They stressed the vulnerability of their position in society by referencing gender

norms in the *xeer*—such as the provision for men’s protection over women’s personal security—and channeled their accounts through poetry. In fact, according to accounts gathered by Gardner and El Bushra (2004), the women who attended the Borame conference (1993) suggested the establishment of a *guurti* (an upper house of the senate). This is significant insofar as women’s interests in pursuing peace activism engulfed the social welfare of all members of society.

Baraanburpoems illustrate the social and psychological impacts of violence on gender relations that women express through song. These changes (which include demographic changes) compel shifts in the gendered division of labor and add to women’s responsibilities, rather than causing men to men take up women’s roles (El Bushra, 2007). Resilience, as a coping mechanism for women who have suffered physical and psychological trauma, is a central feature that contributes to changes in gender relations (El Bushra, 2003; Sorenson, 1998; Turshen&Twagiamariya, 1998)

The strategies women deployed involved both traditional and new tools. Traditionally, the use and function of oral poetry has varied from urging young men to oppose colonial oppression to demanding exclusion in peace processes. In pastoral culture it also served as a means to transmit social roles for boys, girls, men and women (Hodson, 2000; Wieringa, 1995; Kapteijns, 2009). Women’s participation in the peace movements drew on three particular tools for engagement with formal peace talks. These tools included: *baraanbur*, which conveyed their frustration with ongoing conflicts; the collapse of the social contract (*xeer*) which exposed women to socio-economic insecurities; and the use of informal networks to rally support for peace efforts between warring clans. Women utilized the capacity to communicate across clan lines and lobbied for peace between their husbands and natal clans in ways that made many suspicious of them. The uniqueness of women’s political participation during the peace movements is precisely how women occupied public spaces that discursively manifested into women-led demonstrations and political demands for reconstituting peace.

### **Peace Campaigns and Public Spaces**

Grassroots peacebuilding efforts have helped democratize public spaces to include women in the dialogue on peace. The liberal peace discourse fails to capture this and also neglects the ways women are using these public spaces to impact their lives beyond merely working in peace activism. This includes gainful employment for sustaining households, assuming public positions, and continuing grassroots efforts for women’s rights. While it is

true that Somaliland women's peace activists have responded to international discourses on women's rights—including women's participation in peace processes and public life—it is important to link changes in gender relations, as well as changes in how women negotiate their presence in the public sphere, to how peace is defined twenty years onwards.

In the early 1990s, Somaliland women organized sit-ins during which they called upon God to relieve them of their suffering; they publicly demonstrated and spurred rallies in open spaces; and they organized themselves by appealing to maternal clansmen to end the violence (Gardner & El Bushra, 2004). Contrary to demonstrations during the colonial period, which served the interests of a unified Somali state, Somaliland women who participated in peace processes demanded a right to participate in future governments by calling for an allocation of at least thirty percent of future government seats for women. The ideas of sociologists and political scientists (regarding "critical mass") illustrates that discourses of the peace movement in Somaliland did not exist in a vacuum isolated from other local women's peace movements; instead, they also deployed international discourses for reconciliation. Women who returned from refugee camps in Ethiopia, as well as women who were educated as teachers and nurses, came back to Somaliland to aid in the peace movements and reconstruction efforts. A similar period of post-conflict reconstruction occurred after the 1994 Rwandan genocide when women mobilized locally across ethnic lines to denounce violence, promote reconciliation and secure increased visibility for women in decision making (Gizelis, 2009).

The women who led the peace campaigns included urban elites and rural women. As the rise in female-headed households attests (Nagaad, 2010), the impact of the conflict on women's day-to-day lives is a struggle for the majority of women in Somaliland. Some important questions to ask, then, are: What other kinds of participatory spaces are being occupied by Somaliland women as a consequence of the conflict, and how do these women link their socio-economic status to the lack of enforcement of political rights? Who has benefitted from the peace movement's gains for women (including minor political achievements such as observer status for ten women at Borame and entrenchment of women's rights in the constitution)? How can the impact of the peace movement in Somaliland be characterized if only a few women come to represent and construct the discourse on peace? As noted elsewhere, assumptions regarding women's propensity to seek peace in line with their peaceful nature does not hold true in every case. Yet, it is true that as a political strategy women do and have drawn upon their roles as mothers and peacemakers to end conflicts (Ringera, 2009; Charlesworth,

2008).

While peace (defined by Somaliland women as a cessation of conflict and a programmatic priority) has been achieved and utilized to frame the peace movement, peace twenty years onward must have a different meaning given new socio-economic and political realities. Women make up two-thirds of the population, the majority of households are female-headed, and a greater number of families are urban dwellers. This has certainly impacted Somaliland women's activities in the public sphere. Thus, it is important to look at how men and women relate to each other and how meaning is produced through every day practices that shape participatory spaces. It is also important to explain how women create subjectivities for participation in the public sphere.

### **Political Participation and Post-Conflict Reconstruction**

Somaliland women face post-conflict issues similar to those faced by other African women, including the collapse of political and economic infrastructures of society. While establishing peace is one priority, the myriad of issues involved in post-conflict reconstruction can make women's issues a low priority. Women's contributions to post-conflict reconstruction are subsumed by efforts to reconstitute order and norms and to facilitate development through the rebuilding the social, political and economic infrastructures of society (Sorensen, 1998). The greater social project of post-conflict reconstruction in Somaliland has seen women take up roles in public sector employment as civil society leaders and small business owners (Warsame, 2002).

The many issues that Somaliland women face in the post-conflict context ought to be discussed with a view to the differences between rural and urban women. According to Warsame (2002), the majority of Somaliland households are rural and overwhelmingly engaged in pastoral or agro-pastoral activities that are increasingly becoming marginalized by the rise of urban commercial centers. The pastoral economy is heavily influenced by market dynamics, and while livestock rearing for subsistence is still prevalent, the majority of rural households gear their economic activity towards selling in urban markets in exchange for household goods (Nagaad, 2010; Warsame, 2002). Women increasingly own livestock and property, and this impacts decision making at the household level; as such, a greater number of women are working as breadwinners (Warsame, 2002).

Weak public infrastructure and institutions and the impact of conflict on men in general—including psychosocial trauma, physical disabilities and

migration out of Somaliland—are all contributing factors to changes in gender dynamics (Sorensen, 1998; Warsame, 2002; Zuckerman & Greenberg, 2004). However, changing economic roles have not translated into greater political influence or decision making for women (Warsame, 2002; Nagaad, 2010). Study after study conducted on the issues women face in post-conflict reconstruction relegate social reconstruction to a process of rehabilitation from trauma related to conflict and social integration (Sorensen, 1998; Chetail, 2009). This suggests that practical solutions to gender inequities emphasize institutional mechanisms (such as UN Resolution 1325 and gender quotas) that entrench women's rights but ignore household dynamics that, in many instances, are ideologically sustained by patriarchal attitudes (Geisler, 2004; Shepherd, 2008; El Bushra & Mukarubuga, 1995).

Efforts aimed at post-conflict reconstruction can reinforce perceptions of women's gender roles and maintain the public and private spheres as separate spheres of influence and subjugation. Politicizing women's roles during and after conflict means that women's activities in the household and in public spaces are intricately intertwined. Participation in post-conflict reconstruction is rarely construed political except in certain occupations, whereas strategies geared towards resilience and survival are seen as natural extensions of women's natures during and after conflicts (El Bushra, 2007). Maintaining households or social relations through extended kin networks may be delineated as less political, despite the fact that women's activism and volunteerism through the peace process in Somaliland certainly had political consequences (El Bushra, 2007; Sorensen, 1998).

### **Civil Society Organisations and Peacebuilding**

In 2006 women accounted for twenty-four percent of civil servants, and women-led NGOs occupied the majority of civil society leadership positions in Somaliland. Women in the public sphere are certainly present in particular occupations and, since 1960, have had a long history of public service. NGOs have acted as intermediaries between weak government institutions and informal social networks to provide ad hoc services in education, healthcare, livelihood strategies and platforms for advocacy. This is a general trend of NGOs and civil society organizations that occupy an ambivalent role in conflict and post-conflict settings (Paffeholz, 2009, as cited in Chetail, 2009). Traditionally, peacebuilding as a discourse sees the strengthening of civil society as a part of democratization by which association in civil society can help accrue social capital in the interests of neoliberal state building (Richmond, 2008; Pouligny, 2005). This has certainly been true of peacebuilding efforts organized by the international community, whose

hopes of reconstituting the Somali state attest to the belief that though civil society is often seen as oppositional and independent of the state, such is rarely the case when peacebuilding remains state centric (Chetail, 2009).

Civil society and NGOs led by or focused on women have largely been grassroots efforts in Somaliland, and strict definitions vis-à-vis their relationship to the state is difficult to ascertain. Instead, considering the length of the Somali conflict and the absence of formal recognition for Somaliland, civil society organizations are best understood by examining what they do rather than what they say their mission is. This often includes providing security in the initial aftermath of conflict, providing basic social services, and harnessing informal and professional networks (Helander, 2005). Distinctions made between formal and informal networks and associations collapse in the face of Somaliland's attempts at post-conflict reconstruction. Leaders of women-focused NGOs derive personal and collective influence from their work. As Tripp (2005) notes, women's issues have the potential to be politicized through discourses and subjective identifications with gendered roles, such as "mother" or "caregiver."

Hilhorst and Leeuwen (2005) add another dimension to the discussion of civil society in peacebuilding by illustrating that the term "peacebuilding" often refers solely to NGOs and ignores other kinds of networks that serve similar functions, such as trade unions, community organizations, and traditional leadership institutions. Through their research on NGOs involved in peace work in Southern Sudan, they highlight that these NGOs often weave formal and informal networks, activities, and subjectivities throughout their work. It becomes difficult in that regard to understand the role of NGOs in peacebuilding solely through their peace-related activities. Other factors become relevant—including how membership in these NGOs fosters a sense of belonging and comradeship for women engaged in peace work.

Helander (2005) notes that the political culture of Somali civil society means activists rely on a host of subjective and fluid identities; as such, it becomes difficult to disassociate informal and formal networks of cooperation and interests. Consequently, vital questions in terms of political representation for women are: To what extent, if any, do women parliamentarians or civil society leaders represent the interests of poor, illiterate women? To what extent are women exclusively the constituents of these leaders? In what way do they view their positions and the obstacles they face? What subjectivities do they draw upon to construct legitimacy for their roles? In what ways do women-focused NGOs harness informal networks similar to the peace movements of the early 1990s?



Organized by several women's groups in the early 1990s, the largest women's-focused NGO in Somaliland is Nagaad-Umbrella Organization. The motivation to sustain a women's movement aimed at enhancing decision making for women in general became a primary focus for Nagaad. The leaders of these NGOs are educated women and urban elites with the capacity to utilize discourses on women's rights and adapt them to the context of Somaliland's women. Political participation has been described according to its normative ascriptions within these NGOs and includes advocating for greater political representation across all levels of governance (local and national).

Women's inclusion in peace processes is meant to serve as a precursor to participation in democratic institutions, according to UN Resolution 1325. Countless examples exist and it is recognized that women's experiences across many African countries through mass mobilization have led to a rise in political participation and representation particularly in the 1990s (Tripp, 2001; Parpart&Staudt, 1989). Although women's rights are entrenched in the constitution of Somaliland, women are conspicuously absent from many leadership positions in local councils and national bodies. Women's contributions to Somaliland's democratic ambitions encounter obstacles of representation that stem from a lack of experience in positions of authority, illiteracy, economic opportunities, and clan-based political parties. In many ways, the public sphere as the sanctioned political domain is weakened by the presence of the kind of work women's-focused NGOs engage in, but women are also actively engaged in discursively shaping the public domain itself.

## **Conclusion**

Somaliland women's contributions to peacebuilding in Somaliland underscore the need to incorporate more women into formal political processes and institutions of the state. The impact of conflict on gender roles, and the need to prioritize social reconstruction alongside political and economic reconstruction, indicates that women's new roles in the public sphere may conflict with prevailing cultural norms premised on clan politics and Islamic moral edicts. Neither of the two contradicts in principle women's gains in the public sphere, and women's contributions vary, as demonstrated by the fact that many cite maintaining households as a reason for seeking gainful employment outside the household. Women have been integral to sustainable peace initiatives and to shaping peacebuilding both as a program and as a discourse. As Somaliland celebrates its twentieth anniversary as a self-declared Republic, reflecting on its gains includes affording women prominence in its political history and future development priorities.

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# Self-determination and Legitimacy in Somaliland

Brandon Payne

*Brandon Payne is a native of California, USA. He graduated from the University of Notre Dame, USA, with a degree in Economics and Peace Studies. He has worked on Capitol Hill in Washington DC and volunteered in Haiti and the Philippines. He lives in Hargeisa, Somaliland, where he manages the English Department at the University of Hargeisa.*

## Introduction

As a *de facto* independent state, Somaliland enjoys popular support and a free hand in most of its activities. However, a lack of official recognition from the international community inhibits its ability to fully engage with other nations. While Somaliland's independence claim is impeded by internal and external factors, I argue that Somaliland has a politically and philosophically legitimate claim to secession and statehood and counterarguments to its right to independence have five fatal flaws.

## Self-determination

In 1951 philosopher Hans Kohn wrote that, "Nationalism is first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness" (Kohn, 1951, p. 8). By establishing a new political community in the wake of civil war and social breakdown, the people of Somaliland asserted their consciousness as a new nation. Their new nation, however, did not sprout from nothing. Instead, it resulted from a long train of abuses and usurpations perpetuated against its people.

With a separate colonial history, a separate economy, a separate approach to governance, and a separate consciousness, Somaliland no longer bears any resemblance to the anarchy that is southern Somalia. Yet, the strong contrast between Somaliland and the rest of cartographic Somalia is not enough to warrant independence outright. Countries throughout the world have regions of various stability and fortune. Essential to Somaliland's independence claim is the legitimacy of the political project itself. That legitimacy is founded in self-determination and manifests itself in democratic institutions.

When advocates of Somaliland make a case for international recognition it enhances their argument if the government is seen as a democratic government of the people. Historically, this has not been a requirement for inclusion in the international community; however, the international community's rhetorical emphasis on democracy means that it is politically useful for an aspiring nation

to be democratic. Of the successful secession (not anti-colonial) movements in the post-World War II era, all but Bangladesh maintained some semblance of democracy through, at the very least, a national referendum for independence. Yet, self-determination is predicated on more than just democratic institutions; it represents a natural and legitimate right of citizens over their own sovereignty. This belief emerged from the Enlightenment and has embedded itself in modernity.

The United Nations (UN) case for self-determination is laid out in the December 1960 “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People,” which states, “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status.”

The UN Charter of 1945 also specifically mentions self-determination. Article 1(2) speaks of the “develop[ment] [of] friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” Article 73(b) clearly advocates for the political aspiration of nations when it states that UN members are obligated “to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions.” Additionally, article 21(3) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states unequivocally that, “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government.”

Even before these UN documents, self-determination of people was a popular principle among politicians and philosophers. The Montevideo Convention of 1933 determined that, “Even before recognition the state has the right...to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts.”

In his Fourteen Points (1918), American President Woodrow Wilson sought an establishment of international order “based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.”

French philosopher Ernest Renan (1896) contended that the “will of nations is then the only legitimate criterion” for deciding issues of governance and “if anyone has a right to be consulted in such an affair, it is the inhabitants” of the territory in question (p. 82).

In the American Declaration of Independence Thomas Jefferson asserted that, “Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”

Much earlier, in the mid-seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes (1930) championed self-determination as a human right when he discussed the “commonwealth by institution.” In this situation, men voluntarily agreed amongst themselves to submit to an assembly “on confidence to be protected against all others”—an alternative to the “commonwealth by acquisition” achieved by a dictator through the use of force (p. 340). Following this tradition, Somaliland’s independence claims are embedded in popular sovereignty rather than the authoritarian use of force.

The union of the two Somalilands in 1960 violated the UN “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People,” which defends maintaining colonial boundaries: “Any attempt at partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” Somaliland was a recognized country, and the Italian colony was a recognized country; the union between the two totally disrupted their territorial integrity and forced a national unity that had no basis in history or popular thought. Yet, this was ignored by the United Nations and even by other African nations who considered—and continue to consider—colonial borders inviolable.

Defending the union of the two Somali nations by arguing that two sovereigns can opt out of maintaining colonial boundaries to enter a union also suggests that the sovereigns can opt out of the union to maintain colonial boundaries. Indeed, there are examples of the international community recognizing this very practice.

A 2003 report from the South Africa Department of Foreign Affairs advises that “Somaliland had not only been a separate colonial unit but actually a separate independent state...which makes Somaliland’s case unique and special as a legal justification for secession when things have not worked out” (Lujiza, 2003, p. 6). Somaliland’s former independence gives it claim to being a successor state rather than simply an independence movement, as has been the case in other parts of the world. In Africa, the Lujiza report notes that historically the Organization of African Unity “permitted states to retrieve their sovereignty following their unsuccessful union” (p. 6). When the United Arab Republic dissolved in 1961, the international community accepted that Syria and Egypt were again independent. When French Sudan and Senegal united as Mali, the international community accepted their split only a year later. Senegal and Gambia formed Senegambia in 1980, then parted ways in 1989. Similarly, after the Cold War, successor state claims were a key factor in reestablishing the independence of former Yugoslav Republics and Soviet Socialist Republics. Political scientist Henry Srebrnik (2004) asserts that, “Certainly, in terms of international law, Somaliland has a stronger case to qualify for statehood than did Bosnia-Herzegovina following

the dissolution of Yugoslavia” (p. 225). Yet, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been a UN member since May 22, 1992.

The objection to these historical precedents is that the nations who were giving up control of the territories voluntarily relinquished them. The counter to this objection is that there is no power-wielding government (even if there is a recognized government) in Mogadishu to grant Somaliland’s independence. However, the United Nations and the African Union now claim that Somaliland has no right to remove itself from the doomed union. The international bodies argue that union should be maintained regardless of political and economic realities in cartographic Somalia.

Philosophically, this argument is supported by the belief that the mutually agreed-upon union was legitimate and Somaliland’s unilateral bid for independence is illegitimate. This position: (a) misunderstands the injustice and illegitimacy of the 1961 referendum and the Somali government that followed it; (b) disregards the self-determined legitimacy of the present Somaliland government; (c) unnecessarily fears setting a precedent for secession movements; (d) makes the assumption that ethnic unity automatically brings national unity; and (e) fails to recognize the impossibility and illegitimacy of reintegrating Somaliland with the rest of Somalia.

### **Legitimacy and united Somalia**

If the right to self-determination ensures that a people freely determine their political status, then the self-determination of Somaliland was denied in the formation of the Somali Republic in 1960 and 1961. Despite the willingness of the leadership in British Somaliland to enter into a union with Italian Somaliland, the public sentiment in the British territory never favored union. In British Somaliland the constitutional referendum was not only defeated but also boycotted on the grounds that voting implicitly accepted the authority of Mogadishu. The referendum only passed because the population in Italian Somaliland had a large enough electoral advantage to carry the vote (Shinn, 2002).

Despite pride in the selection of British Somalilander Mohammed Egal as Defense Minister, “in Somaliland enthusiasm for the union began to wane as people were confronted with its consequences” (Bradbury, 2008, p. 33). When the British Somaliland leaders of the attempted December 1961 coup were exonerated on grounds that a Mogadishu court had no jurisdiction over Somalis from the former British territory, supporters of Somaliland’s independence claimed legal vindication. While the constitutional referendum



had passed because of overwhelming support in Italian Somaliland, the judge in the treason case noted that the legislature in Hargeisa had never approved the Act of Union passed by Mogadishu. Without legislative approval the executive leaders in British Somaliland rushed into the union believing in the irredentist claims to a pan-Somali state that would include the French colony and parts of Kenya and Ethiopia.

While Somaliland's executive leaders (who were chosen by the British) accepted this scheme, it never became a reality and two expansionist wars with Ethiopia failed to acquire any of the historic Somali territory in the Ogaden. Feeling misled and disillusioned by the abusive mechanics of integrating the colonies, Somalilanders began to question the legality of the union and continued to do so during the drive to independence in 1991 (Rajagopal & Carroll, 1992). The pan-Somali failure and "the experience of alienation felt by many Isaq meant that a united nation was no longer seen as an attractive or advantageous option" by 1991 (Bradbury, 2008, p. 81).

In spite of their subjugation, as well as the assertion in the UN Declaration that, "The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights," the UN has continuously refused to entertain the possibility of a two-state solution in cartographic Somalia. While some might object to describing Mogadishu's rule as "alien subjugation," history clearly shows that Somalilanders (taking pride in Somali culture) considered any and all outsiders to be alien, whether British or African. There is no dispute that the North was dominated and exploited during the union. The domination and exploitation of the North are best summed up in a 1990 Africa Watch report which documents government seizure of imported goods without compensation, unfair trade policies targeted at the North, and a lack of investment in livestock production, agriculture, industry and infrastructure in the North (Africa Watch Committee, 1990).

The electoral rejection by Somalilanders of the constitution of the misbegotten political marriage between the two Somali colonies highlights the illegitimacy of the marriage from the beginning. The government in Mogadishu had no legitimacy in the North because "the rule-maker must act under a grant of power from a legitimate source, one formally authorized by constitution or statute. If no law granted an official power to make regulations,

whatever rule the official promulgated would remain illegitimate” (Seidman and Seidman, 2006, p. 46). The authorization to govern British Somaliland came not from the people of British Somaliland (who never approved the Act of Union) but from Somalis in the South, who maintained control through a military state for 22 of the next 30 years.

The marriage failed not just because of Mogadishu’s lack of legitimacy in the North, but also because of its poor governance. As African states were receiving independence from European colonizers, Immanuel Wallerstein (1961) warned that, “Unless the power [in new countries] is effectively exercised by a central agency, and unless the rules of the power game are generally accepted by all the competitors, disintegration and secession become not merely possible but probable” (p. 85). This admonishment perfectly predicts the Somali situation. Power was not effectively exercised by the original Somali government in Mogadishu facilitating Mohammed SiadBarre’s easy military coup in October 1969. The overthrow of Barre’s government by a coalition of all Somali factions in 1991 epitomized the ineffectiveness of his government. For Somalis, the Barre regime was not only ineffective at moving the country past a failed economic model based on Cold War patronage but its increasingly brutal violence against opposition, especially in the North, eliminated any popular support as the public realized that “the rules of the power game” served the regime and not the people.

Cornell Law Professor MunaNdulo (2006) notes that “the mark of good governance consists, above all else, in its effect in nurturing and promoting the best qualities in the people—the habits of obedience to government as the constituted authority...the redress of grievances...the quality of public spiritedness and patriotism in matters affecting the interests of the community” (p. 3). The Barre government achieved none of these, nor did it keep the basic infrastructure functioning. There was little obedience to a government seen as an unconstitutional authority. Redress of grievances was a novel idea under a regime that routinely executed political opponents and even the Catholic bishops of Mogadishu. Patriotism in the North never rested with Mogadishu, partly because Somalis are intensely clannish but more importantly because there was never a reason for northern Somalis to take pride in the violence-prone and dysfunctional Mogadishu government which consistently treated them as second class citizens.

Following the collapse of the Barre government in 1991 many Somalilanders began to fear “that maintaining a relationship with Mogadishu would lead to a repeat of the persecution they had suffered under the military government”

(Bradbury, 2008, p. 81). "By the time the SNM met in Burao in April 1991 [at the Grand Conference of the Northern Peoples] to chart a course for the future, the outcome was practically a foregone conclusion" (Bryden, 1994, p. 36). The destruction of cities in Somaliland was seen by fighters returning from the south, and with the realization that the United Somali Congress "government" in Mogadishu had no ability to exercise control over Somaliland, the popular sentiment for independence was galvanized. Somaliland reasserted its independence on May 18, 1991 in a vote of elders representing the clans of the northern people.

### **Legitimacy of the Present Somaliland Government**

The struggles of the 1990s eventually produced a Somaliland government that is a constitutional democracy. The constitution, which passed with nearly ninety-eight percent of the vote in a May 2001 referendum, lays out the basic laws for the country (Bradbury, 2008). There is a bicameral legislature, an executive branch and "supreme court."

As stipulated in the constitution, there are only three political parties in Somaliland and none can be based on religion, region or kinship. This requirement forced the six contenders in the December 15, 2002 district elections to form cross-clan alliances. The three parties with the highest number of votes in the district elections were allowed to form national parties and to contest in the parliamentary and presidential elections. Election observers from Europe and South Africa declared the first election under Somaliland's constitution "transparent, free from intimidation and, by and large, in line with internationally recognized electoral norms. They also noted the high participation of women voters" (Bradbury, 2008, p. 189).

The presidential election in 2003 was contested by the Kulmiye opposition leader Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud "Silanyo" all the way to the supreme court (the margin of victory was 80 votes, later recertified as 214 votes). After the court settled in favor of appointed incumbent Dahir Riyale, Silanyo called for peaceful cooperation rather than violence. He was reflecting the will of the public, which "made clear its opposition to violence as a way of dealing with the issue" (Bradbury, 2008, p. 210).

Despite urgings from advisors to form an alternative government, Silanyo refused, pointing to the feud between United Somali Congress generals Ali Mahdi Muhammad and Muhammad Aidid in Mogadishu in 1991 as a cautionary tale of the enduring chaos that power struggles can create. International observers representing a number of international NGOs came

from South Africa, Ethiopia, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Canada and the United Kingdom. The election was considered in accord with international standards and received high marks, despite some regional irregularities (Bradbury, 2008).

Silanyo's courage to step down and avert a crisis reflected his resolve to establish strong and ethical leadership in Somaliland. Silanyo's choice emboldened the people of Somaliland and increased their pride in the effectiveness of the political system which they ratified. This reaffirming result is a logical consequence of true democracy, according to Democracy International co-founder Eric Bjornlund (2010): "In a true democracy, the rule of law, democratic political institutions, and independent civil society organizations help ensure respect for electoral outcomes. These institutions and values in turn bolster people's faith in their governments and their willingness to support peaceful political transitions" (p. 5).

Valerie Bunce (2010) has warned that, "In many new democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa...electoral competition has not ensured accountability" (p. 9). If such is the case, Somaliland is an outlier. Not only have its elections been certified as free and fair by international observers but politicians have been held accountable. Silanyo easily defeated Riyale in their June 2010 rematch and enjoys wide support among Somalilanders.

Silanyo's restraint and victory also represent the fundamental stability of political institutions in Somaliland. They rely not on strong personalities so much as a common belief in the progress of the nation and a commitment to its system.

History shows that no modern Somali movement—religious or secular, political or apolitical—can last without strong and consistent leadership. The Salihiya resistance to British colonizers in the early twentieth century ceased with the death of the poet laureate and guerilla leader Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan, known to the world as the "Mad Mullah of Somalia" though he operated in British Somaliland (Lewis, 2008). The public execution of ten clerics in 1975 eliminated political Islamic movements in Somalia and ended their challenge to the "Godless socialists" of the Somali dictatorship (Le Sage 2001; Abdullahi, 2007, p. 44). Facing "widespread insurrection initiated by the tribes and powerbrokers," the Somali government infrastructure imploded with the removal of President Mohammed SiadBarre from Mogadishu in January 1991 (Shay 2008, p. 8). The tentative stability achieved in the summer of 1991 by the insurgent United Somali Congress was destroyed by the infighting of rebel Generals Ali Mahdi Muhammad and Muhammad Farah

Aidid (Shay, 2008; Lewis, 2008). The Somali National Alliance, which attempted to replace the collapsed government after the Battle of Mogadishu, failed after the murder of Muhammad Farah Aidid in 1996. Al-Ittihad al-Islaami dissolved when Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys sought new opportunities with the Union of Islamic Courts (International Crisis Group, 2005). The Union of Islamic Courts was vanquished not only by the Ethiopian army but by the surrender and disappearance of its leadership—most notably, then-UIC military commander and current president of the Transitional Federal Government, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, who surrendered himself to Kenyan authorities in late 2006.

Somaliland breaks free from this tradition of failed leadership and institutions. It has endured the death of a president, Mohammed Egal, and the electoral defeat of a president-to-be, Silanyo. Compared to the historical record, the resilience of Somaliland's political institutions is noteworthy. These political institutions also enjoy more popular support—and thus make a greater claim to legitimacy by right of self-determination—than any previous government in the region.

### **Secession and Precedents**

Hesitation toward recognizing the independence of Somaliland rests in part on fears that recognition for the region would spark secessionist movements across the continent. However, the report of a 2005 African Union fact-finding mission to Somaliland recognized the abuse suffered by Somalilanders and their special situation: "Going by the clear presentation and articulate demands of the authorities and people of Somaliland concerning their political, social and economic history, Somaliland has been made a 'pariah region' by default. The Union established in 1960 brought enormous injustice and suffering to the people of the region." The Somaliland case is "unique and self-justified in African political history," the authors continue. "Objectively viewed, the case should not be linked to the notion of 'opening a Pandora's Box.' As such, the AU should find a special method of dealing with this outstanding case" (African Union Commission, 2005, p. 4). Analysts who have examined the possible precedents set by the recent independence of Kosovo have also dismissed the Pandora's Box theory of independence movements (Vermeulen, 2006). Indeed, South Sudan's independence referendum and subsequent admission to the United Nations failed to produce a plethora of formerly reticent secession movements.

## **Nationalism**

Despite the political and economic success of Somaliland (it has often been described as a phoenix rising from the ashes of civil war), the irredentist claims which were originally used to inspire a pan-Somali state including the British and Italian territories are still used to justify Somaliland's reintegration with the warring South. However, this prospect ignores the realities of Somaliland's psychology and remarkable achievements. By promoting a reunion based solely on the affiliation of ethnicity, supporters of reunification are suggesting "a kind of primordial right, analogous to that of the divine right of kings" whereby irredentist claims supersede the self-determined destiny of the Somaliland people, who see themselves as irrecoverably independent (Renan, p. 70). The absurdity of the pan-Somali position is even repudiated by the African Union, whose members have always found "their stability in asserting the validity of [colonial] borders and reject any attempt to recarve borders on the grounds of ethnic nationality" (Wallerstein, 1967, p. 76).

National unity requires more than ethnic, religious, linguistic or cultural homogeneity. Renan described the essential quality of a nation as "a living soul, a spiritual principle" (p. 80). This principle is based on the "common possession of a rich heritage of memories" and the "desire to live together" (Ibid). In Somaliland this heritage of memories is apparent in the attitudes of the people and the public display of war relics and Somaliland flags. The desire to live together is apparent in the effectiveness of its political institutions. Ibrahim Hashijama (2009), who lived in Somaliland as a boy and now practices law in England, writes of elections in Somaliland: "The enthusiasm with which all Somalilanders embraced campaigning and elections was amazing. It is particularly gratifying to see that, after two decades of dictatorship, Somalilanders are equally, if not more so, enthusiastic about the electoral process and the participation in the recent voter registration exercise surpassed all expectations" (p. 6).

The national solidarity and success of democratic political institutions in Somaliland serves to legitimate the government therein; just as the lack of democratic political institutions and national solidarity in the South has delegitimized all governments therein since 1969 (Marx, 2005).

According to Weber (1978), "Nation is...not identical with the people of a state," nor is nation "identical with a community speaking the same language... above all, national solidarity may be linked to memories of a common political destiny with other nations" (p. 923). For Somalilanders that common political destiny is a separate political destiny from the rest of cartographic

Somalia. The youngest generation in Somaliland has grown up knowing *de facto* independence and nothing else. They have no personal solidarity with the TFG in Mogadishu or other factions in cartographic Somalia. If one asks young people in Hargeisa to name their nationality, the answer, without fail, will be that they are Somalilanders. Among some people—young and old—the Somaliland identity is so strong that the term “Somalilander” has been adopted as the preferred ethnic term as well.

### **Reintegration of Somaliland and Somalia**

Forcing Somalilanders to submit to the wills of an ineffective government in Mogadishu would be tantamount to enslaving their political future to a foreign power (not unlike the first unification or British colonial rule). Not only does that reality contravene the spirit of law set forth by the United Nations and the African Union, but it is a practical impossibility. Somaliland has consistently refused to participate in peace talks with leaders from Mogadishu under the same principle that led to a boycott of the 1961 referendum: engaging with Mogadishu implicitly accepts its authority.

Somaliland’s avoidance of peace conferences involving representatives from Mogadishu even extended to a Congressional hearing in Washington DC. United States Representative Donald Payne, a Democrat from New Jersey, invited Somaliland Foreign Minister Abdillahi Mohamed Duale to appear before the House Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health on June 25, 2009. Chairman Payne also invited Mohamed Omaar, TFG Foreign Minister, and Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Mohamud, President of Puntland, to the hearing titled “Somalia: Prospects for Lasting Peace and a Unified Response to Extremism and Terrorism.” Duale initially accepted the invitation before reversing course and requesting a separate hearing, which was denied.

Cold hostility between Somaliland, Puntland and the TFG, as well as the TFG’s limited capacity and expiring mandate, indicate that mediated reunification of cartographic Somalia is highly unlikely.

The only other option would be reintegration by military force. That method of control was used for decades by the dictator Mohammed Siad Barre to oppress all opposition, not just the independence-minded agitators in Somaliland. The ultimate result of more than two decades of military rule is the present quagmire: growing Islamic militias with connections to al-Qaeda control much of the South; pirates roam the seas drawing the ire and the navies of governments around the world; millions are displaced and dependent on food aid. A future attempt at reintegration by military force would yield even more devastating effects, especially on civilians.

The willingness of Somaliland's leaders to defend their country—through violence if necessary—is indisputable. Former Somaliland President Mohammed Ibrahim Egal outlined the attitude of the Somaliland government on armed resistance to forced integration: “Our arms have been repaired and are kept clean. We are ready to defend our independence. If they try to come here from Mogadishu to force us back, we will bury them here” (Bryden, 1994, p. 40). There is no reason to believe that Egal was bluffing and indeed the government spends more on its military and security operations than any other part of its budget. Today, Somaliland's forces number 16,000 men.

### **Conclusion**

Somaliland has a strong political and philosophical case for recognized independence; its remaining impediments to realizing that goal are external and internal.

External impediments are geopolitical concerns that seek to marginalize the region. Through its limited diplomatic ability Somaliland may reduce these impediments, but without significant patronage and assistance from an influential country such efforts appear futile in the near future.

Internal impediments include a weak state apparatus that fails to fulfill the obligations reserved for states. In particular, the government of Somaliland fails to exercise a “monopoly on the legitimate use of force” within its claimed territory as outlined by Weber (1946, p. 117) and later Tilly (1985, p. 171). Its powers for state making and extraction prove relatively weak: the state is unable to eliminate rivals in eastern regions and limited in its ability to raise revenue. Somaliland also suffers a blow from the requirement laid forth at Montevideo that a “person of international law” should possess a defined territory. Border disputes with Puntland and the SSC must be settled before meeting this criterion of accepted territorial integrity (on this point, the colonial border supports Somaliland's claim; however, abdicating territory in exchange for peace seems a plausible and worthwhile political decision). Additionally, Somaliland has significant civil liberty problems and unspoken clan issues that need to be resolved before it can be considered a liberal democracy.

Tackling these external and internal deficiencies are the remaining tasks to convince Somaliland's skeptics, who have little recourse to disagree about the region's political and philosophical foundations.



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# **Somalia and state-building: state capacity or state autonomy? A critical review of how to decolonize African studies**

Debora Valentina Malito

*Debora Valentina Malito is a PhD candidate in Political studies, Graduate School in Social and Political Studies, University of Milan. She holds a BA in Economics and Social Science at the University of Calabria, 2005, and an MA in International Relations at the University of Milan, 2007. Her research focus on Somalia is the persistence of state disintegration within the international and regional context. Additional research interests include the international dimension of the statehood crisis; global and regional intervention in conflict resolution; and the Horn of Africa and global war on terror.*

## **Abstract**

Why did internationally driven state-building fail in Somalia? While the academic discourse on state-building tends to exclusively focus on endogenous dynamics, decision making tends to neglect the international dimension of state-building. External efforts at state-building failed in Somalia because of their intrinsic top-down nature. This paper explains why the capacity-oriented approach is insufficient to answer and resolve the question of state instability. It also presents alternative ways to conceptualize state collapse, based on an analysis of historical and economic forms of domination. The purpose of this article is to contribute to a critical rethinking of the mainstream approaches that inform state-building in the contemporary era.

## **Introduction**

The breakdown of the former republic of Somalia has become the paradigm of complete state collapse in the contemporary era (Menkhaus, 2003; Lewis, 1994; Rotberg, 2004). Since the fall of SiadBarre's government in January 1991, Somali territory has been embroiled in permanent civil war: all international efforts to manage and resolve the conflict have failed, and international intervention has left Somalia in a more disastrous situation (Leyne, 2000). In 1993, armed Somali fighters shot down two U.S. Blackhawk helicopters, signaling the defeat of the U.S. military in Mogadishu, and prompting a consequent withdrawal of American forces from the country.

The defeat not only resulted from the complete departure of UN peacekeeping mission from Somalia, but also required a critical rethinking of peacebuilding operations (Hansen & Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 2001). Since 1991, various efforts have been made to restore Somalia, but the international community's repeated attempts at state-building have failed in large parts of the country (Shinn, 2010). The international intervention

failed to pacify the country (Laitin, 1999), and failed to reinforce or create an institution of government.

The only successful responses to this problem of sovereignty have emerged from local projects of state-building, which transformed the territorial order on a sub-regional basis, as represented by the self-proclamation of the independent Republic of Somaliland in 1991, and the declaration of Puntland as an autonomous region.

This paper aims to answer one basic question: Why did internationally driven state-building fail in Somalia? This paper also highlights a fundamental hypothesis:

External efforts at state-building failed in Somalia because of their intrinsic top-down nature. This failure is not so much due to the way in which institution-building has been implemented as to its ontological foundation. The success of state-building, then, is not only a question of how it is enforced, but also how it is conceived. In order to demonstrate this statement, it is necessary to analyze the factors that led up to a state-building process, or, in other words, the statehood crisis that preceded it.

This article holds a fundamental, epistemological orientation, arguing that any event concerning the life and death of the state (formation, deformation, integration and disintegration) needs to be evaluated inside its appropriate historical and international context (Tilly, 1975). The purpose of this article is to contribute on a critical rethinking of the mainstream approaches informing state-building in the contemporary era.

This paper begins with the position that state stability does not merely depend on the ability of the single state to develop an effective governance (in Weberian terms); stability also depends on the relative position assumed by single states within the entire international system (Frank, 1975), and the impact of external pressures on the internal mechanism of state consolidation. A capacity-building approach is not sufficient in order to recreate or revitalise a stable structure of government.

This paper is divided into four parts: the first presents the problem of Somalia's sovereignty within the regional context. The second section presents the theoretical foundation for state collapse analysis. This review shows that state-capacity is insufficient for answering and resolving the question of state instability. The third section explains why, empirically, the international dimension of statehood does matter in the Horn of Africa.

The fourth part examines the international dimension of state instability, focusing on two macrofactors necessary to explain the statehood's crisis: the historical and economic forms of domination. A final section concludes that as long as the problem of African statehood is exclusively conceived as a capacity-problem, there will be no suitable solution that can be provided in order to resolve the statehood crisis.

### **The Somali case: between state fragility and state-building**

Somalia's process of state disintegration and integration is one of the more relevant topics within the contemporary international arena. This is mainly because the Horn of Africa is a strategic region in crisis, and, furthermore, because Somalia has directly undermined the credibility of the international community's ability to manage the statehood crisis (Cliffe, 1999).

Despite the general failure of the international community to manage the Somali crisis (Marchal, 2011), international actors continue to propose solutions and paths toward development, because the international commitment to state-building has become the "chief issue for global politics" (Fukuyama, 2005). The current formula of sovereignty rehabilitation is represented by the development of institutions and state-building through the creation of governance capacities. In past decades, state-building has become the prominent analytical and ontological paradigm designed to overcome problems linked to political development in African countries (Mengisteab&Daddieh, 1999). State-building, the most famous variant of institutional building, can be defined as the external attempt to build or reinforce institutions (Zartman, 1995).

Institution-building is a keyword on the agendas of international organizations that favour good governance as instrument of stabilization. Institution-building is a peculiar aspect of a broader process of capacity development (Blagescu& Young, 2006), a complex and multilevel (economic, social and political) practice intended to improve state governance by focusing on the creation or expansion of institutions and technical skills. Contrary to the concept of state formation, which is mainly an endogenously driven mechanism, state-building encompasses a variety of exogenous strategies (e.g., military occupation, peacekeeping, national reconstruction, foreign aid) aimed to develop governance.

Since 1991, several efforts aiming at reconciliation and state-building have been pursued in Somalia. Considering the outcomes of two major initiatives – the 2000 Arta process and the 2004 Mbgathi process – it appears that a

relevant threat to the accomplishment of their respective purposes was caused by the interference of several international pressures.

In May 2000, Djibouti proposed an initiative aimed to promote a bottom-up, building-block approach. Egypt, Libya, Eritrea and the Gulf states supported this Arta process, an expression of the centralised-approach and the Arab consensus, which both influenced Somalia's peace process. The conference of Arta established the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG), but it did not enjoy the support of the other regional administrations in Somaliland and Puntland. Military leaders, warlords, and administrators from Somaliland and Puntland were excluded from the meeting, while all the members of the international community were present. This representation issue undermined the viability of the process and, in 2001, those opposed to this plan formed a coalition against the TNG called the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), supported by Ethiopia and United States.

The SRRC waged a violent campaign against the government, and in 2004 the TNG collapsed. A further attempt to stabilize Somalia occurred through the January, 2004, Mbgathi Peace Conference in Kenya. The conference, sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and Western allies, encouraged a building-block approach to reconciliation based on decentralization. The initiative led to the formation of a new government in October 2004, called the Transitional Federal Government. But persistent divisions among Somali and regional actors stalled the process. In addition, the initiative clashed with the emergence and increasing popularity of a new political party in Mogadishu, the Islamic Courts Union.

Since 2000, diplomatic antagonism during peace talks has undermined Somalia's reconciliation process (Menkhaus 2003). Alternative diplomatic initiatives, based on rival state-building approaches, were attempting to orient Somalia's reconstruction on different policy trajectories: Ethiopia and Western actors encouraged a building-block approach based on decentralization, while competing Arab initiatives (sponsored by Egypt, Eritrea and the Arab League) supported a centralized approach.

Despite the political and theoretical emphasis place on it, state-building has had, in practice, very limited success in resolving the crisis. During the post-Cold War period, UN peacekeeping operations intended to enhance state-building mechanisms have achieved negative results. The failure of the UN in Somalia (Unosom) and Angola (Unavem, Monua), and its relative failure in Cambodia (Untac), have prompted a general rethinking of the UN's role in managing current crises (Gizelis&Kosek, 2009). The subsequent US-led state-

building initiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan marked the definitive failure of international efforts at state-building, and entailed more critical rethinking of the legitimacy and effectiveness of exporting democracy.

### **Theoretical foundations: capacity-oriented approach**

This paper focuses on a conceptual and empirical question: why did several efforts at state-building fail in Somalia? In order to answer this question it is necessary to answer a preceding one: why did Somalia collapse? Conventional wisdom suggests that the Somali conundrum is explained by its *capacity gap*, involving the inability of a clan-based society to provide the basis for a modern state (Shultz, 1995; Lewis, 1994). Mainstream interpretations of the Somali war as a barbarian conflict affected by clan rivalries also colored discourse about the state, and obscured the very important issue at the heart of the contemporary, enduring crisis: the political conflict for state power.

The major debate, concerning the evolution of post-colonial states, has developed as African states have become potential subjects of state failure (Krasner & Pascual, 2005). Since the early 1990s, state failure has received some attention by policymakers, but since September 11, 2001 and the beginning of the Global War on Terror, this topic has been of increasing interest to academics and the public (Rice & Patrick, 2008; Bruton, 2010). Weakness, failure, fragility and collapse have become common terms used and abused inside academic circles (see Table 1).

### **Failure, fragility and collapse: The return of neo-colonial epistemology**

There is no general agreement amongst scholars as to whether the phenomenon of state breakdown is fomented by economic, political, or social factors, largely because the phenomenon is so complex that is produced by a variegated array of interacting factors.



Table 1. Definitions among patterns of statehood crisis (Malito 2011, p. 37)

| <b>Types of statehood crisis</b> | <b>Focus on</b>                                 | <b>Definition</b>   |
|----------------------------------|---|---|
| <b>Fragility</b>                 | Partial provision of core functions             | "A State is fragile if the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor" (DFID 2008, p.7).  |
| <b>Weakness</b>                  | Partial working of government functions         | "Countries that lack the essential capacity and/or will to fulfil four sets of critical government responsibilities: fostering an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; establishing and maintaining legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions; securing their populations from violent conflict and controlling their territory; and meeting the basic human needs of their population" (Rice & Patrick, 2008, p.3).   |
| <b>Failure</b>                   | Incompleteness<br>Lost the monopoly of violence | "Failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions. In most failed states, government troops battle armed revolts led by one or more rivals. Occasionally, the official authorities in a failed state face two or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrest, different degrees of communal discontent, and a plethora of dissent directed at the state and at groups within the state" (Rotberg 2003, p. 5).   |
| <b>Collapse</b>                  | Implosion<br>Black hole                         | "A collapsed state is a rare and extreme version of a failed state. Political goods are obtained through private or ad hoc means. Security is equated with the rule of the strong. A collapsed state exhibits a vacuum of authority. It is a mere geographical expression, a black hole into which a failed polity has fallen. There is dark energy, but the forces of entropy have overwhelmed the radiance that hitherto provided some semblance of order and other vital political goods to the inhabitants (no longer the citizens)" (Rotberg 2003, p.5). |

The literature on weak and failed states reached a certain degree of consensus, but it met three main limits (Malito, 2011): First, the negative connotation of the term *failure* inevitably reflects a normative value related to the establishment of a successful model of political development (Hagmann&Hoehne, 2009). The academic and political discourses have been polarized along a borderline between a positive (Western) and a negative (non-Western) notion of political development, which legitimizes a complete return to a neo-colonial epistemology.

Second, the use of these terms is noticeably vague – and often tautological – because they cover very different phenomena and conditions, without much apparent recognition of the variety and heterogeneity existing between state distress phenomena. In addition, each index uses several indicators. Even if indicators belong to four general groups of performances–economic, political, security and social welfare standards–each of these includes indicators that are proxies for one core aspect of state function. The proliferation of definitions and indicators leaves literature on state failure largely unconnected.

Finally, these analyses are based on a unilateral capacity model, where the lack of autonomy is not considered a source of state instability. There are few indicators that measure the problems involving the degree to which a state is autonomous. The lack of recognition given to this issue in the contemporary academic debate represents the principal obstacle to a correct analysis of state instability.

### **State-centred and socio-centred approaches**

The state-centred approach focuses on microlevel factors affecting the ability of the bureaucratic state machine to realize its objectives and functions. An array of scholars portrayed the African state as a vampire (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991), a leviathan entity (Callaghy, 1987, 1988), a patrimonial (Leftwich, 2000) and neo-patrimonial based system (Young, 2002), or a predatory-elite autocracy (Geddes, 1999; Rotberg, 2004). Other scholars emphasized warlordism both as a cause and a symptom of state disintegration, as well as a technique for building new political authority (Reno, 1998).

Rotberg (2003) contended that the destructive leadership of SiadBarre inexorably undermined the legitimacy of any future political process. The irresolution of the statehood crisis is due to a sort of original sin resulting from the first “proto-democratic, post-independence civilian governments of Somalia (that) proved to be experimental, inefficient, corrupt, and incapable of creating any kind of national political culture” (Rotberg 2003, p. 11). In

Somalia, Barre installed a personal rulership that managed and distorted Somali clan relationships. The creation of a 'Clan-klatura' (Zartman, 1995), as the criteria for the organization of governance, was the base of the divide and rule policy that encouraged clan warfare.

Other scholars view state collapse as arising primarily from the organization of society. The clan system has been characterized as the deep roots of the schismatic nature of Somali society (Samatar, 1991). Numerous scholars have focused their attention on the relationship between ethno-nationalist mobilization and conflict (Fearon&Laitin, 2003). Horowitz (2000) has advanced a psychological explanation of ethnic conflict, arguing that state collapse is determined by separatist groups reclaiming the right to separate territorial control. The idea principally focuses on inequalities in the distribution and control of resources, or divergences within the management of the core-periphery relationship between the central administrative apparatus and the marginal regions. Baker and Ausink (1996) have defined ethnic nationalism a pathology of the state, while Shultz (1995) defined Somalia as a prototype of state disintegration determined by the escalation of ethnic conflict. The author integrated the determinant of the ethnic conflict with two other elements: the existence of statehood without nationhood, and Barre's system of repression and corruption. This analysis is not particularly persuasive because it clashes with those interpretations defining Somalia as a historically homogeneous territory. In addition, ethnicity does not share a historical legitimacy able to confer it an explanatory role. Since ethnicity has been a constant feature in the history of many African political and social systems, it cannot explain variation in the level of state stability. Moreover, it has been empirically shown that ethnicity does not display a straightforward relationship to the likelihood of state failure (Bates, 2008).

The capacity-oriented perspective explains political facts in the face of the behaviour of substantial units of the international system, states, or individual decision makers. This approach is based on a methodological individualism where the state's behaviour can be explained through the analysis of individual choices of specific actors. On the contrary, this paper suggests that the key to understanding the social world is through the study of the structure of international politics. The following section explains why this dimension is empirically relevant.

### **Horn of Africa: state fragility in the regional and international context**

Although mainstream literature has long neglected the international dimension of statehood, empirical evidence suggests that the Horn of Africa has been a contentious area of the world where increasing statehood

changes have been accompanied by interstate conflicts of high intensity. International relations in the Horn of Africa are relevant for three reasons: 1) the magnitude of conflict, 2) the relationship between interstate conflict and statehood transformations, and 3) the violation of territorial boundaries.

The Horn of Africa is an exceptional conflict zone (Clapham, 1995) where there persists a long and pervasive trend of severe armed conflicts. In the period between 1946 and 2006, there have been eight interstate conflicts in Africa, 32 internal conflicts and 19 international conflicts (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Despite the fact that interstate wars have been a rarity on the African continent, among these eight interstate conflicts, two of them occurred in the Horn: the Ogaden war and the Ethiopian-Eritrean war of 1998.

On the other hand, this region is an extraordinary example of indigenous statehood formation (CalchiNovati, 1994; Clapham, 1996). The historical enmity between two asymmetric forms of statehood, the multiethnic empire and the homogeneous nation-state (CalchiNovati, 1994) was the basis of the conflict between the Ethiopian expansionist project and the Somali irredentism. Since independence, the claim to Somali-inhabited territories in neighboring countries escalated into several conflicts between Somalia and Ethiopia, a long-running guerrilla war in northeastern Kenya, and a short-lived insurgency in Djibouti.

The Horn is also the only region of the continent in which the inviolability of boundaries has been constantly violated. Eritrea's independence in 1994 was the first major secession that received an international recognition. After the collapse of the Republic of Somalia, two regions, Somaliland in the north and Puntland in the northeast, declared themselves an independent state and an autonomous region, respectively, opening the door to a territorial redefinition that currently involves other Somali regions.

While the Horn has witnessed a high level of antagonistic external relations, escalated by interstate and internationalized armed conflicts, the impact of exogenous factors has been completely overlooked by the dominant internalist approach. Mainstream research tends to emphasize the endemic nature (Krasner, 2002) of state failure, problematically focusing on singular ahistorical explanations that assign state instability both to Africa's proverbial predatory nature, and poor governance. Without doubt, state dissolution is provoked by economical (poverty, underdevelopment) and political (ethnic rivalries, elite predatory rule) factors. These are only as internal in their scale as they are international in their causation, since they have a history rooted in the political economy of the capitalist system in which states are born and

grow.

### **Theoretical foundations: autonomy-oriented approach**

The aim of this work is not to assess any heuristic primacy between endogenous and exogenous perspectives. Its main purpose is to promote a critical rethinking of the international dimension of the state, which has recently been overshadowed by mainstream, capacity-oriented interpretations.

If the problem of African statehood is exclusively conceived as a capacity problem, there will be no suitable solution that can be provided in order to resolve the statehood's crisis. The philosophical foundation of the state-building imperative tends to neglect the role assumed by international political factors in both state formation and deformation. The following section's aim is to highlight two macrofactors that are necessary to explain the statehood's crisis in Africa: the historical and economic forms of domination.

### **The historical-juridical legacy**

Many scholars have emphasized that colonialism bequeathed African states the causes of their artificiality (Clapham, 1995; Ottaway, 1999; Young, 2002). Issa-Salwe (1996) has argued that the major responsibility for the disintegration of Somali political institutions lies with the colonial powers "through the appointment of paid chiefs, the institutionalization of collective punishment, and the politicization of lineages in the new context of the colonial state" (p. 139). Jackson and Rosberg (1982) provided one of the more appropriate and adequate analyses of the state instability in Africa, arguing that juridical statehood is the primary cause of persistence of weak states in Black Africa. States are abstractions legitimized by negative sovereignty but with little empirical legitimacy: they persist in their weakness only because of the formal negative form of sovereignty.

The concept of negative sovereignty has been elaborated by the theory of quasi-states (Jackson, 1987, 1990). African states are *state by courtesy*, lacking of any empirical criteria of statehood. While they possess a juridical legitimacy, an essential international attribute, formal recognition does not correspond to effective domestic sovereignty. Quasi-states are not fully functional states; they are infused with a false legitimacy, bestowed by international community that distorted and altered the organic political development of the existing structure within Africa (Jackson, 1990).

## **Economic development**

The problem of the African state is affected by the dilemma of development. Does development concern the weak capacity of the states to advance appropriate policies for growth? Or, to the contrary, does development regard the system of international relations (and historical forms of domination) to which the African states have been subject?

Within the international political economy's debate, there have been two prominent lines of argument. The first approach posits that globalization has led to a process of increasing homogenization, and state collapse is perceived as a question of survival, or natural selection, on the street of progress. The second approach argues that the diffusion of market economy has spread increasing heterogeneity and inequality between states. This debate implies a crucial question: is political modernization a catalyst or an obstacle for political development? This debate derives from the discussion that emerged in the early 1970s between liberals and neo-Marxists, when the postcolonial state was investigated as matter of political economy. Liberal theorists and Marxists elaborated two antagonistic approaches: modernization theory on one side, and dependency on the other.

Neo-liberals have stressed homogeneity as a result of globalization process. The state's evolution depends on a conception of progress where the leading forces of modernization imitate well-developed countries. Liberals perceive the inefficiency in the evolution of state performance strictly as a capabilities deficit, or a problem of growth (Solow, 1956; Rostow, 1953). Tainter (1990) has argued that state collapse occurs when their investments in the maintenance of this social complexity diminish, while Bates (2008) suggests that societies with lower income are more likely to experience state failure when people in power have access to resources.

The neo-liberal position is based on the legacy of modernization's assumptions. Rostow's stages of economic growth constitute a linear explanation of the world based on the dichotomy of tradition and modernization, in which the term *development* connotes a direct sense of progress. The state of tradition was the starting point of any countries' evolution, and a constraint to the progress of modernity. This approach is still considered the dominant paradigm inside American political science, but it has been subject to different criticisms since the logic of this analysis is empiricist and ahistorical (Jones, 2005). The absence of historical explanations produces an excess of empiricism, where particular social conditions (poverty, conflict, authoritarianism) are taken as given, as natural social features of a particular society.

Neo-Marxism developed the major criticism to the modernization approach, affirming that the expansion of capitalism is the primary reason for uneven characteristics of states in the international system. The evolution of states depends on the central force leading the capitalist system: the accumulation of capital. This dependency school (Wallerstein, 1974; Arrighi, 1969; Frank, 1975; Amin, 1985) has interpreted the phenomena of state instability as a consequence of the development of the world-capitalist economy.

The uneven development of capitalism produces a spatial polarization between core and peripheral countries. The differences existing between performances of governance in the world are caused by the position assumed by states inside the international division of labour, where development is the primary cause of underdevelopment (Frank, 1975), and unequal exchange (the systematic transfer of surplus from peripheral to industrialized core countries) is the prominent cause of state collapse.

An evolution of the dependency's theory has been elaborated by Wallerstein inside the world-system theory. Wallerstein argues that the structure of the world economy is based on the principle of accumulation and it has expanded from its European origins to the entire globe. The world system is a social organism composed of a set of mechanisms with a single division of labour and multiple cultural systems. The ability of this approach to interpret the statehood of Third World countries derives from the structural character of the relationship existing between core and periphery: "The differential strength of the multiple states within the system is crucial to maintain the system as a whole, because strong states reinforce and increase the differential flow of surplus to the core zones" (Wallerstein, 1976, p. 241).

The neo-Marxist approach has not been without criticism, as the dependency school failed to predict the outcome of the core-periphery relationship. Meanwhile, WST has left an important vacuum in the theorization of the state (Wendt, 1987), since it tends to conceptualise the state as a derivative from its position inside the world system (Cox, 1983). Despite these constraints and the absence of a clear theory of the state able to incorporate these propositions inside a general theory, these contributions represent a good starting point to understand dynamics existing between states inside the international arena.

Quasi-states and dependency theories offer two interesting and alternative ways to conceptualise state collapse in the post-bipolar period. Why? The historical trajectories of African post-colonial states disconfirm to the

optimistic conceptions of those parts of the political theory that associated development with the process-tracing of European modernization. Both quasi-states and dependency theories are able to read the challenges of the emerging post-colonial states within their historical (economic and political) context: on one side there is a regime of negative sovereignty which conferred to Third World states a limited sovereignty. The club of strong, or Westphalian, states conditioned the entire development of the emerging states, from the domination (under colonialism) to their domestication (under neo-colonialism) and relative collapse. On the other side there is an international economic system populated by centres and peripheries, which, through their mutual interdependence sustain, the global dichotomies of development and underdevelopment, as well as stability and instability.

### **Conclusion**

Traditional theoretical approaches of the state and international relations are inadequate to deal with a number of principal aspects of state evolution and dissolution in Africa (Brown, 2006; Neuman 1998) : a reorientation of the epistemological and ontological foundation of African politology is then necessary and welcomed. The state is not independent from international pressures; African states in crisis are subject to diverse pulls and pressures as part of the process of interaction with the international system. Analyzing the African state system in terms of capability is a dangerous perspective: when the states lack the substantive autonomy to exercise governance and effectiveness inside their own territory, their performances are definitively altered. For this reason, this paper criticizes the capacity-oriented approach, opts for an international politics framework, and suggests an ontological reorientation towards the autonomy-oriented level of analysis.

State-building is not an exclusive matter of state capacity, as demonstrated by Somaliland's status. The international community refuses to recognise Somaliland's declaration of independence, even if it is a political organization able to provide effective government in a relatively stable environment. In this case, effective governance does not matter. Why is it that there are two different regimes of state capacity? When effectiveness is absent, obtaining it becomes an indispensable requisite in order to be redeemed from the conditions of weakness and failure, even if the state enjoys the formal statehood recognition. But when effective governance is present, this factor is not sufficient for a state to be recognised as a member of the international community.

Whereas the academic discourse on state-building tends to exclusively pay attention on endogenous dynamics, decision-making tends to neglect the



international dimension of state-building. The international community failed to promote a sustainable solution to Somalia's crisis because it failed to interpret the origin of the state collapse. There does not exist any genetic pathology affecting the African state (Ergas, 1986), nor are degenerative phenomena (kleptocracy, corruption, clanism, autocracy) able to prevent the formation of a modern state in Africa. International politics affects African stability (Clapham, 2002), now as in the past. If European imperialism has shifted the evolution of the African statehood, contemporary imperialism has definitively shifted the trajectory of the post-colonial era toward state failure.

This paper aimed to contribute a critical view of how state-building is conceived in its philosophical foundation. Choosing a level of analysis implies a cost-benefit calculation. I suggest choosing an international structural perspective, because the alternative microlevel perspective suffers of ethnocentrism. The capacity-oriented approach is subject to a heterogenization distortion that risks shifting the research analysis toward a comparative investigation between ideal-typical models of statehood rather than towards the explanation of the statehood's crisis.

Inside the realm of political science, this tendency to neglect the international dimension of the state has favoured the development ideology, by which African states are epiphenomena of a developmentalist malaise. This idea needs to be subverted and this paper aims to add some useful contributions to this effort:

To study Africa today is to be profoundly subversive of the tradition of African studies ... To decolonize the study of Africa is not and can not be only about Africa; it must also teach us something of late modern life (Mamdani, 2004, p. 155).

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# Urbanization and Climate Change: Changing Relationships between Cities and their Surrounding Environment

Abdullahi Mohammed Odowa

*Abdullahi Mohammed Odowa holds an MA in Natural Resources and Peace from United Nations Mandated University (UPEACE) in Costa Rica. Prior to UPEACE, he studied in Sudan and Nigeria. He is currently working with University of Hargeisa as director of Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, an institute established to disseminate the knowledge of peace and conflict studies in the region via teaching and researching on issues related to peace, security and development. Mr. Odowa has worked as head of examination unit as well as dean of students affairs of University of Hargeisa. His research interests include the nexus between environment, security and development; resources based conflicts management; peacebuilding and social reconciliation. Odowa developed two published curricula on “Environmental Change and Human Vulnerability” and “Research Methods”.*

## Introduction

Urban areas are complex, dynamic and agglomerate of the majority of the world's inhabitants and their activities. Although urban areas may contain other species, humans design, inhabit and define urban areas (McGranahan et al, 2005, p. 797). More than half of the world's population, or approximately 3.3 billion people, are estimated to live in urban areas (United Nations Population Fund, 2007).

The feedback and interaction between urban areas and global climate change is complex. Even though urban systems occupy only a small fraction of the earth's surface, cities require an inflow of ecosystem services from a much larger area. It is generally believed that urbanization contributes to climate change because rich urbanites produce more greenhouse gases than poor rural people, and as the world's population continues to urbanize, increasing emissions are expected (Ayodeji, 2009, p. 959).

In today's world, cities provide opportunities for people to improve their lives and their children's lives by allowing academics, politicians and great

innovators to meet. Furthermore, cities are home to the majority of the world's population. Cities, however, have been blamed for being one of the major drivers of global environmental change by producing huge amounts of emissions, by being the primary site of ecosystem service consumption, by polluting the environment, and by facilitating the spread of conflict and social unrest (Cities Alliance, 2007, p. 1).

By hosting concentrated groups of people and their activities, as well as other physical structures, cities tend to be warmer than surrounding rural areas. Ayodeji (2009) finds, "Recent studies have shown that there is a marked difference in temperature between the city core and adjacent rural areas. This temperature difference, which increases with city size, is usually referred to as the urban heat island" (p. 962).

Urban growth may spur innovation more than rural areas, however, potentially helping to produce future technology needed to mitigate environmental hazards such as climate change. Kahn (2006) writes, "Since cities are hotbeds of innovation, urban nations are more likely develop green technologies such as hybrid vehicles. Such technologies help to reduce greenhouse gas emissions per dollar of Gross National Products" (para. 3).

Historically, there has been a close relationship between cities and their immediate environment, as the sustainable survival of a city's population was very much dependent on the amount of natural resources available for its residents. However, modern cities and modern societies face tremendous challenges as they disassociate themselves from nature (Cities Alliance, 2007, p. 2).

## **Evolutionary Relationship between Cities and their Environment**

It is known from the literature of ancient cities that the creation, location and sustainability of a city were very much determined by the richness and closeness of its environment. However, this intimate connection does not prevent residents of those cities from degrading, and sometimes completely destroying, their immediate source of livelihood and survival (Smith, 2009).

History also teaches us that some civilizations and ancient cities failed to protect and manage their rural areas as well as their immediate surrounding environment, which supplied food and other ecosystem services. Without these services, these civilizations could not sustain themselves and disappeared altogether. This is a good indicator that the survival of a city, as



well as the well-being of its residents, is very much dependent on the well-being of its environment. As Grimm et al. (2008) found, "Even in ancient times, the excessive demands of a highly stratified urban elite led to degradation of productive landscapes and the collapse of otherwise successful societies" (p 756).

Despite the historical impacts of urbanized populations on the environment, one may argue that ancient cities impacted natural resources to a far lesser extent than today's cities. This could be due to many new phenomena, including the rapid increase of the human population, technological advancement, lifestyle pattern changes, economic growth and others.

Explaining this phenomenon, Ayodeji (2009) states:

Environmental effects due to urbanization have been observed as far back as early 18<sup>th</sup> century. Until the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, urbanization levels were too small for there to be any significant effects other than local climate and hydrologic impacts. In the 1950s, less than 30% of the world's population lived in urban areas. It is projected that by 2030, 60% of the world's population will live in cities (p. 959).

Even-though technology and globalization both create many opportunities and vast economic prosperity on the global scale, their role in global environmental change remains debatable. Both are believed to have increased the production of and demand for ecosystem services, and at the same time, facilitated their transport over far distances in a very short period of time. Both technology and globalization seem to facilitate rapid transport of environmental services from one part of the world to another.

All this became possible because of technology and globalization. Together, these factors have created an artificial nexus between urban settlers and their environment, where modern urban residents seem to dissociate themselves from natural resources. Despite the importance of environment in supplying essential services to cities, it remains last to consider when it comes measuring social development (Cities Alliance, 2007, p.7). This development, one can argue, has widened human impacts on the environment on an unprecedented global scale.

## **Urbanization and Human Population**

The world's urban population is expected to nearly double by 2050 (United Nations Population Fund, 2007). Even though this population growth is global in nature, most studies and projections suggest that it is most likely to take

place in the developing world, particularly Africa and Asia.

According to a 2006 United Nations Human Settlements Programme report:

Asia and Africa will continue to dominate the global urban growth through 2030. Currently the least urbanized regions in the world, with 39.9 per cent and 39.7 per cent of their populations living in cities in 2005, respectively, by 2030, both regions will become predominantly urban, Asia with 54.5 per cent of its population living in cities, and Africa with 53.5 per cent of its population urban. Asia alone will account for more than half of the world urban population (2.66 billion out of global urban population of 4.94 billion); and urban population of Africa (748 million) will be 2030 larger than the total population of Europe at that time (685 million). (p. 6)

This report projects increasing urbanization in Africa and Asia, regions believed to already be vulnerable to climate change and associated natural disasters. Furthermore, the biggest worry of urban expansion in these regions is that slums are becoming the predominant type of settlement. In most cities of the developing world, growing numbers of people live in very poor shelters with no sanitation, no access to clean water and without electricity, and they are believed to be vulnerable to weather-related disasters.

In Africa, as the population become more urbanized, alternative livelihoods become very limited, and the gap between the rich and poor increases. These factors might also increase the dependence of poor urban citizens on the natural resources available. According to a 2006 United Nations Environmental Programme report, "The extreme deprivation of health, education and other services as well as poor social relations makes breaking out of poverty difficult. These factors alone with the lack of opportunity available to poor people have heavy environmental costs" (p. 268).

In most of the developing world, particularly in Africa, the pattern of urbanization and growth of the urban population seem to grow in unplanned manner. This, coupled with the high level of dependence on supplies from rural areas, as well as unequal distribution of wealth, forces large numbers of rural residents to move to cities, where they end up living in poor slums with no clean water, no sanitation, and no work to support their families.

## **Cities and Climate Change**

The prevailing view is that urbanization causes a lot of environmental problems, including that of global warming which humanity confronts in

the twenty-first century (UN-Habitat, 2009, p. 5). Urbanization and changes in land use and land cover are believed to be the two main driving forces for global climate change. As McGranahan et al. (2005) found:

The importance of global trade and of global environmental burdens has grown considerably over the past two centuries, and especially in the last few decades. Urban development has been an integral part of this process; all urban centers are engaged to some degree in the production and consumption of internationally traded goods and in contributing to globally burdensome wastes such as greenhouse gases, persistent organic pollutants, and ozone-depleting substances. In general, however, global ecosystem pressures derive from the consumption and wastage undertaken to support the lifestyles of the world's more affluent residents, most of whom live in urban centers of high-income countries. (p. 816)

Cities are expanding into surrounding protected areas, as well as rural areas, at very rapid rates; this is particularly true in most developing countries, where future urban population increases are expected (UN, 2008, P. 1). Furthermore, transport systems, manufacturing industries and other huge physical structures are established to support this massive population growth, all of which have a negative impact on climate variability and environmental degradation (Cities Alliance, 2007, p.2).

Forests are among the planet's most important providers of ecosystem services. These areas have wide importance for human livelihood, as well as the world's collective biodiversity. Therefore, deforestation remains a major challenge for environmental activists and governance. Urbanization is believed to cause rapid deforestation in several ways, including through physical expansion of cities, expansion of agricultural areas required to feed ever-growing urban populations, and a high demand for wood for construction purposes.

Furthermore, when trees are lost due to rapid urbanization, the amount of carbon stored in these trees is released into the atmosphere and converts into carbon dioxide, which is believed to be one of the greenhouse gases causing global warming. The more carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, the warmer the earth's surface will be. Also, loss of trees leads to changes in the hydrological cycle, and alters the amount of water in the soil, ground and in the atmosphere.

The simplest damage urbanization can cause to nearby forests is to create edges along disturbed areas. Because edges receive more light, less water,

and tend to have different surrounding environment than the rest of the forest, they can negatively affect remaining areas of the forest, although the degree of impact may depend on the shape, location and site of the affected area of the forest.

## **Climate Change Impacts on Urban Areas**

As the sea level rises due to human-induced warming, coastal cities are expected to experience different types of natural disaster. Some have argued the 2004 tsunami in Asia and Africa, as well as Hurricane Katrina that affected New Orleans in 2005, demonstrate the significant implications of climate change on coastal cities and their populations (Kahn, 2006, para 1).

Prolonged droughts, variability of rainfall patterns, and floods are undermining sustainable food production in different parts of the world. This is particularly true in Africa, where rain-fed agriculture is widely practiced. Furthermore, the biggest concern involving food crises across the world is that in situations where a majority of citizens are hungry but a few remain unaffected, there is a likelihood of having high rates of social unrest, widespread violence, and even armed conflict (Kaplan, 1985).

Climate change and other environmental hazards may affect soil fertility, pastoralist lifestyles, and water availability and accessibility. All these factors may lead to the migration of rural populations to cities, thereby increasing the rate of urbanization, suggesting that “climate change will cause population movements by making certain parts of the world much less viable places to live” (Brown & Crawford, 2009, p. 20).

In any city, the degree of risk from weather-related disasters will be greatly influenced by the quality of housing, basic infrastructure, quality of governance, income and other adaptation policies in place. While Africa is not the main contributor to climate change itself, it is widely believed that the continent is one of the most vulnerable regions to climate change and other environmental hazards (Brown & Crawford, 2009, p.39). This is partly due to its dependence on climate –depending food production and pre-existing institutional, political, economic and social stresses facing the continent.

## **Urban Governments**

Local governments play a critical role in the adaptation to and mitigation of environmental hazards, including those posed by climate change to cities. These governments have an enormous influence on how a city is planned and developed and on its relationships with the surrounding environment.

A city cannot operate in isolation from its environment and settlements. Therefore, a sustainable city must offer security to its citizens and protection to its holy and historic places. Furthermore, a city's design should be determined by its geographical location, its people, and its relation with the nature and other environmental and cultural factors.

In 2007, the United Nations Environmental Programme reported that:  
No single recipe for managing change can be applied to all cities. Cities are affected by their location, their climate and natural features. Cities and urban settlements don't operate in isolation – they are part of a national structure, subject to central government, strengthened or limited by regional and national infrastructure, budgetary policies, development priorities, decentralization policies. To meet the urban challenges of today, and the challenges to come, appropriate management frameworks must be available, through which cities can apply innovative approaches suitable for their local circumstances.  
(pp. 2-3)

## **Conclusion**

Urban settlements in both developed and developing countries will increasingly feel the effects of the climate change, and there is growing need for governments to find ways of reducing greenhouse gas (GHC) emissions. Complex and overlapping interactions and feedbacks exist between cities and their surrounding environments. While cities are believed to emit greenhouse gases, pollute the air, and destroy protected areas and forests, climate-related hazards have negative impacts on cities and their citizens.

The outcome of the dominant notion of modernist urban planning is a city that pollutes the air, emits greenhouse gases, destroys neighborhoods and disconnects people from the natural environment that supplies their needs. We need cities that protect their residents, respect their natural resources and sustain their hinterlands that supply food, water and other ecosystem goods and services. This will require a paradigm shift from a current modernist planning mentality to a more sustainable model.

No city can be fully sustainable without a rich and healthy natural ecosystem, capable of supplying basic needs for the survival and well-being of its residents. Therefore, future urban planning should consider geographical location of cities; while prioritizing protection of the environment, holy and historic places, and culture – and strive to sustain all of these.

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# **WHY THE SOMALIA PEACE TALKS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT SOMALILAND DID DIFFERENTLY WITH REGARDS TO PEACEMAKING/PEACEBUILDING: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND**

Mahamoud Abdi Sh. Ahmed

*Mahamoud Abdi Sheikh Ahmed works for ActionAid international, Somaliland as Programme Support Coordinator and gives presentations promoting peace, lectures at Universities including the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies at University of Hargeisa. He attended the Rotary Center at the University of Bradford, England, where he finished studies an MA in conflict resolution as the first Somali Rotary World Peace Fellow in 2010. He was a team leader with the Norwegian Refugee Council in Somaliland, which provides basic education to children of displaced families; a teacher and manager and newscaster of a local TV station. Sh.Ahmed's own childhood was interrupted by inter-clan violence, forcing his family to flee to Ethiopia. Sh. Ahmed could not go to school until at the age of 14 because of the conflict. He attended his first primary class at Aw- Barre Refugee camp. He earned his first degree from Amoud Univerity in 2003; Since then he studied Journalism from Indiana University of Pennsylvania, the USA, and International Development Studies from University of Oslo, Norway before Bradford.*



## **Acronyms:**

|                |  |
|----------------|--|
| <b>AMISOM:</b> | African Union Mission in Somalia               |
| <b>ARS:</b>    | Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia      |
| <b>ICU:</b>    | Islamic Court Union                            |
| <b>IGAD:</b>   | The Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| <b>NFD:</b>    | North Frontier District                        |
| <b>ONFL:</b>   | Ogaden National Liberation Front               |
| <b>RRA:</b>    | Rahanweyn Resistance Army                      |
| <b>SAMO:</b>   | Somali Africans Muki Organization              |
| <b>SDA:</b>    | Somali Democratic Alliance                     |
| <b>SDM:</b>    | Somali Democratic Movement                     |
| <b>SNA:</b>    | Somali National Alliance                       |
| <b>SNC:</b>    | National Salvation Council                     |
| <b>SNDU:</b>   | Somali National Democratic Union               |
| <b>SNF:</b>    | Somali National Front                          |
| <b>SNM:</b>    | Somali National Movement                       |
| <b>SNU:</b>    | Somali National Union                          |
| <b>SPM:</b>    | Somali Patriotic Movement                      |
| <b>SRRC:</b>   | Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council  |
| <b>SSDF:</b>   | Somali Salvation Democratic Front              |
| <b>SSNM:</b>   | Southern Somali National Movement              |
| <b>TFG:</b>    | Transitional Federal Government                |
| <b>TNG:</b>    | Transitional National Government               |
| <b>UNITAF:</b> | Unified Task Force                             |
| <b>UNISOM:</b> | United Nations Operation in Somalia            |
| <b>USC:</b>    | United Somali Congress                         |
| <b>USF:</b>    | United Somali Front                            |
| <b>USP:</b>    | United Somali Party                            |

## **Abstract**

The central government of the Republic of Somalia collapsed in 1991. Since then, the southern part of the country has experienced bloodshed and chaos. Soon after the state collapsed, clan fiefdoms formed, and clan-based armed groups remain at large in Somalia. Warlords, and then, Islamist insurgents with assistance from external actors, looted, raped and ruined the south-central of the country, including the capital city, Mogadishu. The state's collapse did not result in chaos in the whole of the republic, however, and inhabitants of the northern region of the country decided to reconcile their differences. After peacemaking and reconciliation efforts concluded, once-hostile clans agreed to turn their peacebuilding to state-building within the former borders of British Somaliland. Today, the Republic of Somaliland has an internationally unrecognized but functioning government, and is relatively peaceful compared to the surrounding region. This paper examines what makes Somalia and Somaliland so different, using Lederach's model of peacebuilding to compare and contrast the two.

*Keywords:* Peacebuilding from below, Lederach model, Colony, Somaliland, Somalia, Republic of Somalia, Cold War, State Collapse, Intra-state Conflicts, Clans fiefdoms, Warlords, Islamists, Clan Leaders, Traditional Leaders, Faction Groups, Peace Conferences, Indigenous Peacemaking, Guurti.

### **Introduction**

The Somali people of Eastern Africa are mainly pastoralists, and were divided among five countries during the nineteenth century partitioning of Africa. During partition, Somalis fell under the rule of three European colonial powers—Britain, France and Italy. Somali lands became battlefields between those rulers during World Wars I and II (Lewis, 1993). In 1960, Somaliland and Somalia gained independence from Britain and Italy respectively, and merged to form the Republic of Somalia that same year.

After 30 years of unity between these two Somali regions, the central government collapsed in 1991. Following the collapse, Somalia and Somaliland took different directions in the search for peace and stability, even though their citizens belonged to the same ethnic group, spoke the same language and practiced the same faith.

In Somalia, the state collapse led to anarchy and lawlessness. Clan revenge became the norm and people had to go where they could get clan protection. Separation lines between neighbouring Somali families across the country

resulted in the formation of clan fiefdoms. The international community, as well as regional states, sponsored more than a dozen peace conferences to mediate between the warring factions but none of them brought a lasting peace accord to Somalia. Each time, tensions, remained high, and as killings kept rising, civilians were caught in the middle. Over the years, various governments or alliances formed in exile and “parachuted” into Mogadishu, only to be toppled by various clan or religious-based factions. (Menkhaus, 2004).

Today, Somalia is a lawless country, a safe haven for international terrorists (“Al-Qaeda Somalia suspect ‘killed’,” n.d) and a base for twenty-first century sea piracy (Wright, 2009).

### **Theory Review**

“In the peacebuilding from below perspective, solutions are derived from cultural resources, relying on local actors and local knowledge, including the local understanding of conflict and its resolution (WOODHOUSE, T. and RAMSBOTHAM, O. 2000, p. 145)”

“Elders are recognized as having traditional power for facilitating and arbitrating the process and events and monitoring the outcomes (Lederach, 1995, p. 97).”

This paper focuses on one influential model that has emerged recently in the field of peacebuilding. This model is commonly known as the *bottom-up approach*, or more broadly, as *peacebuilding from below*. It is frequently associated with the theorist and practitioner John Paul Lederach, a professor of international peacebuilding at the University of Notre Dame, and a practitioner in the field of conflict transformation. The paper looks at the evolution of this model in Lederach’s work, and will test it to analyze the violent conflict in Somalia against Somaliland’s indigenous peacebuilding techniques (Lederach, J. P. (1997).

### **The John Paul Lederach Model**

Lederach’s model is best understood against the broader historical background of the field of conflict resolution. It emerged as a distinct scholarly field emerged in the 1950s, soon after the end of World War II, and is rooted in scholarly research into why nations go to war and how future wars could be prevented or solved (Ramsbotham, Miall & Woodhouse, 2005).

The early 1990s, marked the end of the Cold War, and the United Nations

took on a larger role in intervening in armed conflicts. But new, unpredicted types of war arose. Usually termed ethnic or civil wars, where predominantly fought within state (intra-state) and not between states (inter-state) (ERMUTH, 2001).

With its “Agenda for Peace,” the UN authorized larger peacekeeping missions than ever before, with new and complex mandates and agendas, as intrastate conflicts erupted in many parts of the world. Unfortunately many of those missions ended with failure (Makinda, 1993).

During these difficult times for peace, conflict resolution thinkers focused theory research on the dynamics and trends of intrastate conflicts, in search of solutions. Among the significant models that emerged then was Lederach’s model (see *Fig. 1*) of a comprehensive transformation-oriented peacebuilding and conflict resolution approach (Ramsbotham, Miall & Woodhouse, 2005).

In the model, Lederach divided society into three social hierarchal orders of leadership. He argued that societies have grassroots (Track III), mid-level (Track II), and top leaderships (Track I), with the lowest level of leadership being the most connected to the people in a society while the highest level is the least connected. Similarly, Lederach found that the more connected the leaders are to a society, the more trust, support and legitimacy they enjoy (Ramsbotham, Miall & Woodhouse, 2005).

This model not only developed new ways of understanding conflict, but also shed light on new ways of handling or transforming conflict. The essence of the theory was that peace built from bottom to top is more productive and durable than dictated, top-down approaches (Lederach, 1995). Lederach used a house as a metaphor to illustrate peacebuilding: A house is not built from the roof down. Houses are built from the ground, beginning with a foundation, followed by walls and ending with the roof. Like a house, peacebuilding should begin with strong foundations (Track III), then the walls (Track II), and last, the roof (Track I) (Ramsbotham, Miall & Woodhouse, 2005).

In the dominant, top-down peacebuilding model, key actors are elite, or Track I, state actors who decide, impose and prescribe the content of any peace agreement for the other stakeholders (WOODHOUSE, T. and RAMSBOTHAM, O. 2000).

Lederach’s approach insists that a process of peacebuilding from below is more sustainable than quick-fix, top-down approaches. As explained by

Duffey, “In the peacebuilding from below perspective, solutions are derived from cultural resources, relying on local actors and local knowledge, including the local understanding of conflict and its resolution” (WOODHOUSE, T. and RAMSBOTHAM, O. 2000, p. 145).

Thus, in peacebuilding from below, local actors, who have indigenous knowledge and the trust of the people, mediate with cultural enriched traditions (see *Appendix 1*) (Lederach, 1995). It is natural that every community and society has developed its own way of dealing with problems over the years. Since these homegrown ways methods have been traditionally used to solve conflicts, communities may find it difficult to accept conflict resolution imposed from the outside (Clarke, W. S., & Herbst, J. I. (1997).

This does not mean, however, that conflicting parties never need intervention or third- party mediation. But the nature of these third- party mediators is important, and their perceived legitimacy will greatly depend on which level of society they are from. The further decisions are far from the locals, the weaker their impacts will be on the ground. Lederach’s model therefore emphasizes the importance of local actors in mediating conflict, and that decisions should be made with the input of all stakeholders (Lederach, 1997).

The main difference between outside and locally led peacemaking is that outsiders are not directly affected by the conflict and may have external strategic interests of their own. Moreover, local stakeholders may not have the trust, will or desire to implement externally mediated outcomes. Similarly, outside mediators may tire of the process and resort to quick-fix solutions. In essence, the core assumption of Lederach’s model is that local mediators are equipped with traditional tools crafted over the years to solve their own conflicts (Ramsbotham, Miall & Woodhouse, 2005). As Lederach writes, “Elders are recognized as having traditional power for facilitating and arbitrating the process and events and monitoring the outcomes” (1995, p.197).




Figure 1. Actors and approaches to peacebuilding, from Lederach, 1997, as cited Ramsbotham et al, 2005.

The paper will compare peacebuilding efforts that have occurred in Somaliland and Somalia in the two decades since Siyad Barre’s regime fell. The key research questions are: Can peace be found for Somalia? And what lessons Somalia can learn from Somaliland?

## Somalia after Siyad Barre

“Nowhere has the crisis of state collapse been as profound and prolonged—and as misunderstood—as in Somalia, which has gone without any functioning central government since January 1991” (Menkhaus, 2004, p. 8).

In January 1991, the Republic of Somalia entered a new era marked by a protracted power vacuum after the collapse of the central government. The absence of law and order led the country into complete internal schism. Today, Somalia is the leading state amongst the failed states in the world, and it is one of the few countries that has been without effective central government for the last 20 years. The government collapsed after the formation of armed rebel groups and the start genuine civil war. In 1988, fierce fighting between the SNM and the government broke out in the northern region of the

country, followed by conflicts with the USC and SSDF in the southern part of the country. The whole country was divided between factions fighting against the government and those supporting it. Eventually, the government—one of the most powerful military governments in Africa—was overthrown by clan militias in 1991. At the time, the international community did not intervene, nor did it do enough to stop widespread violence and human rights abuses (Sahnoun, 2004). Although many peace conferences have been held on Somalia,<sup>1</sup> none of them have worked because the peace was built from top. These efforts are summarized in the table below, including information about the external actors who hosted the conferences to meet their own national interests in Somalia (see also *Appendix 2* and *Appendix 3* for additional information on these conferences).

### The Start of Peace Talks in Somalia.

“Between 1991 and 1999, more than a dozen international sponsored national reconciliation conferences were held on Somalia, none of which produced a lasting accord” (Menkhaus, 2004, p. 8).

*Table 1.* Multi-party reconciliation conferences on Somalia (Johnson (ed.), 2009).

| Serial number | Conference Name   | When            | Who                            | Where    | Sponsor                                |
|---------------|---|-----------------|--------------------------------|----------|--|
| 1.            | Djibouti I  | 5-11 June 1991  | SSDF,SPM,USC<br>SAMO, SNU, SDM | Djibouti | Government of Djibouti                 |
|               | Djibouti II   | 15-21 July 1991 | SSDF,SPM,USC<br>SAMO,SNU,SDM   | Djibouti | Government of Djibouti                 |
| 2.            | Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation | January 1993    | 15 factions                    | Ethiopia | United Nations                         |
|               | Addis Conference On National Reconciliation             | March 1993      | 15 factions                    | Ethiopia | United Nations, Government of Ethiopia |

1 Used in this paper, the term applies to the southern region of the Republic of Somalia

|    |  |                                |  |          |                              |
|----|--|--------------------------------|--|----------|------------------------------|
| 3. | National Salvation Council (Sodere)                            | November 1996-<br>January 1997 | 26 factions                            | Ethiopia | Government of Ethiopia       |
| 4. | Cairo Conference   | November 1997                  | Hussein Aideed's government and NSC    | Egypt    | Government of Egypt          |
| 5. | Somalia National Peace Conference (Arta)                       | May–August 2000                | Elders, Diaspora and Factions leaders. | Djibouti | Government of Djibouti       |
| 6. | Somalia National Reconciliation Conference (Eldoret/ Mbagathi) | 2002-2004                      | Warlords, TNG and Diaspora             | Kenya    | IGAD/<br>Government of Kenya |

Table 2. Limited party reconciliation conferences on Somalia (Johnson (ed.), 2009).

| Serial number | Conference Name   | When         | Who                                  | Where    | Sponsor             |
|---------------|-------------------|--------------|--------------------------------------|----------|---------------------|
| 1.            | Nairobi Informals | 1994         | Faction leaders                      | Kenya    | United Nations      |
| 2.            | Nairobi           | October 1996 | Ali Mahdi, Hussein Aideed, Osman Ato | Kenya    | Government of Kenya |
| 3.            | Yemen             | May 1997     | Ali Mahdi, Hussein Aideed, Osman Ato | Yemen    | Government of Yemen |
| 4.            | Nakuru talks      | 1999         | Warlords, Scholars and Diaspora      | Kenya    | Government of Kenya |
| 5.            | Khartoum          | 2006         | TFG, ICU                             | Sudan    | Arab League         |
| 6.            | Djibouti          | 2008-2009    | TFG,ARS-Djibouti                     | Djibouti | United Nations      |



## Somaliland after Siyad Barre

“...most important, is the ‘bottom-up’ approach to the restoration of peace and stability that has been pioneered in Somaliland by genuine clan leaders of the hostile clans” (Farah & Lewis, 1997, p. 350).

“It reached its height at the Boorama conference, where ... clan councillors representing all the groups in Somaliland managed to produce separate national and peace charters” (Farah & Lewis, 1997, p. 350).

“Voting is fighting; let us opt for consensus” (Walls, ed., n.d., p. 52).

In Somaliland, after the Republic of Somalia collapsed, power went in to the hands of the SNM that occupied the main cities of Somaliland.<sup>2</sup> The biggest challenge remained how the SNM, dominated by the Isaaq and allied Iisa clans, and hostile, clans like the Gadabursi in the west and the Harti (Dhulbahante and Warsangali) in eastern Somaliland that were allied to the Barre’s government would coexist peacefully. Unlike other armed groups had done elsewhere in Somalia, the SNM invited leaders of opposing clan’s leaders to talks. SNM leaders and traditional leaders from hostile clans met for the first time in Berbera,<sup>3</sup> Somaliland in February 1991 with the intent of stopping further bloodshed and continued inter-clan violence. In the meeting, a common *Guurti*<sup>4</sup> and an administrative body were formed, and four key principles were agreed upon:

1. The establishment of a national ceasefire.
2. The return of immovable properties to their original owners.
3. The responsibility of each clan for the security of their territories and the control of their militias.
4. The formation of a common administration at a follow-up meeting in Burao.

Soon after the national ceasefire, grassroots peace initiatives began in villages and districts within each clan and sub-clan, with stakeholders opening dialogue with their neighbours through informal and formal meetings, as shown in following table (Walls, ed., n.d.), (Farah, A. Y., & Lewis, I. M. (1997). (See *Appendix 1* for more information on indigenous peacemaking methods used in these meetings).

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2 The northern region of the Republic of Somalia.

3 This Berbera meeting is remembered for ending hostility among the northern clans.

4 *Guurti*: The most enlightened and judicious persons that are found in a group or a nation at large.

Table 3. Major inter-clan reconciliation conferences in Somaliland (Farah and Lewis, 1997).

| Serial number | Conference Name | When                          | Who   | Where      | Sponsor                  |
|---------------|-----------------|-------------------------------|---|------------|--------------------------|
| 1.            |                 | 17-19 May 1991                | Gadabursi/lisa                              | Boorama    | The people of Boorama    |
| 2.            | Guul Allaa      | 17-19 October 1992            | Baha Samaron/<br>Jibril Abokor              | Boorama    | The people of Boorama    |
| 3.            |                 | 4 October 1992                | Habar Yonis/<br>Iisa Musa                   | Hargeysa   | The people of Hargeisa   |
| 4.            | Tawfiq          | 28 October - 8 November 1992  | Habar Yonis/<br>Iisa Musa                   | Sheikh     | The people of Sheikh     |
| 5.            | Khaatumo        | 2 January - 5 February 1993   | Dhulbahante/<br>Habar Yonis                 | Dararweyne | The people of Dararweyne |
| 6.            |                 | 6-9 October 1992              | Warsangalis/<br>Habar Yonis                 | Jiidali    | The people of Jiidali    |
| 7.            |                 | 11-18 August 1992             | Warsangalis/<br>Habar Tol Jalo              | Shinbirale | The people of Shinbirale |
| 8.            | Danwadaag Beri  | 23 November - 1 December 1993 | Habr Tol Jalo/<br>Dhulbahante/<br>Sawaqroon | Garadag    | The people of Garadag    |

Table 4. National Peace Conferences in Somaliland (Walls, M. (Ed.). (n.d.).).

| Serial number | Conference Name                | When                 | Who   | Where    | Sponsor                       |
|---------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|---|----------|-------------------------------|
| 1.            | Berbera Brotherhood Conference | 27 February 1991     | Northern <sup>1</sup> hostile clans   | Berbera  | The people of Berbera         |
| 2.            | Burao National Conference      | 27 April-4 June 1991 | Common Guurti formed in Berbera, Scholars and SNM                           | Burao    | The people of Burao           |
| 3.            | Boorama National Conference    | 24 January-May 1993  | The interim government of Somaliland, the Guurti, Scholars and clan leaders | Boorama  | The people of Borama          |
| 4.            | Hargeisa National Conference   | 1997                 | The government of Somaliland, clan leaders, Guurti and Scholars             | Hargeisa | The government of Somaliland. |

At the Burao National Conference, the Guurti agreed to Somaliland's declaration of independence from the Republic of Somalia (see *Appendix 4*), and a common administration, led by the SNM chairman at the time, was formed with a two-year term. In 1993, Somaliland's Guurti met again in Boorama<sup>5</sup> to build a state and government. The Guurti debated what type of government the country should have, eventually agreeing to a presidential system but inserting the Guurti itself into the government, as the upper house<sup>6</sup> of Somaliland's new parliament. Additionally, the Boorama meeting resulted in the formation of peace charter, called the "*Axdiga Nabadgalyada ee Beelaha Soomaaliland*" (Farah & Lewis, 1997, p. 350).

To form and adopt this charter, delegates agreed to elaborate conflict resolution and management principles articulated at a prior reconciliation conference held in Sheikh (see *Table 3*). Among the principles agreed were:

1. Each clan should take responsibility for the security of areas under its control.
2. Each community should disband its militia, all weapons should be handed over to the government, and no private arms should be kept or carried in public.
3. Each community would stand to defend Somaliland from any incursion

<sup>5</sup> The Boorama conference is remembered for state-building, rather than peacebuilding.

<sup>6</sup> A parliamentary function similar to the United States Senate.

from outside.

4. Each community would not wage war against any other community in Somaliland.

In this way, Somaliland transitioned from civil war to statehood, while Somalia has adopted new externally formed governments almost every five years.

## **Conclusion**

In 1991, the central government of the Republic of Somalia was overthrown by clan militias. Over the decades since, two Somali lands—the Republic of Somalia, and Somaliland— took significantly divergent approaches to restoring peace and stability.

In Somalia, armed factions turned on themselves after they toppled the military government. Clan revenge killings became the norm, and people were forced to return to their own clans for protection, resulting in the formation of clan fiefdoms. In Somaliland, however, hostile clans sat at the table, negotiated their conflicts, and reconciled their differences.

In Somalia, more than a dozen peace conferences have been held to mediate between warring parties. None of these has restored lasting peace or stability in the country, for the reasons that follow:

1. None of the peace conferences were held in accordance of Somali traditions, but rather, included UN-legitimized warlords to represent clans and sub-clans. As warlordism became a both a source of pride and a way to receive international recognition, clans that did not have armed groups were incentivized to create them, so that their voices could be heard in the UN's broken conferences on Somalia.
2. The conferences were state-building conferences, not peacebuilding conferences. Power-sharing was put forward as the first and the last agenda of these conferences. Neither reconciliation nor a ceasefire was given appropriate priority. Much of the time, warlords with diverging external interests were competing for the leadership of anticipated, artificial governments for the country.
3. The UN failed to evaluate why its efforts failed and why peacebuilding efforts were unsuccessful. Instead, it continued the repeated mistake of forming a new government in exile, and parachuting it into Mogadishu.

In contrast, Somaliland's grassroots peacebuilding efforts spread, without external intervention or assistance, from villages to districts to regions, and resulted in the formation of a national common administration over the hostile clans in the area. The reasons that Somaliland's peacebuilding efforts

were successful can be summed up as follows:

1. As shown in *Table 3*, neighbouring clans and sub-clans began negotiating without outside, third-party involvement. These interclan talks expanded from the district level to the national level.
2. At each reconciliation conference, traditional leaders were given lead roles in the reconciliation process. Mid-level and top leaders of society were also involved. Every clan leader was assigned a secretary to take minutes and record agreements before the resolutions were sent to an executive committee, where top leaders of the society amended and implemented them in accordance with previously passed charters. At the Bura Conference, for example, clan elders first adopted the conference's resolutions, and then passed them to the executive committee. In Boorama, while only clan delegates cast formal votes to make decisions, mid-level leaders of society worked to bring all stakeholders together in informal workshops each afternoon. This approach contributed enormously to the success of the conference.
3. Another major milestone in Somaliland's peacebuilding process was the addition of the clan council, or Guurti, to the government, allowing traditional leaders to monitor the implementation of the national charter, and translate their peacebuilding efforts into state-building. To this day, the Guurti retains final say in any nationwide policy decision that could affect lives of people in Somaliland, similar to the role played by the Senate in the United States.
4. Somaliland did not immediately rush into state-building and power sharing. Instead, after the culmination of two consecutive peacebuilding efforts, the processes of state-building and power sharing began at the Boorama Peace Conference in 1993.

This paper concludes that John Paul Lederach's model of peacebuilding from below, and his metaphor of peacebuilding as building a house, held true in Somaliland, while the absence of this model in Somalia has prevented the establishment of long-lasting peace in the country. Lederach's theory of peacebuilding in a divided society concludes that all segments and levels of the society should play a role in finding peace and stability. According to Lederach (1997), it is not possible to build a house without foundations, or without walls, or without a roof. That being the case, it is a flawed approach to bring warlords and other elites to "peace conferences" in luxury hotels, while the foundation of the society that has traditionally led reconciliation processes, and had the trust and legitimacy of the people, are left behind. By comparing and contrasting the cases of Somalia and Somaliland, one sees

evidence that peacebuilding is not be possible in divided societies unless all stakeholders are involved and take part. This is why Somalia's peace talks have failed, while Somaliland has succeeded in peacemaking and peacebuilding.

In conclusion, a comparison of Somalia's and Somaliland's peacebuilding processes can be summarized in this fact: No peace conference on Somalia was ever held inside Somalia, while no peace talks on Somaliland had ever been hosted outside of Somaliland. As Clarke and Herbst (1997, p.49) write: "Peacebuilding in Somalia must be rooted in the customary conflict management practice of traditional elders, who have long played the lead role in reconciliation and negotiation, a natural bottom-up approach..... rushed, faction-centred peace conferences in luxury hotels abroad were seen as the antithesis of appropriate peacebuilding in Somalia."

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# Appendices

| UNIVERSAL <-----       |   | Community Mediation/U.S.  |  | >----- PARTICULAR   |  |
|------------------------|---|---|--|---|--|
| FACET                  | FUNCTION  | FORM  | FORMULA  | FORM  | FORMULA  |
| 1. Entry               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Who? How?</li> <li>* Locate acceptable 3rd party</li> <li>* Seek help/ remedy</li> <li>* Define process</li> <li>* Establish expectations</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Mediator/ formal role</li> <li>* Face-to-face meeting with disputants</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Contact office</li> <li>* Introduction of process</li> <li>* Ground rules: roles/ process</li> <li>* Sessions at office (2 hr)</li> <li>* Create trust/ atmosphere of safety</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Prepare guurt</li> <li>* Elders councils</li> <li>* Traditional authority</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Early contact/ women to clan of origin</li> <li>* Intra-sub-sub-clan deliberations</li> <li>* Establish space for dialogue (stop killings)</li> </ul>   |
| 2. Gather Perspectives | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* What happened?</li> <li>* Create forum/ process</li> <li>* Express conflict/ vent</li> <li>* Acknowledge</li> <li>* Grievances</li> <li>* Feelings</li> <li>* Experiences</li> <li>* Concerns</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Storytelling by turn taking</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Facilitate/ monitor interaction</li> <li>* One speaker at a time</li> <li>* Paraphrasing</li> <li>* Open questions</li> <li>* Encourage expression of feelings</li> </ul>               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Iterate meetings</li> <li>* "Peace" conference</li> </ul>                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Iterative inter-sub-clan deliberations (2-6 months)</li> <li>* Multiple contacts/ multiple groups</li> <li>* Guurt/ broad forum (2-6 months)</li> <li>* Right to speak</li> <li>* Cross-clan elders council</li> <li>* Listen/ moderate/ arbitrate</li> </ul> |
| 3. Locate Conflict     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Where are we?</li> <li>* Identify core concerns</li> <li>* Create common meaning</li> <li>* Create a framework for advancing on concerns</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Identify issues</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Create list/ agenda of issues</li> <li>* Reframe issues</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Surface issues</li> <li>* Legitimate grievances</li> </ul>                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Poetry/ proverb to provide frame/ meaning</li> <li>* Lengthy orations</li> </ul>  |
| 4. Arrange/ Negotiate  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* How do we get out?</li> <li>* Address nature of relationship</li> <li>* Seek solution to issues/ concerns</li> <li>* Create paths toward resolution/ reconciliation</li> </ul>                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Problem solving on issues</li> <li>* Healing/ relational focus</li> </ul>        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* One issue at a time</li> <li>* Separate interest/ positions</li> <li>* Generate options</li> <li>* Narrow to mutual solutions</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Open forum</li> <li>* Coalition building behind scenes</li> </ul>                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Out at sessions</li> <li>* Iterative inter-sub-clan deliberations</li> <li>* Deals on past grievances (Restitution)</li> <li>* Future relations</li> </ul>  |
| 5. Way out/ Agreement  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Who does what, when?</li> <li>* How will relationships continue</li> <li>* Monitor/ implementation</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Agreements</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Written</li> <li>* Concise/ clear</li> <li>* Reality test</li> <li>* Follow-up contact</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Agreements</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Written/ oral</li> <li>* Exchange of camels/ women for marriage</li> <li>* Establish councils/ monitoring mechanism</li> </ul>  |

Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities  
of disarmament

(Supplement to the General Agreement signed in Addis Ababa  
on 8 January 1993)

We, the undersigned Somali political leaders, meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 15 January 1993 at the Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation in Somalia;

Having agreed on the need for a viable and verifiable cease-fire to promote the peace process in Somalia;

Recognizing that such cease-fire is intricately linked to questions of disarmament;

Further recognizing that disarmament cannot be accomplished in a single event but through a sustained process;

Hereby agree on the following:

I. Disarmament

- 1.1 All heavy weaponry under the control of political movements shall be handed over to a cease-fire monitoring group for safekeeping until such time as a legitimate Somali Government can take them over. This process shall commence immediately and be completed in March 1993.
- 1.2 The militias of all political movements shall be encamped in appropriate areas outside major towns where the encampment will not pose difficulties for peace. The encamped militias shall be disarmed following a process which will commence as soon as possible. This action shall be carried out simultaneously throughout Somalia. The international community will be requested to provide the encamped militias with upkeep.
- 1.3 The future status of the encamped militia shall be decided at the time of the final political settlement in Somalia. Meanwhile, the international community will be requested to assist in training them for civilian skills in preparation for possible demobilization.
- 1.4 All other armed elements, including bandits, shall be disarmed immediately and assisted through rehabilitation and integration into civil society.

/...

**II. Cease-fire monitoring group**

2.1 A cease-fire monitoring group comprising UNITAF/United Nations troops shall be established immediately. There shall also be a committee composed of representatives of the warring factions to interlocate with the monitoring group and observe the implementation of the agreement by UNITAF/United Nations troops.


III. All sides agree in principle that properties unlawfully taken during the fighting shall be returned to the lawful owners. This shall be implemented as and when the situation allows.

IV. All POWs shall be freed and handed over to the International Committee of the Red Cross and/or UNITAF. This process shall commence immediately and be completed by 1 March 1993.

The present agreement shall enter into effect on 15 January 1993.

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
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2. Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)  
Mr. Mohamed Farah Abdullahi, Chairman
3. Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)  
Mr. Abdi Muse Mayow, Chairman  
Col. Mohamed Nur Aliyow, Chairman (sna)
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Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Chairman
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Mr. Abdurahman Dualah Ali, Chairman
14. United Somali Party (USP)  
Mr. Mohamed Abdi Hashi, Chairman




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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



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



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
  
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
  
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
  
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On Behalf of Civil Society


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
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
  
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
  
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
  
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Boudine  
Ambassador of the Republic of  
Djibouti to Somalia


  
H.E. Amb. Abdulaziz Ahmed  
Special Envoy of the Federal  
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia  
for Somalia


**IN THE PRESENCE of:**


  
Amb. Carlo Ungaro  
Special Envoy of Italy (Chair of  
IGAD Partners Forum for  
Somalia)

  
Amb. Mohammed Salim Al  
Khussaibi  
Special Envoy of the League of  
Arab States

  
Amb. Mostafa Khedre  
Deputy Assistant Minister for  
Foreign Affairs of the Arab  
Republic of Egypt

  
Mr. Glenn Warren  
Embassy of the United States in  
Kenya

  
Dr. Walid Musa  
European Union and European  
Commission Delegation in  
Kenya

  
Amb. Winston Tubman  
UN Representative of the  
Secretary General for Somalia

Annex 1: Resolution from Burao Elders' Meeting

Burao 5/5/1991

KU: GUDOOMIYE-ku xigeenka ururka XX S N M ANNA GUDOOMIYAHA SHIRKA AAYA KA TALINTA WAQOOWI.

Shirka aayo ka talinta waqooyi oo ay isugu yimaadeen guurtida iyo suldaamada iyo odayaasha wax garadka ah ee beelaha waqooyi oo maanta lagu qabtay magaalada Burao waxa la isku raacay qodobadan hoos ku qorani:-

x

- 1. In waqooyi gaar isu taago ooa la raacin Kooifur
2. In lagu dhaqmo shareecadda Islaamka
3. In la sugo nabadgelyada Waqooyi
4. In si dhaqso ah loo dhiso dawlad Waqooyi
5. In golayaasha ururka iyo dawladda si cedaalad ah loogu qaybiyo beelaha Waqooyi
6. Arrinta nabadgelyada Samaag in si gaar ah wax looga qabto oo gudi lno saaro.

MAGACYADA SAXEEXAY

- 1. Suldaan Maxamed Faarax G/W/Galbeed
Shiikh Ibraahim Sh. Yuusuf Sh. Madar Gudoomiyaha Guurtida reer Shiikh-Isaxaaq
2. Suldaan Cabdi Sh. Maxamed G/W/Galbeed
3. Suldaan Maxamed Suldaan C/qadir G/W/Galbeed
4. Suldaan Yuusuf Suldaan Xirsi G/Togdheer
5. Suldaan Saxardiid Suldaan Diiriye G/W/Galbeed
6. Suldaan Ismaaciil Muuse G/W/Galbeed
7. Suldaan Rasheed Suldaan Cali G/Sanaag
8. Suldaan Ismaaciil Suldaan Maxamuud D/Laasqoray
9. Axmed Shiikh Saalax D/Laasqoray
10. Shiikh Daahir Xaaji Xasan G/Sool
11. Axmed Xirsi Cawl G/Sool
12. Suldaan Maxamed Jaamac G/Awdal
13. Shiikh Muuse Jaamac G/Awdal
14. Xasan Cumar Samatar D/Saylac
15. Maxamed Warsame Shiil D/Saylac
16. Garaad C/qani Garaad Jaamac G/Sool
17. Suldaan Cali Muuse G/Togdheer

Gudi iyo Gebanimo

Xoghayaha Shirka Aadan Axmed Diiriye

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