

SOMALILAND PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

# JOURNAL

Volume 3

October 2019



SOMALILAND PEACE AND  
DEVELOPMENT JOURNAL

GUEST EDITOR

Kevin Kester, Keimyung University, South Korea

Managing Editor

Nasir M. Ali

Assistant Managing Editor

Ayan Rashid Ibrahim

EDITORIAL BOARD

Abdirahunan Ahmed Hussein, University of Hargeisa, Somaliland  
Abdiwasa Abdilahi Bade, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia  
Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan, Franz Fanon University, Somaliland  
Adan Yusuf Abokor, Rift Valley Institute, Somaliland  
Jama Musa Jama, Hargeysa Cultural Centre, Somaliland  
Ayan Yusuf Ali, Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention, Somaliland  
Samuel Kale Ewusi, University for Peace Africa Programme, Ethiopia  
Kedir Jemal Ibrahim, University of Hargeisa, Somaliland

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD

Mohamed Salih, International Institute of Social Studies, The Netherlands  
Kuruwilla Mathews, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia  
Webster Zambara, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, South Africa  
Michael Walls, University College London, UK  
Barry Hart, Eastern Mennonite University, USA  
Kevin Kester, Keimyung University, South Korea  
Jonathan Rudy, Elizabethtown College, USA  
Alexandra Lewis, University College London, UK

ISSN: 2707-4897

Copyright © 2019 Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies



Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies

☎ +252 (0) 63 442 7156

+252 (0) 63 442 6417

✉ info@instituteforpeace.org

🌐 www.instituteforpeace.org

## DEVELOPMENT JOURNAL

### Guidelines for Authors

The SPDJ is an annual peer-reviewed academic journal with an editorial and international advisory board. All submitted articles are subject to peer review by experts who specialized in the themes of the journal. Hence, authors are suggested to adhere to the following criteria:

- The articles should be original and should not have been published previously, online, or in print format.
- Length: 5,000–7,000 words (including references).
- Format: All submissions must be in English and typed single-spaced, 12 pt, with a one-inch margin.
- Reference: Use Butcher's Copy-editing: The Cambridge Handbook for Editors, Copy-editors, and Proofreaders.
- Title: Include a title of not more than 15 words
- Abstract: Include an abstract of not more than 350 words
- Diagrams, figures, maps, and other graphic materials should be placed in the appropriate place in the manuscript, and captions should be provided immediately below its figure.

The Journal reserve the right to alter and omit all articles submitted to assure the quality, or reject a paper, even after it has been accepted for publishing if it becomes apparent that serious problems are challenging the quality and integrity of the Journal.

## NOTE ON CONTRIBUTORS

Mohamed Farah Hersi has more than a decade of experience in research, technical advisory service, policy development, and political economy analysis. Mohamed Farah was educated in Somaliland and South Africa where he earned his LLB and LLM respectively. Currently serving as the Director of the Academy for Peace and Development, Mohamed Farah has published both academic articles and policy-oriented reports.

Zuhur Yasin Ibrahim is a social activist, program development specialist, and graduate of the University of Hargeisa and Admas University, Somaliland. She has worked with different international non-governmental organizations in various positions and capacities. Currently, she is working as the International Partnership Development lead in SOS Somaliland and living in Hargeisa.

Amran Mohamoud Hassan is a researcher and security analyst based in Hargeisa, Somaliland. Ms. Hassan has an MA in peace and conflict studies from the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Hargeisa, Somaliland.

Maria Abdilahi Gaheir is a co-founder and board member of the Center for Policy Analysis, a non-governmental, non-profit think-tank organization based in Hargeisa, Somaliland. Maria has been engaging in the area of activism and civil society for a long time. She has LLB, a postgraduate diploma in peace and conflict studies, and a master's degree in international relations and diplomacy.

SOMALILAND PEACE AND  
DEVELOPMENT JOURNAL  
Volume 3 October 2019

CONTENTS

Guest Editor's Note

About this Issue

ARTICLES

Post-Conflict State Reconstruction in Somaliland: An African Perspective of  
Statebuilding Processes

*Mohamed Farah Hersi*

Interrelations Between Education and Peace in Somaliland: Perceptions from University  
Students

*Zuhur Yasin Ibrahim*

Emerging Foreign Bases in the Horn of Africa: A Sign of Hope or a Dilemma in  
Regional Security

*Amran Mohamoud Hassan*

Effects of Droughts on Pastoralist and Agro-Pastoralist Women in Somaliland

*Maria Abdilahi Gaheir*

## GUEST EDITOR'S NOTE

The series of papers in this volume will introduce readers to a complex set of issues related to development today in Somaliland and the Horn of Africa. The papers in the collection focus on statebuilding, education, security, and gender. These are amongst the most fundamental issues for a society seeking to cultivate peaceful cultures in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century. Jackie Kirk understood this nearly fifteen years ago when she wrote about education, gender, and fragile states from Afghanistan. She argued in a 2008 paper in *Globalization, Societies, and Education* that “education is in many states intricately connected with — if not a root cause of — conflict and instability. Education should, therefore, be part of the analysis of fragility, and in the identification of priority stabilizing interventions.” This volume contributes to that analysis.

Today, a review of the literature indicates there are nearly 57 million children out of school and over half of these children are in conflict zones. It is expected that by 2030 two-thirds of these children, and 80% of the world's poor, will be living in conflict-affected and fragile contexts. In response, the World Bank in their 2011 *World Development Report* declared that conflict and insecurity “is the primary development challenge of our time.” Hence, if the international community wants to ensure universal access to quality education, and safe places for learning — at all levels of education, and in all countries — then addressing conflict, peace and state stability everywhere is an imperative. Somaliland is at the core of this imperative.

What is more, in Somaliland the rising interculturalization of schools and universities and inter-clan contact due to migration means that academics are increasingly expected to teach a diverse body of students from across Somaliland and the Horn of Africa, including those students arriving from refugee crises and conflict-affected contexts. Hence, conflict-sensitive education initiatives that take into account the contextual conflict dynamics are integral to successful peacebuilding. To this end, King details, in her book *From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda*, how systematic and constructive peacebuilding education that was conflict-sensitive was key to managing inter-ethnic animosities in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. Kester, in his book *The United Nations and Higher Education*, has also written about the need to use globally diverse

pedagogies – beyond the Western rational lecture – that takes into account the learning experiences and preferences of students from Africa, Asia, and Latin America in the classroom.

This volume of the *Somaliland Peace and Development Journal* will explore the topic of education, and the related issues of governance, gender, and statebuilding, more closely within the Somaliland and Horn of Africa context. The article by Zuhur Yasin Ibrahim, “Interrelations Between Education and Peace in Somaliland: Perceptions from University Students”, presents some basic statistics on the rise and development of higher education in Somaliland. The author presents a normative standpoint that higher education should contribute to developing the peacebuilding capacities of students to foster a peaceful Somaliland. This argument is in line with global calls for education to be more closely examined and utilized in development, humanitarian relief, and peacebuilding efforts, as detailed above with Kirk, King, and Kester. The paper lays the foundation for further examination of peace and education literature worldwide, as well as future empirical research in Somaliland, and serves as a starting point for this important discussion.

The statebuilding in Somaliland has been imperative. The article by Mohamed Farah Hersi on post-conflict and bottom-up statebuilding is insightful toward the type of creative approaches adopted by local communities in Somaliland to ensure security and development, even in light of neglect by the international community. It is a useful paper illustrating an alternative model of reconciliation and development beyond the traditional Western state model. The third article by Amran Mohamoud Hassan provides an overview of the geopolitical significance of the Horn of Africa and the historical policies and emergence of foreign military bases in Somaliland. The paper details the role of the security sector in mitigating or exacerbating conflict in the region, especially with some Cold War-era tensions still lingering.

The fourth article by Maria Abdilahi Gaheir examines the role of gender in development within Somaliland. Gaheir argues for intersectional analysis in the investigation of environmental crises and the disproportionate impact this has upon women, particularly upon rural women. The paper is a keen expose into the increased vulnerabilities of marginalized groups during times of crisis.

In the end, the volume provides some much needed introduction into the entangled relationship between education, politics, and social issues in the region. The papers provide useful insights into the complicated Somaliland and Horn of Africa context for those new to the region and those more experienced. Readers will find this a valuable contribution of articles raising awareness on the contemporary issues of education, peace, and development in Somaliland.

Kevin Kester, PhD  
Keimyung University, South Korea



## ABOUT THIS ISSUE

Weak and fragile governance institutions have been a reality in Africa since independence. The sources of that fragility and weakness vary from one context to another, however, their impact on African citizens, with their social, economic, and environmental dimensions, are similar. Following Somaliland's triumph against the military government of Somalia in 1991, and its subsequent withdrawal from the failed union of 1960, Somaliland has managed to build state institutions that offer a unique opportunity to promote good governance and democracy in Somaliland that will improve economic and social life. But after almost three decades of existence, these institutions still face social, economic, and political challenges. While the state institutions are regarded as the nucleus of the state, their weaknesses are also considered as the primary source of its fragility. Therefore, one of the fundamental symptoms of state weakness contributing to this fragility is the state's failure to perform the functions necessary to meet citizens' basic needs and expectations. In this regard, weakness within institutions has had continuing and profound effects on numerous aspects of the social life of citizens elsewhere in Africa.

This volume contains articles that analyze the pressing issues in Somaliland from different perspectives. One of these articles deals with post-conflict state-building endeavors in Somaliland and highlights the importance of leveraging indigenous institutions in constructing robust accountable governing structures where the different layers of the society all have involvement. It is necessarily important to note that Somaliland conflicts are resolved by non-violent means, and communities work together in collaboration with local people and domestic state institutions. Another article analyzes education's relationship between education and peace, with an emphasis on the perspectives of university students. A further article discusses the major impacts of climate change. This article positions that a worsening climate in a changing environment is another critical factor that challenges the lives and livelihoods of many Somaliland citizens, in particular, those living in pastoral and agro-pastoral settings, most specifically, women and the vulnerable section of society.

Straddling the Red Sea, Arabian Peninsula, and facing the Indian Ocean, the Horn of Africa is located in a strategically significant region. The

significance of this region fosters many challenges with many external actors interested to establish their bases in the region. However, many questions arise from multiple perspectives regarding these bases in the region with their advantages and disadvantages for the area. Looking back through history, the countries in the region experienced similar military bases even though the time and political goals were different. However, the legacies of those bases still remain apparent. Somaliland is one of the countries involved in these complex political dynamics of the region, and one of the articles extensively discusses the emerging military bases in the region and their implications for regional security and stability.

The articles in this volume of the Somaliland Peace and Development Journal are contributions to the assertion that the challenges facing Somaliland are directly tied to governance issues. The articles argue that these challenges can be addressed through studying the genesis and causes of these issues the nation faces, and that by doing so options and ways to tackle them may emerge. Therefore, the articles carried within this volume are an important reference and interest to decision-makers, academics, university students, civil society actors, and anyone who has an interest in understanding the social, economic, ecological, and political challenges facing the region. However, it is the responsibility of those running the state to reach decisions based on empirical and evidence-research.

Nasir M. Ali  
Managing Editor

## Post-Conflict State Reconstruction in Somaliland: An African Perspective of Statebuilding Processes

*Mohamed Farah Hersi*

### ABSTRACT

*In January 1991, the central government of the Somali Democratic Republic collapsed as a result of armed insurgency against Mohamed Siyad widely known as 'Barre regime'. Somaliland, a former British protectorate that had united with Somalia in 1960 with the aim of uniting the divided Somali people in the Horn of Africa, declared its unilateral withdrawal from almost three decades union with Somalia but remains unrecognized by the rest of world. This paper will explore Somaliland's journey of peace and statebuilding processes which has adopted a bottom-up, locally-driven, and traditionally-fashioned approach to post-conflict state reconstruction. The study adopts a qualitative research approach by conducting an in-depth interview and reviewing existing academic literature on African state reconstruction approaches. The study will critically apply and examine Aka Claude's theory of 'building from below' in relation to the statebuilding process of Somaliland.*

### INTRODUCTION

Somaliland, a former British protectorate is comprised of a territory, boundaries, and people as defined by international treaties such as the Anglo-French Treaty of 1888,<sup>1</sup> the Anglo-Italian Protocol of 1894, and the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1897<sup>2</sup>. The people of Somaliland are part of the Somali 'nation' who inhabit in the Horn of Africa, from Awash Valley, through the Ethiopian Ogaden, and into northern Kenya as far as the Tana River.<sup>3</sup> During the 'Scramble of Africa', the Somali-inhabited land and its people were colonized by different European and non-European countries. Somaliland was colonized by the British, Somalia by the Italians, Djibouti by the French, Ogaden was annexed to Ethiopia and

---

<sup>1</sup>Academy for Peace and Development, 'A self-portrait of Somaliland: Rebuilding from the Ruins', 1999

<sup>2</sup> Subsequent agreements between Britain and Ethiopia in 1942, 1944, 1948 and 1954 concerned the implementation of the 1897 treaty, but did not alter the substance of the original accord.

<sup>3</sup> Mark Bradbury, 'Becoming Somaliland', African Issues, 2008

north Kenya was annexed by the British to Kenya.<sup>4</sup> After a century of colonial rule, the first Somali-inhabited territory ‘British Somaliland’ became independent. However, due to colonial resistance, and the subsequent Somali nationalistic sentiments, Somaliland united with Somalia (the Italian colonized territory) five days after it had received its independence from the British. In July 1960, the first two de-colonized Somali-inhabited territories were united under one independent and sovereign state ‘Somali Democratic Republic’ hoping the rest of the Somali territories will follow suit.

The union of the two Somali territories had encountered enormous challenges. The North (Somaliland) had been marginalized politically and economically by the South (Somalia) and felt that their sacrifice of the unity of the Somali people was not heading towards the right direction<sup>5</sup>. In 1969, the democratically elected government was overthrown through a bloodless coup by General Mohamed Siyad Barre, a military junta who was later elected by the ‘Supreme Council of the Revolution’ as the new president of the Somali Republic. With a growing resentment against the unity of the Somali Republic, the people from Somaliland formed an armed insurgency movement in 1981-‘Somali National Movement’ widely known as ‘SNM’.<sup>6</sup> In 1991, Barre’s regime collapsed and the people of Somaliland declared that the unity of Somalia had failed and as a result unilaterally announced the re-formation of Somaliland as an independent sovereign state. In Somaliland, a new political era had emerged in which the people of Somaliland regained their sovereignty. The statebuilding project of Somaliland was shaped and structured by the social clan-based structures through which peace and stability was regained. A new civilian government was elected as the successor of SNM interim administration, which subsequently led the process of political and social reconciliation of the people of Somaliland. The political reconstruction of the statebuilding process of Somaliland was a locally-driven, culturally rooted, traditionally structured process through which the state was constructed from below. Despite the progress, Somaliland has made for the last two decades, it remains diplomatically unrecognized for the sole reason that Somalia remains a

---

<sup>4</sup>Hussein A. Bulhan, ‘Politics of Cain: One Hundred Years of Crises in Somali Politics and Society’, 2008

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

failed state and does not possess the capacity of negotiating with Somaliland.<sup>7</sup>

## CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

After the end of World War II, international political actors such as the United Nations recognized the importance of post-conflict reconstruction as a major ‘grand strategy’ with a ‘grand narrative’.<sup>8</sup> The objectives and the goals set up by those involved in the post-conflict reconstruction has been to provide humanitarian aid and rebuild fractured dysfunctional state institutions.<sup>9</sup> During the Second World War post-conflict reconstruction, there was no theoretically adopted framework on post-conflict reconstruction. However, the Marshal Plan become a major post-conflict reconstruction strategy to rebuild Western Europe.<sup>10</sup>

Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren intimate that the term ‘post-conflict’ is misleading. They argue that the term ‘post-conflict’ means the end of open warfare. However, post-conflict reconstruction remains undefined by most scholars and as of now, there is no well-scholarly agreed comprehensive conceptual definition of post-conflict reconstruction. Nevertheless, with the emergence of the post-cold war era, attempts have been made to conceptualize the term “post-conflict reconstruction”.<sup>11</sup>

Several concepts have been developed to theorize and conceptualize the term “post-conflict reconstruction”. The concept of the failed state has been identified as one of the leading concepts of post-conflict reconstruction. Scholars such as Pierre and Tull argue that state failure is an African phenomenon and cannot be ignored.<sup>12</sup> For them, there is a relationship between the concept of state failure and state reconstruction

---

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Yosef Jabareen, *Conceptualizing “post-conflict reconstruction” and “Ongoing Reconstruction” of failed states*, (published online 2012).

<sup>9</sup> Ibid 1.

<sup>10</sup> After the end of WWII, the United States put together a plan, known as ‘the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948’ (Marshal Plan). For the economic reconstruction of Western Europe including Turkey and the defeated powers of Germany and Italy. The plan also finally laid down the foundation of NATO and EU. (reference-<http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1852.html>)

<sup>11</sup> Ibid 1.

<sup>12</sup> Pierre and Tull, “Post-conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States” in *International security*, Vol,32 No:4 2008

in Africa. For instance, 82% of peace-keeping missions are stationed in Africa and according to the Fund for Peace Failed States Index, 50% of the ‘most failed state’ are in Africa.<sup>13</sup> It is, therefore, important to look at state failure and state reconstruction with the aim of understanding the impact of state failure in post-conflict reconstruction in African states. Modern states are expected to provide security, aspirations, and good public services for their people, the lack of which states shall be categorized as a failed state. Similarly, Weberian definition of the modern state is the ability to successfully uphold a claim on the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in its enforcement of its orders.<sup>14</sup> The lack of use of legitimate force over its recognized territory is a clear sign of the failure of the state to perform its fundamental functions. This is evidently the case of Somalia, in which Somaliland had been part of since 1990. The collapse and the subsequent state failure of Somalia led Somaliland to re-think about re-building its state institutions in a democratic fashion.

In the case of the state failure, Jeffrey Herbst argues that “the notion that states incapable of imposing authority and providing basic goods should be deprived of the security and new functional states should get the possibility to secede”.<sup>15</sup> Jeffrey’s argument is the recognition of new states that emerged from a failed state like the case of Somalia. Somalia collapsed and ceased to exist as a state in 1991, and a new state Somaliland becomes functional and democratic but lacks international recognition. Marleen Renders is of this narrative and has pointed out that, “Somaliland looks like a state but is not recognized as such. Somalia no longer looks like a state, but it is one on the world map”.<sup>16</sup> There has not been a major political reconstruction in Somalia since 1991. The debate of ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ is plagued by the lack of theoretical and conceptual understanding and definitions and as a result, suffers definitional uncertainty.<sup>17</sup>

However, African scholars whose academic scholarship has focused on state reconstruction and state formation have argued that African states were formed as colonial products and, therefore a model for the post-

---

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid 2.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

conflict reconstruction of African states. This study will apply the theories and concepts developed by ‘Claude Ake’ a Nigerian political theorist whose political theories have shaped the modern African political thoughts. His contribution to the nature of African states has been well-documented. Ake’s theoretical construction of the state in Africa covers a range of multifaceted issues including, but not limited to, the nature of the state in Africa; the historiography of the African state; the relationship between the state and the social class; the state, development, and underdevelopment; the state and the democratization; the state and the national question; the operation and internal mechanism of a dependent capitalist state as well as the unique features of the state in Africa.<sup>18</sup>

As follows, Ake defines the state in Africa as a set of relationship and interaction among social classes and groups organized and sustained by political power:

*“The state is a specific modality of class domination. This modality is one in which class domination is mediated by commodity exchange so that the system of institutional mechanisms of domination is differentiated and dissociated from the ruling class and even the society, and appears as an objective force standing alongside society. The essential feature of the state form of domination is that the system of institutional mechanisms of domination is autotomized and becomes largely independent of the social class, including the hegemonic class”.*<sup>19</sup>

Ake’s theories were not only impinging on the state formation in Africa, but he also laid down the foundation of the African political thinking of rebuilding the post-conflict state in Africa. As one of the few scholars on the continent whose theory of post-conflict have sparked on the African scholarship literature on the conceptual thinking of the post-conflict reconstruction theory, Ake argues that the ‘endogenous initiative of rebuilding the state from below’ can serve as a condition for achieving sustainable democratic reconstruction of the state’ in post-conflict

---

<sup>18</sup> Jeremiah O. Arowosegbe, “Reflections on the Challenge of Reconstructing Post-Conflict States in West Africa; Insights from Claude Ake’ Political Writings”, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, 2011

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

Africa.<sup>20</sup> For him, state-building in Africa was neither a tragedy nor a farce.

This paper, in the context of Ake's political theory on post-conflict state reconstruction, makes a strong argument that post-conflict state reconstruction can only be achieved by applying the concept of 'rebuilding from below'. The paper argues that African-led, traditionally-fashioned, locally driven processes should guide the post-conflict reconstruction approach. This paper looks at Somaliland's post-conflict state reconstruction and its approach to peace and statebuilding processes focusing specifically on how the concept of 'building from below' was applied to post-conflict state reconstruction in Somaliland after it unilaterally declared its sovereignty from the rest of Somalia on the 18 May 1991.

## STATE FORMATION IN SOMALILAND

Modern state sovereignty both in conception and organization originated from medieval Europe with the disintegration of feudalism and absolute monarchies.<sup>21</sup> Political historiography of early state formation in Europe suggests that war and violence were means of state-building. Charles Tilly in his famous book, *Coercion, Capital and European states A.D 990 -1992* outlines that coercion and capital was early incentives for the state formation in Europe. He argues that 'war made the state and state made war'.<sup>22</sup> This concept of war-centric state formation in the early stages of the European state formation process can also be applied to the African state formation process both before and after colonization.

The concept of the modern state in Africa was imposed by colonial powers for their own political, economic, and military gains.<sup>23</sup> The imposition on the modern state had a deep-seated negative impact on African societies. The newly-born African states struggled to overcome social and political issues that had ultimately caused crises for the new states in Africa. The post-colonial state in Africa was highly driven by

---

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Shaheen Mozaffar, 'The crisis of the state in Africa', volume 5 issue 1, Bridgewater Review, 1987

<sup>22</sup> Filex Gerdes, 'Civil war and state formation; the political economy of war and peace and Sierra Leone' volume 9.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.



anti-colonial mobilization. The nationalist movements expected social and political transformation in the post-colonial state in Africa. Such nationalist feelings and mobilization were captured in the words of the likes of Kwame Nkrumah who declared, “*We will transform the Gold Coast into a paradise in ten years*”.<sup>24</sup> After ten years of the independence of African states, there were clear signs of the lack of performance of the nationalistic promises made at the dawn of independence and this resulted in state failure in Africa.

In the Somali context, the Somali-inhabited grazing lands were partitioned by non-Muslims and Muslim colonial powers.<sup>25</sup> Egypt was the only Muslim country after the Ottoman Empire, and non-Muslim Christian imperialists such as Britain, France, Italy, and Ethiopia. Somali social and political order had been re-shaped by the colonial influence. Before the colonials, Somali people were composed of different social and political units known as, ‘kinship’.<sup>26</sup> Somali traditional political order was unstructured and there was no central authority which combines the different kinship groups or clans. Centralization of power and authority was introduced by the colonial powers with their colonial administration. The stabilization of power and authority in Somali territories had been a fundamental issue since decolonization.<sup>27</sup>

The colonial legacy of the Somali people had a profound impact on the political history of the Somali people. The colonialization of Somali people in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries shaped the thinking of the political elites of the Somalis and motivated them to search for freedom and pan-Somali unity.<sup>28</sup> Some of the colonial powers supported the unification of the divided Somalis and the removal of colonial artificial boundaries. In 1946, Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary articulated this opinion. In his words;

*“... we propose that British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, and the adjacent part of Ethiopia if Ethiopia agreed, should be lumped together as a trust territory so that the nomads should lead their*

---

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> I.M Lewis, “Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism”, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, volume 1, issue 2, 1963

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Hussein A. Bulhan, *Politics of Cain: One Hundred Years of Crisis in Somali Politics and Society*, 2008

*frugal existence with the least hindrance and there might a chance of a decent economic life, as understood in that territory”.*<sup>29</sup>

This proposal was however rejected by other imperial powers. During the early stages of the struggle for independence, most of the Somali-inhabited territories including Somaliland dreamt of all Somali-settled territories under an umbrella of a single state.<sup>30</sup> The concept of pan-Somalism which originally came from the Somali political elites became a prominent political ideology for the Somali people. It had been one of the main drivers of the political unification of the two Somali-inhabited territories. Dr. Abdirashid Ali Sharmake, the last popularly elected civilian president of the Somali republic reiterates the importance of a greater Somalia. He intimated that:

*“Our misfortune is that our neighbouring countries, with whom, like the rest of Africa, we seek to promote constructive and harmonious relations, are not our neighbours. Our neighbours are our Somali kinsmen whose citizenship has been falsified by indiscriminate boundary ‘arrangement’”*<sup>31</sup>.

The divided kindship groups and clans were united by the domination of non-Muslim Christian colonial powers and reinforced Somali sentiments of national identity through Islam.<sup>32</sup> Islam was not the only unifying factor of Somali nationalist sentiment because the Somalis as a homogeneous ethnic group was a force of unity. The Somalis also felt their wider sentiment as, ‘Africans’.<sup>33</sup> While some scholars argue that the Somali nationalist movement was a locally driven pro-unity and pro-independence movement, while others believe that it was an external Muslim-driven project.<sup>34</sup> There is no doubt through the history of the Somali people the identity was a conflicting element. The Somali people are associated with three different identities such as Islam, Somali, and African. These different identities had an impact on the pan-Somalism and the independence struggle movement.

---

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> I.M Lewis, “Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism”, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, volume 1, issue 2, 1963

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

On 26 June 1960 the first Somali territory, ‘British Somaliland’ received its independence from the British, ending a century of colonial rule. The post-colonial political structures debated on the most pressing issue of unity. Some of the political elites were reluctant to merge Somaliland into Somalia which had gained its independence five days later. Pro-unity political parties primarily Somali Youth League from Somalia and Somaliland National League from Somaliland agreed to unify the two territories to establish a one Greater Somalia nation-state- - a dream that had not achieved its objective until now.<sup>35</sup> The unification of two the independent states of Somali people towards a ‘Greater Somalia’, was driven by a popular sentiment towards and not by the political elites. The politics of unity and independence ended up with the unification of the two Somali independent states on the 1 July 1960.

The unification of the two Somali states was not a well-thought-out process. Somaliland preferred to have signed an act of union with Somalia before the merger of the two countries, but this initiative had never been taken.<sup>36</sup> There was no legal framework of the union of the two independent states, and the existing parliament in Somalia and Somaliland failed to formulate and approve an act of union. Within a matter of a year, Somaliland felt that the union with Somalia had not fulfilled its expectations. The post-unification government was dominated by Somalia taking almost 80% of the parliamentary seats and the government positions as well. The people of Somaliland felt that they were marginalized and tried to reclaim their sovereignty in 1961 in a failed military coup. In the same year, a popular referendum had been held throughout the regions of Somaliland and, more than 60% of the people of Somaliland voted against the act of union.<sup>37</sup> From onwards, the political friction between the two polities grew and the Somali nationalist movement lost its way.

In 1969, the civilian rule came to an end and a new military-led government took over through a bloodless military coup. General Mohamed Siyad Barre became the president of Somalia and adopted ‘scientific socialism’ with the support of the Soviet Union. Civil structures including parliament, constitution, and the government were dismantled and a ‘Supreme Revolutionary Council’ was introduced as an

---

<sup>35</sup>WSP, *Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities*, 2005

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

alternative approach of governance to the civilian rule.<sup>38</sup> Most of the local people in Somaliland welcomed the newly formed military government thinking that some of their problems and the frustrations of the union would be addressed. In 1963, the British awarded Kenya its independence, and the Northern Frontier District (NFD) overwhelmingly decided to join the 'Greater Somalia', but the Kenyan government decided to retain the post-colonial territorial integrity of Kenya.<sup>39</sup> The Ethio-Somali war broke out in 1964 and 1977 provoked by the desire of annexing the Somali-inhabited area in Ethiopia into 'Greater Somalia'. By 1978, the Barre regime lost the war with Ethiopia, and NFD became part of Kenya. In 1977, the last colonially-administered Somali territory 'Djibouti' gained its independence from the French and decided not to join into the 'Greater Somalia'.

Furthermore, the political conflict between Somaliland and Somalia was growing with SNM establishing military bases in Neighbouring Ethiopia.<sup>40</sup> SNM being an armed struggle against the injustice of the military regime against the people of Somaliland was dominated by the 'Isaaq'-Somaliland's dominant clan. Several factors triggered the formation of the Somaliland-driven armed movement against the military regime: a) the formation of Somali-nation state and the Pan-Somalist political ideology which ended up the unregulated union between Somaliland and Somalia in which Somalia became a dominant political force over Somaliland; b) the hard policies of Somalia over Somaliland business trade; c) violation of human rights and the socio-political marginalization of Somaliland people.<sup>41</sup> Brons argued that "*political and economic discrimination against the Northerns (Somaliland) region had been a regular occurrence since the early post-independence years and turned into open hostilities and clan-related terrorism directed against the Isaaq people*".<sup>42</sup> In the years that followed, the armed struggle intensified and most of the Somaliland people joined the armed struggle against the Barre regime. In 1988, a full-fledged war broke out in Somaliland that caused the deaths of civilians and the destruction of cities that had never been seen the likes of which in modern Somali war history.

---

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Mohamed-Rashid Sheikh Hassan, 'Somali History: The Clan and the State in Somali Context', 2015

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

## The Re-birth of Somaliland: From legacies of popular insurgency to Post-conflict reconstruction

In January 1991, Barre's regime collapsed as a result of the armed political movements against his government. In southern Somalia, civil war had continued and there had not been a central government which had the authority to govern its claimed territory. Warlords, radical fundamentalist, and sectarian politics ensued. On the contrary, former British Somaliland was recovering from the war and able to reconstruct its institutions. The peaceful post-conflict political settlement of Somaliland owes much to the popular political movement of SNM and its history of the struggle against the Barre regime. The political vision of the SNM was much different from other political movements in Somalia. SNM had constituted itself and used Claptam's typology of political philosophy as a 'reform insurgency' with national objectives, intending to reconstruct the government.<sup>43</sup> SNM's main political objective was to remove the Barre regime and restore democracy into Somali political governance. The unity of the Somalia was never discussed and the charter of SNM was assertive to the territorial integrity of Somalia. However, the situation had changed and SNM becomes a separatist insurgency in late 1988. Even though SNM was initially inclusive, it was later changed into a clan-based political movement. One of the reasons for the radical policy shift from an inclusive organization into a single clan dominated organization emanated from Siyad Barre's counter-insurgency policy of divide and rule. Most of the other clans inhibited in Somaliland were pro-government and therefore, only the Isaaq, the largest clan of former British Somaliland became the dominant clan of the SNM. The movement was financed and supported by the Isaaq people in the country and those in the diaspora. Prunier captured the ethnic dominated construction of SNM when he states that, "in a way, the SNM does not exist: It is simply the Isaaq people up in arms."<sup>44</sup>

The SNM was formed by some political elites with popular support from the Isaaq people. Isaaq is one of the largest clans inhabited in Somaliland. Other clans being the Samaron and Harti were pro-government and did not ally with SNM. It was formed based on popular struggle and had an accountable and transparent governance structure. As observed by some scholars including Ibrahim M. Samater, SNM was a participatory

---

<sup>43</sup>Mark Bradbury, 'Becoming Somaliland', in *African Issues*, 2008

<sup>44</sup>Ibid.

democratic political movement which had democratic governance structures.<sup>45</sup> Compagnon has extensively argued that SNM had a post-Barre political vision which was articulated into their political manifesto ('A Better Alternative').<sup>46</sup> SNM's model of governance was highly influenced by traditional structures. The movement had used traditional political institutions to mobilize the populace and raise funds for the movement. The legitimacy of the political movement was determined by the SNM's engagement with the traditional structures. It is in this regard that the political manifesto of SNM acknowledged that the clan system is at the root of the political stability, social cohesion, and economic activity of the Somali people t that the government of Somalia should blend 'traditional Somali egalitarianism and the requirements of the good central government.'<sup>47</sup> The proposed 'hybrid political order' by the SNM had challenged the political orthodoxy in Somalia which, since before independence, had considered the traditional clan politics as destructive and divisive and incompatible to the modern state and suggested that the clan system be eliminated in the newly established modern Somali state.<sup>48</sup> However, SNM had formed for the first time in the Somali political history a 'House of Elders' known as the "*Guurti*". The Guurti being a traditional house with a political and traditional mandate facilitated the clan-based political settlement of the post-Barre transition period. It had also played a critical role in mediating and managing inter-clan and other types of conflicts.

#### BOTTOM-UP STATE BUILDING PROCESS: BUILDING FROM 'BELOW'

Following the collapse of the central government of Somalia, the people of the former 'British Somaliland' under the leadership of SNM as the lone military and political actor managed to reconcile different communities in Somaliland polarized by the war. The traditional leaders assembled by SNM and under its leadership agreed long before the defeat of Barre's regime in Somaliland to reconcile post-war inter-clan conflicts in Somaliland and re-build Somaliland from 'below' by using its long-protected traditional conflict resolutions methods. It is important to shed light on how traditional institutions and the struggle movement devised a

---

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

post-Barre statebuilding process. SNM dominated by the “Isaaq” clan was seen by other major clans such as Harti (Dhulbahante and Warsangale) and Samaron as clan-based institutions. One of the major tasks of SNM and Isaaq traditional leaders had been to bring the other clans on the table to be part of the determination of the political future of their own country. These two other clans were supportive of the Barre regime and fought against SNM. The political dialogue of SNM with those clans had changed their perspective of SNM and a real negotiation had been going on between SNM and other clans. The SNM institutional structure which was dominated by Isaaq was changed and more political accommodation and concessions were given to other clans. The creation of the state started with the SNM’s post-Barre political reconstruction and their use of traditional elders as means of statebuilding process. Four months after the collapse of the Barre regime, SNM, Isaaq traditional elders, Samaron and Harti were engaged in different levels of peace-state-building processes throughout the regions of Somaliland.

On 18 May 1991, a Grand National clan conference was held in Burao, the second capital of Somaliland, where all the traditional leaders of Somaliland from different communities and the SNM leadership attended to discuss and decide the future of Somaliland. It was this conference that changed the course of the political future of people of Somaliland. It was agreed that Somaliland’s union with Somalia had failed for reasons mentioned in the previous section of this paper and, a different political path was needed. The traditional leaders and the SNM agreed that Somaliland should withdraw from the union it had with Somalia and this resulting, in Somaliland regaining the sovereignty it lost in 1960.<sup>49</sup> It was argued by some scholars that SNM was not in favor of the separation of Somaliland from the rest of Somalia, but the clan leaders with the support of the people decided that Somaliland should be an independent state from the rest of Somalia.<sup>50</sup>

The peace-state-building processes of Somaliland encouraged critical challenges over its course of implementation. In this paper, the peace-state-building process of Somaliland can be divided into the following: Post-Barre peacebuilding process, centralization of power and state

---

<sup>49</sup> Interpeace and APD, “Peace in Somaliland: An Indigenous Approach to State-Building”, 2008

<sup>50</sup> Marleen Renders, “Consider Somaliland: State-building with Traditional leaders and Institutions”, 2012

authority, and political accommodation of non-Isaaq clans. In this section of the paper, each of these important processes to post-war political reconstruction will be closely examined. (This is part of what you should have done in the introduction)

## INTER-CLAN RECONCILIATION PROCESS AS A STATE BUILDING STRATEGY

The reconciliation process between the Isaaq represented politically by the SNM and other major clans in Somaliland were shaped by three main elements. First, the Somali traditional conflict resolutions tools employed brought a breakthrough to the post-conflict stabilization process. Second, SNM's post-war plan to build representative democratic governance in Somaliland, and third, the role of traditional elders who spearheaded the reconciliation process between Isaaq and Non-Isaaq communities. It is also important to mention that these reconciliations were locally-driven and were initiated from 'below' without the involvement of external actors.

Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are considered as the major means of peacebuilding in Somaliland. Tradition played a critical role in forging peace among conflicting parties and restored the confidence and trust of those people. As I.M Lewis stated,

*‘The evocative power of kinship as the axiomatic natural basis for all social cooperation and as the ultimate guarantee of personal and collective security is deeply rooted in Somali society. For the weaker and less successful members of the Somali lineage, kinship is an indispensable source of protection and safety, readily manipulated by their stronger more politically ambitious clansmen for whom kinship is an elastic resource, conveniently and accessible and infinitely negotiable. “Our kinsmen right or wrong” is the basic motto of Somali social life. As the foundation of social cooperation, kinship enters into all transactions between and amongst individuals. There is no significant area of Somali social activity where the influence of kinship is absent’.*<sup>51</sup>

---

<sup>51</sup>Ahmed Y.Farah & Loan M.Lewis, ‘’ Making Peace in Somaliland’’, 1993



The socio-political organization of the Somali people, as described by I.M Lewis, is the clan-family which is the most important social structure of pastoral politics and economics. The ‘*Xeer*’, a body of traditional regulations and laws is an unwritten social order which regulates the different aspects of Somali pastoral lives. The existing social contract and the long-practiced traditions and customs had enabled the different communities in Somaliland to reconcile their difference and cease hostilities among them. The post-war reconciliation critically fashioned the basic social order and institutions of Somali society.

The first post-conflict inter-clan conferences held between January-June 1991. These conferences were held in the different regions of Somaliland. In the east, the Dhulbahante held meetings with the Isaaq in different locations such as Oog. In the west, a similar inter-clan conference was held in Dilla and then Borama. It was documented that more 39 inter-clan conferences were held from 1991-1997.<sup>52</sup> These conferences (See table below showing overview of conferences) were supported solely by the local people and there were no external financial and technical assistance. This was purely a locally-engineered traditionally-fashioned peacebuilding process. The aim of these conferences was diverse. Some of these conferences were aimed at ending the inter-clan hostility and bring a ceasefire to the conflicting clans. The end of hostility paved the way for the restoration of trust and confidence of the clans and facilitated a meaningful political dialogue between the different clans in Somaliland. Other conferences were purely political arrangement and power distribution among the different constituencies.

---

<sup>52</sup> Interpeace and APD, ‘Peace in Somaliland: An Indigenous Approach to State-Building’, 2008

Table1: Overview of peace Conference in Somaliland 1991-1993<sup>53</sup>

Clans	Meeting Place	Date (Approx.)	Name (If any)
Dhulbahante–Habar Je’lo	Yagori	02/1991	
Samaron–Isaq	Borama	17-19/05/1991	Guul Allah (Allah disposed Victory)
Samaron–Isse	Borama	17-19/05/1991	
Warsengeli–Habar Yonis	Yube	18/06/1991	Yube I
Habar Yonis–Warsengeli	Yube	6-9/10/1991	Yube II
Habar Yonis–Habar Je’lo–Dhulbahante	Oog	30/10/1991	
Reer Nur–Jibril Abokor	Borama	1992	
Habar Awal–Samaron	Hargeisa	1992	
Warsengeli–Habar Je’lo	Eel-Qohle	10/05/1992	
Dhulbahante–Habar Je’lo	Kulal/Awr Bogavs	1-22/06/1992	
Warsengeli–Habar Je’lo		11-18/08/1992	
Habar Je’lo–Warsengeli–Gahayle (Majeerteen)	Shimbiraale	16-22/08/1992	
Dhulbahante–Habar Je’lo	Hudun	1/09/1992	
Habar Yonis–Isse Muse	Hargeysa	4/10/1992	
Samaron–Eastern Clans(Harti)–Sa’ad Muse		1992	
Samaron–Isse	Gerisa	1992	
Samaron–Isse	Agabar	1992	
Habar Yonis–Isse Muse	Sheikh	28/10-8/11/1992	Tawfiiq (Understanding)
Warsengeli–Habar Yonis	Jideli	6-9/11/1992	
Habar Je’lo–Warsengeli–Mohamoud Garad (DUB) Sawaqroon (Majeerteen)	Garadag	23/11/1992	Dan Wadaag Bari (Eastern Alliance)
Dhulbahante–Habar Yonis	Darar Weyne	2/01-5/1993	Khaatumo (Ultimate Reality)

## POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION AND POWER CONSOLIDATION AS STATE BUILDING PROCESSES

### *Politics of Post-Conflict Reconciliation: Issues and Challenges*

Following the separation of Somaliland, a transitional interim government was formed which was led by then the chairman of the SNM, Abdurrahman Ahmed Ali. At the end of May 1991, Abdurrahman formed his first post-war cabinet. The members of the cabinet consisted of 18 ministers, six of whom were non-Isaaq.<sup>54</sup> The emerging SNM led

<sup>53</sup> Marlee Renders, ‘Consider Somaliland: State-building with Traditional leaders and Institutions’, 2012

<sup>54</sup> WSP, Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities, 2005

government faced daunting challenges of reconstructing a war-torn country from ruins, with no available financial and material support from the international community.<sup>55</sup>

However, the inclusion of non-Isaaq clans into the cabinet proved the willingness of SNM and its supporters to build an inclusive representative governance system. The political accommodation and power-sharing arrangements were one of key tasks of the SNM-led government to address in order to form a stable post-conflict political framework. On the other hand, the interim administration was assigned to demobilize and integrate clan-based militias which had proven to be a complex and complicated issue. Some achievements have been made in this regard; however, a more structured political accommodation was needed to address serious concerns over the administration of the SNM government.

The interim administration had been weakened by the existing intra-SNM military and political factions which were blocking the government to complete its tasks. Internal power rivalry turned out to be a serious issue for the new administration. Within a year, the new government failed to demobilize the militias, restore law and order and extend authority over its territorial boundaries. Furthermore, the SNM-led administration failed to control state resources and generate revenue to restore law and order by establishing state security institutions.<sup>56</sup> In the absence of a common enemy, the unity of SNM and Isaaq community broke down, and resources became a source of contention.<sup>57</sup> In January 1992, inter-clan conflict broke out in the city of Burao which was under the control of two different clan militias. With the growing internal division within the SNM, the administration failed to solve those problems and several other armed conflicts now between two different sub-clan of Isaaq broke out in Berbera port. In 1993, the administration was about losing control everywhere and the unity of SNM broke down. Therefore, the SNM administration's term which was two years was about to finish without the administration fulfilling its major tasks.

As agreed in May 1991, the SNM leadership was given a two years' term to manage the transition from SNM based administration to a civil led government. In January 1993, the Borama conference or the conference

---

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

of Elders of the communities of Somaliland (*Shirwaynaha Guurtida Beelaha Somaliland*) also known as the “*Allah Mahad leh*” (‘tribute be to God’) convened in Borama on 24 January 1993.<sup>58</sup> Borama inhabited by the Samaron provided a neutral place for sub-Isaaq clans who fought in Burao and Berbera in 1991 and 1992 respectively as a result of the intra-SNM power struggle. On the other hand, it provided immense opportunities for the non-Isaaq clans to participate in and determine the future of Somaliland.

The Borama conference was considered as a watershed event in Somaliland.<sup>59</sup> The conference of Borama proved to be a defining moment for the future political stabilization of the country. By the time the conference was held, most of the intra-SNM and inter-clan conflicts were resolved. However, the challenges remained long after the Borama conference was finalized. Even though the previous government failed to stabilize the country, the Borama conference addressed issues of reconciliation, security, and state formation. Several resolutions and outcomes were established from the issues debated and discussed during the conference. These outcomes determined the state formation of Somaliland and change the political discourse of the country. First, the conference established a traditional based security framework. Second, it enhanced Somaliland’s unilateral separation from Somalia by framing the post-SNM political framework. Third, it provided and facilitated a peaceful transfer of power from SNM-led government to a civil-rule based administration.<sup>60</sup> It was in this conference that Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, the first prime minister of British Somaliland in 1960 and the last civilian prime minister of Somalia was elected as the new president for Somaliland.

Shortly after Egal took office in 1993, several achievements were registered. The people were tired of conflicts and needed a government with a centralized authority which could use legitimate force against any group that opposes to the resolutions established from the Borama conference. One of the challenges of Egal’s government was to centralize power and restore law and order. Therefore, disarmament and demobilization of militias was top of his agenda. However, the demobilization process needed a financial resource to provide financial

---

<sup>58</sup>Mark Bradbury, ‘Becoming Somaliland’, *African Issues*, 2008

<sup>59</sup>Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

incentives to the disarmed militia. Therefore, controlling revenue-generating areas such as Berbera port was very important for the centralization of power and authority.<sup>61</sup> In doing so, Egal succeeded to functionalize and operationalize institutions of governance. In this regard, government ministers were re-opened, public offices were equipped and a Civil Service Commission was formed. Also, a government-controlled bank was created, and a new Somaliland currency was introduced.<sup>62</sup> Revenue generating locations such as ports and customs were taken over by the new government. State security institutions were re-established, and a judicial system was put in place. In 1994, Somaliland's first annual budget was approved allowing police and army personnel to receive monthly salaries. Egal successfully managed to centralize power and authority under his leadership. As argued by Dominik,

*“The newly appointed President Egal appropriated the means of violence, acquired control over major economic resources, and expanded the government’s administrative apparatus. Nascent institutional standardization was accompanied by burgeoning attempts at socio-cognitive standardization, such as a newly introduced flag and currency served as a constant reminder of Somaliland’s ‘imagined community’. Nonetheless, this phase was also “difficult and not without violence”.*<sup>63</sup>

Despite the progress made in re-establishing democratic governance institutions and developing a conducive environment for post-conflict economic recovery, the new fragile state remained politically and economically weak and was vulnerable to intra-SNM factions and external interference.<sup>64</sup> In consolidating power and controlling state resource, President Egal was heavily challenged by the former president, Abdurrahman Turr and his supporters. In 1994, a year after of Egal's election in Borama, a new conflict erupted between the government of Egal and the supporters of the former president Abdurrahman Tuur.<sup>65</sup> Egal using traditional authorities and some SNM military supporters

---

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Dominik Balthasar, “State-Making in Somalia and Somaliland: Understanding war, Nationalism and State Trajectories as Processes of Institutional and Socio-Cognitive Standardization” PhD Thesis published by UCL ,2012

<sup>64</sup> Mark Bradbury, ‘Becoming Somaliland’, in *African Issues*, 2008

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

managed to defeat his opponents and consolidate his power. Dominik Balthasar rightly captures Egal's struggle with his opponents. In his words;

*“While it is indisputable that these civil wars were brutish and had a negative impact on the lives of thousands of people, and while there might have been alternatives to the violent conflict to achieve the desired outcomes, the civil wars fought in the mid-1990s were constitutive of Somaliland's state-making. Thus, violent conflict is not necessarily “development in reverse”, even if the respective war occurs today and in the form of a civil war. In the case of Somaliland, the civil wars Egal pitched not only enhanced state regime hegemony in institutional terms but have been judged that “as in so many other instances, the notion of statehood was nurtured during the war”<sup>66</sup>*

In 1997, the civil war came to an end and Somaliland entered a new post-civil war political reconstruction era. The last national clan conference was held in which the civil war within Somaliland was resolved and Egal was re-elected for another term. Since then, the new polity had not experienced major conflict and had managed to consolidate power, use violence legitimately over its territories, and establish a modern system of democratic governance.

## CONCLUSION

From a theoretical and conceptual perspective, post-conflict state reconstruction remains undefined. Several scholars had attempted to establish a conceptual definition of the term ‘post-conflict state reconstruction’, however, different policy-oriented approaches had been adopted under different circumstances. The lack of the agreed scholarly defined theoretical framework of the ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ poses challenges to the policy-making apparatus.

The study attempted to address and examine the post-conflict state reconstruction of Somaliland in light with the concepts and theories developed by African political thinkers. The study has employed Aka Claude's theory of post-conflict state reconstruction in Africa. The key finding of this paper is that ‘rebuilding from below’ theory has been effective in the case of Somaliland. The present political stability that

---

<sup>66</sup>Ibid.

Somaliland has enjoyed for over three decades as a result of bottom-up, tradition-fashioned, and locally-driven peace-state-building processes which has proven to be more durable and sustainable than top-down, foreign-engineered statebuilding approach.

## Interrelations Between Education and Peace in Somaliland: Perceptions from University Students

Zuhur Yasin Ibrahim

### ABSTRACT

*Wars and violent conflicts inevitably affect institutions providing social services the most, including but not limited to, education and educational facilities of any country and the community within. The war and conflict with Somalia's ruthless military regime from 1980–1991 in Somaliland affected both the facilities and their enrollment rate. The military deliberately shelled the urban centers and rural areas and all educational facilities across the country were in rubble and ruins. However, Somaliland citizens never gave up and have succeeded in their efforts to recover and rebuild their social, economic, and political infrastructures. In the mid-1990s, there were just a few primary schools. Since then, education has expanded rapidly with the number of primary and secondary schools rising quantitatively. Similarly, the prevalence of peace and stability has served as a vehicle of transformation and development, resulting in rising enrollment thereafter. This increase catalyzed the emergence of higher education institutions across the country. In line with this, defining and exploring the perception of the students towards the fragile, hard-earned peace and stability, and the role of the state is the central objective of this study. The study has utilized and analyzed both primary and secondary data. The conclusion suggests the need for re-visiting and re-conceptualizing of the curriculum in Somaliland to overcome the lackluster sense of nationalism apparent in its citizens. The outcome of this policy is entirely dependent on the integrated and collective approach of stakeholders to advance the nation's education system, thereby sustaining the hard-won peace and stability in the state long-term.*

### INTRODUCTION

After the civil war, the collapse of the Somali state and the subsequent separation of Somaliland from the rest of Somalia, many sectors like the health, education, and the security of the country collapsed and had to be built from scratch. Infrastructure had been destroyed; few skilled staff and professionals such as teachers and weak capacity of the established government structures were among the major challenges facing the



country.<sup>1</sup> Schools and children going to school signifies a sense of stability for communities and brings normalcy to the rather tense atmosphere of apprehension. Hence, many schools and Quranic studies resumed their programs. However, many in the community had to teach and learn in environments that were tainted by the past; where the schools and buildings showed signs of the civil war with bullet walls, buildings in rubble.<sup>2</sup>

Seeing education as a holistic learning process that includes formal, non-formal, and informal learning, peacebuilding efforts were being extended to schools, neighborhoods, tea shops, and household levels.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, Somaliland's formal education came a long way with the establishment of the mandated Ministry of Education and there have been efforts made to promote the education sector. Both primary and secondary schools have experienced a quantitative increase.<sup>4</sup> This increase was the precursor of the emergence of higher education institutions. In this regard, the first University – Amoud University in the Awdal region – was founded in 1998 having the first in-house graduates within the country in 2003.<sup>5</sup> Today, Somaliland has over 30 registered universities located in all regions, according to the Ministry of Education.

Regardless of an increase in the number of educational facilities at all levels across the country, there are serious challenges and obstacles still facing the education system in Somaliland. These include the commercialization of education aimed at profiting off of school fees, population growth surpassing the capacity of the education sector, inadequate skilled and professional teachers, and low payment for the teachers among others.<sup>6</sup> This has wounded the quality of education and

---

<sup>1</sup> Jhazbhay, Iqbal (2010). Somaliland's post-war reconstruction: Rubble to rebuilding, *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies - Multi-Inter-and Transdisciplinary*, no. 3: 1, 59–93.

<sup>2</sup> Eubank, Nicholas (2010). "Peace-Building without External Assistance: Lessons from Somaliland". CGD Working Paper 198. Washington, D.C: Center for Global Development.

<sup>3</sup> In Somaliland, poetry and songs played a crucial role in resolving the differences between the society and state building process.

<sup>4</sup> Education Statistics of Year Book 2013/2014 published by Somaliland Ministry of Education.

<sup>5</sup> Nasir M. Ali (2014). Building State Capacity in a Post-Conflict Situation: the Case of Somaliland, *American International Journal of Contemporary Research*, Vol. 4, No. 1, (January, 2014), pp. 157–170.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

compromise the future of the next generation. The government continues to attempt to address the challenges and gaps that exist within the Somaliland education system, policies, and approaches. Understandably, the quality of education discussed in this study is inseparable from state policies and commitment from the decision-making circles. Therefore, quality education needs a constituency both within the government and among the members of the broader public who are willing and able to demand as much and assert that this must be made an integral part of Somaliland's educational system and facilities. This lays the foundation to catapult students towards a better future and help make them competent and qualified elites who can serve their nation.

This study focuses on University students and the scope is limited to Hargeisa city from a peacebuilding perspective. For a society to move towards a positive future and succeed at its peacebuilding efforts, the government, citizens, organizations, systems, and structures should all be working towards the same goal. With a focus on only Hargeisa city, the question which the study attempts to explore is: what are the capacity needs of university students in terms of skills, knowledge, and understanding to promote peace initiatives in Somaliland? Furthermore and very important, it considers another set of questions: What type of knowledge, skills, and understanding are needed to promote and sustain peace in Somaliland? What are the challenges facing the promotion of peace? And lastly, what are the opportunities associated with this?

## EDUCATION AND PEACE IN PERSPECTIVES

Transformation in the aftermath of any conflict isn't an easy task. It deserves highlighting that the experience and culture of the people are distinct from one society to another while their approaches in seeking peace and building stability may also be varied from one culture to another.<sup>7</sup> However, the challenge for peace practitioners is to find ways in which communities can resolve their internal differences without physical violence, while the goal of peacemakers is to develop more effective ways of resolving disputes without violent conflict, to identify and transform the conditions that cause war.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> Galtung, John & Webel, Charles (2007). *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies* (eds). New York: Routledge Ltd.

<sup>8</sup> Cortright, David (2008). *Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas*. London, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Education from a wider perspective contributes to peacebuilding and understanding the roots and contributors of any conflicts and violence.<sup>9</sup> As argued by Diana and Kenneth (2000) in their research “*The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Peacebuilding Education for Children*” along with the deaths, migration, poverty, etc. that conflicts bring along, there are also opportunities of transformative change that is possible through these conflicts and crises. Time and again the world has seen through the examples of Rwanda as a recent case that transformative change for the better is possible.<sup>10</sup>

The Colombian Conflict has been one of the longest-running conflicts in the world since the 1960s. The consequences and costs one of the oldest civil war in America and the world amounts to millions of innocent people who lost their lives displaced millions (internally and externally) and devastated unimaginable amount of properties from both sides. In 2016, there was a peace accord between the Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which also merited the President of Colombia a Nobel Prize in December 2016. Within these few months of peace, the country has seen notable changes – people going back to schools and more interestingly a baby boom as covered by Al Jazeera English News.<sup>11</sup>

Similar to many pastoral and agro-pastoral societies in the world, the Somali society in the Horn of Africa has a long history of conflicts over natural resource scarcity, for instance, the pasture and water specifically during the dry and drought season.<sup>12</sup> Political and clan rivalry added

---

<sup>9</sup> Gumut, Veronic (2006). “*Peace Education and Peer Mediation*”. In Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa (ed). Ibadan, Nigeria: Spectrum Books Limited.

<sup>10</sup> Habyarimana, Jean Bosco (2012). “*Educating for the Twenty-First Century: Peace Education for the Postgenocide Rwanda*”. In Weaving Peace: Essays on Peace, Governance and Conflict Transformation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa (eds). USA: Trafford Publishing.

<sup>11</sup> Al Jazeera (2016). ‘*Colombia: Baby boom follows FARC peace deal*’. Available at <http://www.aljazeera.com/video/news/2017/03/colombia-baby-boom-farc-peace-deal-170308085014489.html>. Accessed on May, 2017.

<sup>12</sup> Nasir M. Ali (2015). “*The Viability of Pastoral Society in Post-Conflict Settings: Evidence from Somaliland*”. In the Intricate Road to Development: Government Development Strategies in the Pastoral Areas of the Horn of Africa (eds). Addis Ababa: Institute for Peace and Security Studies.

another dimension to the Somali contemporary conflicts.<sup>13</sup> The current conflicts in the Somali regions led many Somali citizens to live in an abject situation and increased the level of poverty and unemployment. For instance, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank rated Somalia's level of poverty and unemployment at 73% and 67% respectively. This ranks Somalia as low as 165 in the ranking.<sup>14</sup>

Like many African societies, the Somalis are an oral society. Many of the traditions, history, and stories are being transmitted through poems, stories, and sayings narrated orally from generation to generation. As a pastoral society, much of the history involves conflicts among neighboring clans mostly over already scarce resources.<sup>15</sup> Bravery<sup>16</sup> in terms of being strong, fighting conflicts, and controlling assets are portrayed in high esteem.<sup>17</sup> This informal education (day-to-day information) that is being brought up with the children instills a keen interest in fighting and possession of weaponry, among other habits and behaviors.

At the dawn of a new generation, the advance of science and technology, extreme and aggressive video games, violent content on media platforms (WWE wrestling, movies, etc.) have increased the destructive ideologies. The argument advanced here is that the world education system is not within the same basket because there are some societies where children are exposed to militarization at an early age.<sup>18</sup> This kind of practice corresponds to the Somali society's common traditions during Eid festivals. During the Eid celebrations, the gifts and clothes that some

---

<sup>13</sup> Hussein A. Bulhan (2013). *Losing the Art of Survival and Dignity: From Self-reliance and Self-esteem to Dependence and Dhame*. Bethesda, Maryland: Tayosan International Publishing

<sup>14</sup> UNDP (2010). Somaliland Millennium Development Goals report. Available [http://www.undp.org/content/dam/somalia/docs/MDGs/Somaliland%20MDG%20Report%20First%20draft%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.undp.org/content/dam/somalia/docs/MDGs/Somaliland%20MDG%20Report%20First%20draft%20(2).pdf). Accessed on May, 2017.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>16</sup> El-Bushra, Judy & Gardner, Judith (2016). *The impact of war on Somali men and its effects on the family, women and children*. Rift Valley Institute, Briefing Paper, February, 2016, pp. 1–9.

<sup>17</sup> El Bushra, Judy & Gardner, Judith (2004). *Somalia: The Untold Story the War through the Eyes of Somali Women*. London: Pluto Press.

<sup>18</sup> D. Bush, Kenneth & Saltarelli, Diana (2000). *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Peacebuilding Education for Children*. Siena, Italy: Arti Grafiche Ticci.

parents bring to their children are military uniforms and plastic guns that are widely available in the market for selling. This shows how even children admire artificial military tools.<sup>19</sup>

In Somaliland, peace is only seen as the absence of war and violence. As a state, Somaliland has managed to control the armed conflicts through continued negotiations, disarmament, and the building of the rule of law mechanisms, such as the police, courts, military, and other state institutions. This doesn't mean that Somaliland has managed to overcome all the challenges and weaknesses that exist within the state institutions<sup>20</sup>, which require commitment and a particular quality of leadership. Without a doubt, Somaliland now faces different forms of structural violence that can lead the country in the long run to relapse into violence and armed conflict if the state fails in addressing structural factors that are generating negative peace. Johan Galtung in his research "*Violence, Peace and Peace Research*" described peace as positive and negative.<sup>21</sup> The latter is observable in the Somaliland context.

Providing social services to the public at large, such as health, education, water, and sanitation, among others, is poor and almost non-existing in many rural areas as well.<sup>22</sup> The presence of weak institutional frameworks and policies and the huge gap existing in institutions providing social services within the regions as well as the population at the peripheries is a clear sign of how this leads to structural violence within the country. The population growth is also another critical factor that exacerbates the already deteriorating situation of the citizens who are desperate about receiving equitable social services in their communities. In this sense, Somaliland has one of the highest rates in child and maternal mortality, the lowest rate of accessibility of basic services, such as access to clean water, health, and sanitation plus education which is universal.<sup>23</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup> In most Somali-speaking region in the Horn of Africa, the parents always gift guns and military uniforms to their children during the Eid festivals and celebrations.

<sup>20</sup> Nasir M. Ali (2014). Somaliland Security at the Crossroads: Pitfalls and Potentials, *American International Journal of Contemporary Research*, Vol. 4, No. 7, (July, 2014), pp. 98–108.

<sup>21</sup> Galtung, Johan (1969). *Violence, Peace and Peace Research*, Journal of Peace Research, Sage Publications, pp. 167–191.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

Furthermore, with the growth of the country very good resource distribution policies, especially for the natural resources, deserve highlighting and implementation as its absence could bring challenges to the country. In connection with this point, the land is one of the major drivers of conflicts within the cities and in the pastoral and farming areas.<sup>24</sup> The lack of land reform policy within Somaliland is a sign of frustrations and increasing violence within the community. This could be linked to the skyrocketing prices of the land aggravated by the government's inaction and reservation to intervene and regulate the price and the market.

Though Somaliland succeeded in building peace, it moves from peace and stability to latent conflict which most of the citizens and state leaders aren't aware of. Therefore, Somaliland should move to build strong state institutions to work towards an equal society to remain in a peaceful situation and sustainable progress and prosperity. Social justice as Fraser<sup>25</sup> discussed in his work "*Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation*", should be at the core of the Somaliland agenda towards a feeling of peace and a sustainable country, where all citizens flourish and social justice should prevail in Somaliland as a whole.

#### DRIVERS AND DYNAMICS OF PEACE: PERCEPTIONS FROM UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

Most of the university level students, if not all, have a good understanding of the concept of peace. Though they didn't spell out the theories, their explanation articulated the research of Johan Galtung on Negative and Positive Peace. Students had a general understanding of peace and linked some of the challenges facing the students as a threat to peace, for example, youth unemployment, and poverty among others.<sup>26</sup> However, the lecturers are able to discuss in-depth the role of university students in building sustainable peace in Somaliland.<sup>27</sup> It is important to note that one key aspect stated by the majority was the role of different

---

<sup>24</sup> Kedir Jemal & Nasir M. Ali (2017). *Mitigating Natural Disasters in Somaliland Policy Options and Strategies*. Hargeisa: Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies.

<sup>25</sup> Fraser, Nancy (1996). *Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation*. USA: Stanford University.

<sup>26</sup> Interview with a student at the University of Hargeisa, Somaliland.

<sup>27</sup> Interview with a lecturer at the University of Hargeisa, Somaliland.

stakeholders in peace, including communities, government, courts, and individuals. One lecturer in one of the universities in Hargeisa stated that peace comes from the joint understanding and actions of the government and the community and that both parties must understand the rule of law.<sup>28</sup>

One of the very important components missing from Somaliland's education system, from Kindergarten to University, is civic education. This subject is where a sense of nationalism of citizens is carved outside of the home. In this regard, incorporating civic education in the country's education system, both for the University students and other levels of the educational system is crucial in bringing about a sense of ownership and responsibility. However, schools in Somaliland don't teach civic education at any level. Besides, young people are not given the skills and information in a structured way through schools. They are not taught about their rights and responsibilities as citizens and how they can positively contribute to their country. To overcome this challenge, suggestions have been made to draft a comprehensive curriculum that includes civic education throughout the education system including universities.<sup>29</sup>

However, even with the absence of civic education in the Somaliland education system, students play an important role in peacebuilding. Most of the people approached by the study stated that students do and need to work with the systems and structures of the state to ensure peace and stability prevail. Moreover, one of the students interviewed underlined that students should work with the police to secure communities, respect the rights of the other citizens and the constitution, and guard the fragile peace against threats. However, the majority of the interviewees highlighted the negative impact of rising unemployment levels on state security. Therefore, the rise of violence caused by university students and graduates is inevitable if the established institutions fail to address those grievances from the grassroots. Regarding the emphasis on this point, Naima, one of the university students, articulates the link between jobs and peace. She stressed that if the students don't find jobs and have to fight for their positions then that would cause insecurity and instability in the state.

---

<sup>28</sup> Discussions with one of the University of Hargeisa lecturers, Hargeisa, Somaliland.

<sup>29</sup> Discussions with the universities students and lecturers in Hargeisa, Somaliland.

Social justice is another dimension of peacebuilding, preservation of security, and maintenance of stability. This means that the importance of the presence and availability of public service provision to all communities in the country had been another major issue raised by the students. The equal distribution of state economy, access to universal education and justice system (courts), improved basic living standards, fair distribution of job opportunities, and widespread services have been mentioned as key to sustaining the fragile peace that Somaliland exists in. As a result of the lack of social justice in Somaliland, the country is seeing the rise of illegal migration of youth (including university students) and it will keep rising. This would not only bring about the tragedies of death but also drain the country's educated population. University students need to be able to envision hope and a bright future ahead of them to become a productive part of society and to promote peacekeeping endeavors.

#### IDENTIFYING THE CHALLENGES AND THE WAYS FORWARD

Various factors challenge the students including unemployment, poor access to services, clan cult and loyalty, and low employment opportunities. Poverty is a potential threat to the peace and stability of the country. Education has been mentioned, especially in rural areas that are lagging.<sup>30</sup> Much of the quality education and universities are concentrated in the capital and a few other cities in Somaliland. Therefore, ensuring peace and stability across the country is dependent on how these issues are addressed. However, the government is responsible to tackle all those issues and should have the capacity to provide services to its people. It is the responsibility of the state to know how to foresee and manage conflicts and provide social justice and equality as well as fair distribution of resources and services to all citizens.

Another major challenge is the capacity gaps of students in terms of skills and knowledge. The students learn in universities, mostly to obtain a certificate. However, it's a grade-oriented learning rather than a knowledge-oriented scheme. This brings a major gap between theory taught in academic institutions and practices in the real world. In this case, overcoming the challenges facing the youth at the universities and secondary schools isn't an easy task. However, it is the responsibility of

---

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, 12.



those running the state to come up with solutions that can tackle the problems that face the youth in general. One of the major interventions that can at least build the morale of the youth is to invest to benefit the youth through skills and knowledge sharing platforms and programs, thus creating jobs and income sources for the students and their families. The investment could have different formats and types. Basic skills like negotiation, problem-solving, reflection, and critical thinking are core to promoting peace among all. University students should be able to learn and research on past challenges, other countries' experiences and proactively bring about solutions for their community. Furthermore and very important, university students should be the brain hub where analysis and discussions are made and solutions pertaining to societal problems are incubated. This kind of thinking seems to be absent from all universities in Somaliland.

Unemployment and underemployment are the major challenges facing youth in contemporary Somaliland. This has led many youth graduates to leave the country seeking better living conditions. Therefore, creating jobs and distributing them equitably and fairly is another important strategy that could help the youth. To realize this, the government, business people, and other influential bodies need to prioritize in bringing about changes to the society in terms of service and opportunity provided for the youth. University students and graduates require job opportunities, an enabling environment to thrive, and become promoters of peace in their country. A vision of hope about the future is vital for the survival of this great nation.<sup>31</sup>

To make Somaliland's peace and stability survive, the youth (including university students) should play an important role in this nation-building process. As they are the leaders of tomorrow, their needs and realities should be a priority within the state policies and strategies. According to UNFPA "*The Somali Youth in Figure Report*", youth between the ages of 18–35 make up 38% of the Somalia and Somaliland populations combined, making up more than one-third of the whole population of the two states.<sup>32</sup> Investing in the youth would lead to the sustainable path envisioned.

---

<sup>31</sup> Discussions with youth and civil society employees, Hargeisa, Somaliland.

<sup>32</sup> UNFPA (2015). *The Somali Youth in Figure Report*. Available at [https://www.unicef.org/about/annualreport/files/Somalia\\_2015\\_COAR.pdf](https://www.unicef.org/about/annualreport/files/Somalia_2015_COAR.pdf) UNFPA "The Somali Youth in Figure report". Accessed on May, 2017.

One of the major interventions which can help the youth graduates and encourage others is volunteering. Therefore, university students should be given opportunities to volunteer and change the theory into practice. In this sense, universities should have established, as part of their curriculum, community service, and practical skill sharing platforms such as internships. This supports the youth to get real-life practical experience and the communities' to benefit from the skills and knowledge of students. This is important and beneficial both to the student and society. For instance, Agriculture faculty students' could support farmers on the field while students can join a healthcare campaign throughout the country as part of their education.<sup>33</sup>

The curriculum of any country designs the future of their country and the next generation as well. Since its separation from the rest of Somalia in 1991, the civic education was never incorporated into the country's educational system. Most of the citizens' desertion from the country could be linked with the absence of civic education in the national curriculum. Without hesitation, Somaliland should revise its national curriculum by looking to international professional guidelines and standards for curriculum centers,<sup>34</sup> and this is what the Two Faces of Education Research (2000) authored by Diana and Kenneth underlines. As a state, the education curriculum must spell out the priorities of the country. Citizens' rights and responsibilities should be included in the curriculum to strengthen efforts to improve the country's conditions.

One of the very important mechanisms that can transform a conflict or sustain peace is holding a public gathering in which a renowned figure or a respected person within the community addresses the public. Indeed, different agents of socialization transform the citizens<sup>35</sup>, such as schools, mosques, universities, and other public halls and religious congregations. Therefore, holding national public awareness events on most key challenges facing Somaliland and jeopardizing its peace and stability is necessary. For instance, clan cult which deeply dominated the hearts and minds of the society is one of the key issues.<sup>36</sup> The clan utilization within the community for political and economic gaining brings about

---

<sup>33</sup> Interview with Ali a University teacher, Hargeisa, Somaliland.

<sup>34</sup> Discussions with youth and civil society employees, Hargeisa, Somaliland.

<sup>35</sup> A. S. Chauhan (2007). *Society and Environment*. New Delhi, India: Shri Sunil Kumar Jain.

<sup>36</sup> Interview with a teacher in Hargeisa, Somaliland.

segregation and conflict within the community in Somaliland as the current situation attests. In this regard, there is a need for a joint campaign to overcome and tackle the inappropriate portrayal of the country's history and use of language among others through the local media.<sup>37</sup>

To avoid the sensitivity of language and change the violent behavior of the citizens, the introduction of university courses mainly dealing with conflict prevention and sustaining peace and stability is necessary as well. The course should link formal education with a sense of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Given the emphasis on this point, university students and faculties should integrate this module on how education – formal or informal and language – affects peace positively or negatively.<sup>38</sup> The inclusion of this course into the curriculum will help in the understanding of a broader concept of issues of social justice, language use, to name but a few, and be used in different disciplines of study and practice.

## CONCLUSION

Somaliland has adopted a bottom-up approach in which grassroots movements involved in finding solutions, where the traditional elders took the lead and the engagement of international actors were minimized or in reality absent. This has made Somaliland's homegrown institutions endure. The philosophy behind this state of isolation was the realization that Somaliland elites and intellectuals were aware of the priorities and solutions that should be based on the context and culture of the Somali people thus producing sustainable institutions fitting to the culture and tradition of the people.

In addition to the institutional development, the peace in Somaliland has been going through different stages in different timelines – from civil wars, disarmament, building security institutions such as the police force and government buildings and structures, to name but a few. Now the government should focus on building the pride and the image of the country for the future through quality education with a particular emphasis on civic education. As a state, the focus should be on how to

---

<sup>37</sup> Discussions with youth groups in Hargeisa, Somaliland.

<sup>38</sup> Interview with a student studying Human Resource Management at University in Hargeisa, Somaliland.

build strong structures and systems that work for the citizens of the country and build sustained peace and development.

In Somaliland, though education has been on a rapid increase with an active and affirmative impact on the overall community development, peacebuilding processes, and democratization of the state, it was not without challenges. These challenges need to be addressed through capacity building programs to promote its effectiveness that could balance the interests of the citizens and the public simultaneously.

Therefore, building the capacity of the educational institutions should be a long-term key priority focusing on capacity, which requires more attention in a post-state-building endeavor not only from those who have concerns about the education sector. Rather, the main responsibility rests on the government shoulders to sketch ways forward and bring forth groundbreaking strategies to overcome the very institutional weaknesses of the educational institutions that remained in Somaliland since the 1990s.

## Emerging Foreign Bases in the Horn of Africa: A Sign of Hope or a Dilemma in Regional Security

*Amran Mohamoud Hassan*

### ABSTRACT

*The Horn of Africa has been a region of conflict and strife for the last six decades. The involvement of external powers and actors extremely impacted on the security and stability of the entire region. This study links the region's instability to the presence of foreign military bases both before the demise of the Soviet Union and post-9/11. While the region has been a victim of geopolitical problems from the known history, which has taken a negative toll on the security of the region, re-establishing foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa has implications for the security of the region in the long-term. Although re-establishing foreign military bases has benefited the region, for instance, in countering terrorism and combating piracy off the Somalian coast, the disadvantages loom large. This article argues that the political and economic engagements of the United Arab Emirates in this region affect the political and economic structures of the region, while disagreement between the Saudis, the Emirates, and the Egyptians on one side, Qatar and Turkey on the other, has exacerbated the region's already deteriorating situation and its political uncertainty which challenges the security of the region. The study relied both on primary and secondary data for analyzing the security of the region.*

### INTRODUCTION

The Horn of Africa, which has been a region of conflicts and strife for decades, straddles the Red Sea, bordering the oil-rich states of Arabia and the Bab-el-Mandab strait, which is one of the world's most important maritime routes<sup>1</sup> and which oil tankers constantly move through. According to Oğultürk (2017), around 12 percent of the world's petroleum passes through the Gulf of Aden.<sup>2</sup> This geopolitically crucial

---

<sup>1</sup> M. Makinda, Samuel (1982). Conflict and the Superpowers in the Horn of Africa, *Third World Quarterly*, no. 1. pp. 93 – 103.

<sup>2</sup> Oğultürk, Mehmet Cem (2017). Russia's Renewed Interests in the Horn of Africa as a Traditional and Rising Power, *Rising Powers Quarterly*, Volume 2, Issue 1, 2017, pp. 121–143.

region is also endowed with abundant natural resources with the presence of multi-ethnic groups and religions.<sup>3</sup> However, the region experiences many socio-economic problems which turned the region into a potential crisis zone and a proxy playing ground for external powers and actors with multiple intrastate and interstate conflicts erupting in the region over the years.<sup>4</sup>

It is important to note that the establishment of foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa dates back to the Cold War<sup>5</sup> period and the competition for global leadership between the United States and the Soviet Union. The geographical location of the region became important for the competing powers and advancement of their global ideological and military domination.<sup>6</sup> Given the emphasis on this point, the foreign military bases established during the Cold War in the region were based at Kagnew in Asmara, Eritrea; and Berbera, during the Somalia military government. Thus, such presence of foreign forces and competition between the major powers contributed and fueled regional and interstate conflicts.<sup>7</sup>

The United States' foreign policy-making towards the Horn of Africa combines several elements. The Horn itself has been a source of concern for decades and developed its specialists with their expertise and experience.<sup>8</sup> The early interest of the US in the region goes back to the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century following America's emergence as a Superpower and its interest to dominate the strategic gates of the world. Though the Americans were based in Eritrea during the olden days of the 1960s and early 1970s, America's

---

<sup>3</sup> Nasir M. Ali (2011). Ethio-Somaliland Relations Post-1991: Challenges and Opportunities, *International Journal of Sustainable Development*, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp.1–10.

<sup>4</sup> Bereket Habte Selassie (1980). *Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa*. United States of America: Monthly Review Press.

<sup>5</sup> Schwab, Peter (1978). Cold War on the Horn of Africa, *African Affairs*, no. 306. pp. 6–20.

<sup>6</sup> Nasir M. Ali (2014). Somaliland Security at the Crossroads: Pitfalls and Potentials, *American International Journal of Contemporary Research*, Vol. 4, No. 7, (July, 2014), pp. 98–108.

<sup>7</sup> Woodrooffe, Louise (2013). *Buried in the Sands of the Ogaden: The United States, the Horn of Africa, and the Demise of Détente*. Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press.

<sup>8</sup> Woodward, Peter (2006). *US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa*. England: Ashgate Publishing Company.

involvement in the Somalia internal affairs intensified when the military government offered a military base at Berbera following the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1977.<sup>9</sup>

In the post-Cold War period, the Horn of Africa, by all means, lost its geostrategic significance until the late 1990s. The 11 September terrorist attacks in the United States, and the growing global terrorist threat to global peace and security, and the sudden piracy on the Somali coast off has changed much about the situation of the region and as a result, its geostrategic importance had re-emerged. The counter-terrorism operations and the security of the Gulf of Aden waterways have brought together the West and the emerging powers<sup>10</sup> to secure the Gulf of Aden against the growing insecurity issues in the region which became a threat to this waterway.

From Somalia to Southeast Asia, it has been a hotbed of unrest which had a global implication for years<sup>11</sup>, as Sea pirates and *Al-Shabab* posed serious threats to the region, while on the other side, Yemen, which is currently in conflict, is also facing the region on the side, next to Bab-el-Mandab strait.<sup>12</sup> With the significance of the region, Horn became a center ground for foreign military forces, such as the United States, France, Japan, China, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Turkey. Also, other nations such as Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Germany have military personnel within the region, particularly in Djibouti. Furthermore and very important, China is the latecomer of the region and established its first-ever military base in a foreign country in Djibouti. It seems obvious that the arrival of the Chinese in Djibouti after the Americans may complicate the situation than expected. The reason is that the two countries: America and China, are at loggerheads fighting over global domination.

Therefore, the geographic location of the Horn is the major driver of the global competition, and the interest to secure and dominate the strategic gates of world states by establishing military bases. This can be attributed

---

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>11</sup> Gortzak, Yoav & M. Farley, Robert (2009). Fighting Piracy Experiences in Southeast Asia and off the Horn of Africa, *Journal of Strategic Security*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (February 2009), pp. 1–24.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 2.

to geopolitical and geostrategic factors. Therefore, this study examines how the increasing foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa might impact the security of the region. The article further examines the role of the Emirates in the affairs of the region and how it affected regional politics.

## THE MILITARY BASE: A SECURITY GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES

During the cold war, geopolitics was not more than the US-Soviet struggle for global primacy and domination. But what do geopolitics mean today for our “*unipolar world*”? The importance of territory has been disputed under globalization due to various factors, including growing transnational and multinational corporations, regional cooperation and mutual dependence, and others,<sup>13</sup> and consequently, today’s global politics demands a new look at the concept of territory and geopolitics together. Furthermore, geopolitics remains a vanguard factor that sustains the connection between the states with the territory.<sup>14</sup>

In the more recent past, traditional geopolitical analysis is transformed into a critical device for interrogating hegemonic geopolitics after the Cold War and is employed in the service of reconsidering discourses of danger that include: ‘*failed states*’, communal violence, small arms smuggling and proliferation, transnational crimes, such as terrorist networks, piracy, and drug trafficking.<sup>15</sup> As a point of illustration, these factors indicated earlier should be linked to a more peaceful and just international order which has not emerged following the demise of the USSR. Therefore, the development and application of a new paradigm of US foreign policy<sup>16</sup>; the construction and demonization of the ‘*rogue states*’, Arab uprising events in the Middle Eastern countries, the lingering conflict in Somalia, unilateral invasion of Iraq, the drone attacks in Pakistan; and the war continuing in Afghanistan as part of America’s “*war on terror*” should be attributed to geopolitics and

---

<sup>13</sup> Stiglitz, Joseph (2002). *Globalization and its Discontents*. New Delhi: the Penguin Group.

<sup>14</sup> Hobsbawn, E. (2007) *Globalization, Democracy and Terrorism*. London: Little, Brown Book Group.

<sup>15</sup> S. Gray, C. (2007), *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History*. New York: Routledge Ltd.

<sup>16</sup> Barry, T. & Honey, M. (2000) *Global Focus: U.S. Foreign Policy at the turn of the Millennium*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.



geostrategic factors.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, “*territory*” demonstrates how a critical geographical analysis, informed by political theory and history, can offer an urgently needed perspective on regional and global politics together.

The importance of geopolitics is related to global security. Although the concept of security is controversial, the end of the Cold War neither eliminated the international security threats nor regional vulnerabilities. Thus, the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the United States were another insecurity catastrophe that deeply exposed the traditional differences among the mainstream theories of international relations that mainly focuses on security and peace. For instance, the differences between the camps of traditional realism and critical theories have demonstrated an extreme debate and disagreement over the concept; therefore, the realism mainly advocated the strengthening of conventional security instruments and the borders of states, or building and establishing strong institutions responsible for governance to strengthen domestic control to prevent both people or governments from experiencing further intensified fears and threats. According to this argument, to ensure security at the national level, governments should be recommended to trust their ability to deter attacks or to defend against them. In this regard, such capacity has centered on the uses of military power among nation-states.<sup>18</sup>

Therefore, the emergence of security threats, particularly for the terror groups and piracy has brought the emergence of new military bases in many parts of the world. In Africa, for instance, the arrival of Americans was to secure and dominate the strategic gates of the African states and should be attributed to geopolitics and geostrategic factors. The Africom was established to fight the radical groups across the African continent, but this strategy has never helped the African states, but rather precipitated the emergence of waves of radical groups spreading across sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, the *Al-Shabab* in East Africa, Boko Haram and Taureg fighters in Nigeria and Mali respectively, and the *Al Qaeda* operatives in North Africa known as *Al Qaeda* in the Islamic Maghreb. This war transferred from Afghanistan was described as one of

---

<sup>17</sup> Charles-Philippe, D. & Grondin, D. (2006) *Hegemony or Empire: The Redefinition of US Power under George W. Bush*. London: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

<sup>18</sup> Nasir M. Ali (2014). Somaliland Security at the Crossroads: Pitfalls and Potentials, *American International Journal of Contemporary Research*, Vol. 4, No. 7, (July, 2014), pp. 98–108.

the most serious and aimless wars that the African states have ever involved in, which led many people to perish and displaced others.<sup>19</sup>

## THE HORN AND THE FOREIGN MILITARY BASES: PROS AND CONS

Overseas military facilities are an established instrument of power projection that addresses a wide spectrum of the political, military, economic, and other interests of states.<sup>20</sup> According to the United Nations disarmament and international security committees, military bases serve many functions, including launching platforms for military maneuvers, weaponry storage facilities, test-ranges for new weaponry, intelligence operations, and extra-judiciary transport for sending countries while also being used to promote states' economic and political objectives.<sup>21</sup>

Although overseas military bases dating back to ancient Greek, the modern military facilities in overseas territories are linked to the period of the Cold War.<sup>22</sup> The power projection of the two spheres of the Cold War and their allies created a rapid emergence of interests to gain worldwide strategic gates for their global power projection and the containment of their rival. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, main states that display overseas military bases have taken a new direction due to the deepening struggle against terrorism, which became the ultimate goal behind the re-emergence of global overseas military bases, especially after the September 2001 attacks in the United States.<sup>23</sup>

The geopolitical interests and the geostrategic location of the Horn of Africa should be considered as one of the leading factors that made countries in the region to become the playground of the Superpowers and serve as Cold War proxies which devastated the environment and led its citizens to remain in destitute and abject living conditions. As a result,

---

<sup>19</sup> Nasir M. Ali (2014a). Why the African States Fall Apart and Who is to be Blamed?, *Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Studies*, Vol. 2, Issue 03 (June, 2014), pp.417–427.

<sup>20</sup> Lachowski, Zdzislaw (2007). *Foreign Military Bases in Eurasia*, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 18. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

<sup>21</sup> Santos Lersch, Bruna dos & Simão Sarti, Josiane (2014). The Establishment of Foreign Military Bases and the International Distribution of Power, *UFRGS Model United Nations Journal*, Vol.2, p. 83–135.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

the massive maneuvers and the huge military equipment and installations supplied to the arc-foe regimes of the Horn from the Superpowers of the day had escalated the situation and led states in the region to the verge of collapse, and caused others to fall apart, like Somalia, which became a victim and an orphan of that War and submerged into a state of war, while its state institutions ceased to function as a state.<sup>24</sup>

In the post-Cold War period, Somaliland, which was a British Protectorate before it merged with the Italian colony in Somalia, declared its sovereign state claiming the boundaries it inherited from the British Government on 26 June 1960.<sup>25</sup> In many regards, Somaliland by its strategic location at the intersection of Africa and Asia, notably facing Yemen, plays a pivotal role in the post-Cold War system of states in the Horn region.<sup>26</sup> It lies, one could say, at the epicenter of a series of conflicts, real and potential, in both continents. On the contrary, it also has enjoyed noticeable growth in both economic prosperity and democracy since the 2000s. This is telling us that things in many areas are improving and Somaliland has been and remains a faithful Western ally. Therefore, some scholars argue that Washington should take the lead in not only recognizing, but also actively supporting Somaliland, a brave small state in size whose people's commitment to peace and democracy-building mirrors America's values as well as her strategic interests.<sup>27</sup>

On an economic front, the prominence of the geopolitics of the region has brought different powers to form bilateral relationships with the countries in the region. Djibouti's geopolitical leverage has flourished into multimillion-dollar investments from different foreign powers both in military facilities as well as economic infrastructures such as ports and railways. Similarly, Somaliland has gained remarkable investments for

---

<sup>24</sup> Nasir M. Ali (2015). "Overcoming Diplomatic Isolation: Forging a New Somaliland Approach". In Somaliland Statehood, Recognition and the Ongoing Dialogue with Somalia. Hargeisa: Social Research and Development Institute.

<sup>25</sup> Schoiswohl, Michael (2004). *Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized De Facto Regimes in International Law: The Case of 'Somaliland'*. Lieden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

<sup>26</sup> Robert, J. (2005). "U.S. Public Diplomacy: A Cold War Success Story?". A 2005-06 Cold War Studies Centre Seminar Series (2 November 2005) London, UK.

<sup>27</sup> Menkhaus, K. (2005). "Somalia and Somaliland: Terrorism, Political Islam, and State Collapse". In *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa* (eds). Virginia: R. R. Donnelley, Harrisonburg.

the development of Berbera Port by Dubai Port Management Company, the DP World as well as the UAE military base in Berbera Airport. Apart from the USA which established this military base for security and strategic objectives, the rest of the nations which established military bases in the region mainly did so for economic and trade interests.

It is important to note that the roles of the regional states are mixed and disregard any single explanation and logical point of analysis. The foreign power sponsored, fledging, and weak Federal Government of Somalia, for instance, have gained substantial development support from Turkey, including the military base which the Turkish government established in the outskirts of Mogadishu. This is the first overseas military base established by Turkey in a foreign country.<sup>28</sup> On the other hand, Eritrea which has been under sanctions for almost two decades is to embrace gains from its geostrategic location as it hosts the first UAE military base outside the Arab peninsula.<sup>29</sup> Besides, Ethiopia is taking its role as a regional hegemonic power where it involves much of the current dynamics both in security and economic development endeavors.<sup>30</sup> Without a doubt, the establishment of foreign military bases throughout the region has been described as a source of hard currency by regional states.

In terms of security, foreign military presence benefits to the security of the hosting state; the first instance lies in the creation of a security umbrella for the hosting country. This may be either overt or over-the-horizon. For instance, joint exercises such as the bright star in the Gulf, and the US Horn of Africa Combined Joint Task Force, provide tangible evidence of the security umbrella, which demonstrate the commitment of the foreign power to the hosting state by providing additional training and exercise for local forces.<sup>31</sup> On a larger plan, the reliance on a common foreign military presence might increase cooperation between

---

<sup>28</sup> Umer Karim, (2017). *Turkish and UAE Engagement in Horn of Africa and changing Geopolitics of the region*, Horn of Africa Bulletin. Available at <http://life-peace.org/hab/turkish-and-uae-engagement-in-horn-of-africa-and-changing-geopolitics-of-the-region/>. Accessed on October 17, 2018.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>31</sup> Peterson, J.E (2009). “*Foreign Military Presence and Its Role in Reinforcing Regional Security: A Double-Edged Sword*”. In *Arabian Gulf Security: Internal and External Challenges*. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research.

regional states much like how the presence of the United States military forces in the Horn of Africa is likely to increase cooperation between regional states. The reason being that certain regional states' such as Ethiopia, which is a long-term ally of the United States and have an influence on the regional states such as Djibouti, Somalia, and Somaliland could increase their collaboration.

On the contrary theoretical point of view, foreign military bases pose a security dilemma to the neighboring states, which is a condition in which efforts to improve national security have the effect of appearing to threaten other states, thereby provoking military countermoves which can lead to a net decrease in security for all states. Any military build-up or an additional layer of security arrangements made by one state provokes the rest of the states in the region.<sup>32</sup> By fact, during the Cold War, although the intention of the Superpower rivals was not to create a state of insecurity in the region, which may hinder their interest, provision of a large sum of military aid to their respective alliance states incited arms race in the region which later resulted in a full-scale military confrontation between states.<sup>33</sup>

It seems obvious that foreign military bases are a double-edged sword. Thus, disadvantages and liabilities are just great, in terms of the arms race and increase of political rivals within the region. Therefore, permitting the foreign military presence creates an association with the foreign power's foreign policy, which may create or increase domestic and regional opposition to the hosting country. One may argue that the reliance on common foreign military presence may strengthen more powerful regional states at the expense of weaker ones, thus, in turn, may lead to foreign policy initiatives by weaker states aimed at gaining a more significant international profile or enhanced relations with the foreign power at the expense of the stronger state.<sup>34</sup> Although this may not be the case in the Horn of Africa, one may inspect that there is regime survival under the umbrella of foreign forces, such as the case of Djibouti, where the president and his family rule the country for almost two decades.

---

<sup>32</sup> Najah M. Adam (2017). Berbera Basing Politics: Understanding Actors, Interests, and Animosity, *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, Vol, 11(7). Pp. 182–192.

<sup>33</sup> A. Lefebvre, Jeffrey (1998). The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somali-Soviet Arms Deal: Containment and the Balance of Power Dilemma in the Horn of Africa, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Dec., 1998), pp. 611–643.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

It is necessary and important to note that the presence of different foreign military forces throughout the region provided security opportunities for the regional states, for instance, in combating piracy and terrorist activities in the region. Without doubt, the United States, which has a longstanding security interest in Djibouti due to its location and the presence of different foreign military bases in the region, promotes the region's security and stability and strengthens the capacity of the state, in terms of security forces and their capacity to counter threats of pirates and terrorist networks.<sup>35</sup> However, the ultimate goal of any foreign force that has a foothold in the region is to realize their national interest that is linked to the region, whether it is security-related, commercial, or realization of regional and/or global hegemony. Thus, the role of foreign military bases in the security of the region intertwines with foreign policy and strategy of outside powers and undermines the role of the regional states.<sup>36</sup>

Furthermore, Middle Eastern countries' involvement in the Horn and the presence of multiple foreign military bases in the region could have security implications for the region. It is vital to note that Iran's threat to the region will increase if the Houthis fully control Yemen, an ally and Shia militia fighting against Yemen's Saudi supported the government. Therefore, it is under the impression of this article that the likelihood of the threat associated with these bases is higher than their positive impact to the regional security, considering the position taken by the regional states in the Yemeni conflict will have a direct impact to the security of the region if the Houthis win this War.

## RESOLUTIONS AND NEW HOSTILITIES

As a result of the Soviet demise, the directions of the US foreign policy were far from clear and in the subsequent years, there was an expression of reviews of possible directions that it could and should take. There was also much reflection on the US role historically and the approaches of the past with possible relevance for the future. Given the emphasis on this point, foreign military interests in the Horn of Africa have changed in the post-Cold War period.<sup>37</sup> During the Cold War, the primary foreign actors that actively undermined the security of the region were the United States

---

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 8.

and the Soviet Union, whose primary motivation was to deter any political influence of the other side. In the post-Cold War, the term foreign military bases have disappeared from scholarly studies of the region, as the majority of the regional states faced widespread conflicts and civil wars that have devastated most of the states within the region. As a result, foreign military interests from major foreign powers shifted from the Horn of Africa as the region lost its geostrategic credibility.

As a result of the rise of the threat of terrorism to global peace and security at the dawn of the 2000s, the United States, which is the global superpower, sought the importance of the Horn of Africa's to wage war on terror. Although the US motives behind its strong presence in the Horn of Africa are controversial, on the other hand, it's part of its global leadership on counter-terrorism. But, several other foreign militaries established long term facilities within the region. It is important to note that the current increasing foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa might be a revival of global multi-polar rivalry. Hence, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Horn of Africa may once again experience the bitterness of competitive geostrategic interest driven by intervention from outside.

Conversely, the Emirates engagement in the region is highly controversial, rotating from one state to another. In the most recent years, the UAE deeply involved in the politics of the region; for instance, the UAE has involved in solving the piracy crisis in Somalia and provided humanitarian aid to the Government of Somalia. On the other hand, the UAE signed an agreement with the Djibouti Government to operate Doraleh Port which is one of the most important ports in the region. While establishing a military base at the port of Assab in Eritrea, the UAE government has also sought to develop good relations with Ethiopia. Without a doubt, the Emirates end goal has both political and economic dimensions.

It is crucial to note that the DP World and the Djibouti Government are at loggerheads fighting over the ownership of the Doraleh Port. This container terminal invested by DP World was confiscated by the Djiboutian Government which put the relationship between the two countries in danger.

In the wake of Gulf standoff between Saudis, the Emirates, and the Egyptians on onside, and the Qatari on the other, the Emirates and its

allies sought the support of the Horn states for the political blockade of Qatar. The majority of the regional states sided with the former, with the exception of Somalia's fledgling government, which declined the request and announced its fake neutral position. The position of Somalia's foreign-sponsored Government towards the Gulf political crises soured relationship with the Emirates. While the increasing rift between Somaliland and Somalia over the Berbera military base and port management agreement with Emirates can be described as a spillover of Gulf crises.<sup>38</sup>

Equally important, the emergence of a new government in Ethiopia has changed the dynamics of the region, where the prolonged conflict over the border has finally ended by this government. This move led the two states to sign agreements to restore and normalize relations, resume flight services between the two countries, and Ethiopia to use port facilities in Eritrea. Thus, Djibouti's prominent position in the Horn of Africa region and its prime territory on the Red Sea, which it has successfully exploited, to offer both access to port and military bases by foreign countries may not sustain long enough or at least will reduce the revenue available to President Ismail Omer Guelleh. Though the two leaders of Djibouti and Eritrea met in Saudi Arabia, in the eyes of Djibouti, Eritrea is a growing threat both to the security and development of Djibouti, as the two countries have fought over Ras Doumeira. President Guelleh which perceived Ethiopia as a close ally and a friend may need to re-evaluate where his country stands. However, the Horn of Africa has been a complex region where alliance rarely remains for long.

On the other side of the coin, critics claim that the UAE hasn't planned to minimize the unexpected adverse effects of deploying its military power in the region. These effects include worsening the complicated political and military rivalries between neighbors such as Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Djibouti and Eritrea, Somalia and Somaliland and increasing the likelihood of a head-on collision. The latter two are in a standoff position, where the two are not willing to talk and discuss. In connection to this, the Emirates policy towards the Horn of Africa is short-term and fragmented; however, the UAE did not view the Horn as a strategically integrated entity and cherry-picked partners which happened to be the region's smallest and most vulnerable states. In other words, the UAE had adopted a high-risk approach from the start. In the post-Arab spring,

---

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 21.



the Emirates activism may unsurprisingly contribute to the militarization of the Horn of Africa and even more dangerously, alter the existing balance of power in this conflict-prone region. Indeed, the UAE has rapidly managed to establish a sphere of influence in the Horn. This influence may expand and help stabilize the region, but it should take into account the geopolitical interest of regional states and not undermine them.<sup>39</sup>

It is much clearer that throughout the history of the region, conflicts and hostilities between regional states have been boiled up and contributed by foreign intervention. As a new prominent player of the current political order of the Horn region, the UAE has already damaged relationships with regional states such as Djibouti and Somalia were both states claim that the UAE is employing an expansionist strategy for the region. On the other hand, the Yemen conflict and the Gulf's internal crisis have projected Somaliland into a position of geopolitical prominence. Both developments enhanced its strategic importance to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which means that even as Mogadishu faces the prospect of potentially crippling cash crunch, Somaliland stands to reap a hefty financial windfall.<sup>40</sup>

For political and economic ends, both Djibouti and Somalia oppose Somaliland's new position for different reasons. The former feeling threat towards its geostrategic significance, and the later, concerned on political ties between Somaliland and the UAE are a violation of its sovereignty rights under the international law.<sup>41</sup> While Somaliland disagrees with those arguments and believes that it has the attributes of statehood enshrined in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of the States in 1933. This Convention defines a state, as a person of international law and should possess a permanent population, a defined territory, government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.<sup>42</sup> However, the Horn of Africa being a fragile region in terms of security, the presence of weak governance institutions, and lack

---

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>42</sup> J. Carroll, Anthony & B. Rajagopal (1993). *The Case for the Independent Statehood of Somaliland*. American University Journal of International Law and Policy. pp. 653 – 683.

of negotiation capacity will lead to new hostility and competition between regional countries for political and economic reasons.

On the other hand, the ongoing peace agreements and normalization of Ethiopia's political relations with the other regional states such as Eritrea and Somalia deserve questioning. What is the reason behind the sudden need to resolve and the involvement of the Gulf States, particularly the United Arab Emirates to decades' old hostilities? Eritrea has obvious appeal to Gulf military strategists; it has well-developed military facilities, experienced military forces, and on the other hand, is close to Yemen's important southern tip. On the other hand, the strategy of the Djibouti regime towards the utilization of its important location, particularly its new ties with China are not something that is welcomed by the United States and its Gulf allies. Thus, the speedy conflict resolutions under the leadership of Ethiopia and with the support of the Emirates whom one can say is representative of the United States interest and its Gulf allies are much to do with the expansion of available options to their presence in the region. On the regional level, landlocked Ethiopia's strategic drive to reduce its dependency on Djibouti's port for imports and exports through the refurbishment, development, and use of other regional ports is the prime motive for its lead towards regional stabilization.

## SECURITIZATION OF REGIONAL PORTS

The term "securitization" has been popularized in the study of international relations by the writings of the Copenhagen School. It is meant as a critical term for how fields hitherto unrelated to security concerns become "securitized" by actors who attach a national security value to them. It is necessarily important to note that in the post-9/11 increased threat of terrorism, major foreign aid donors attached great elements of the security policy to aid, making aid means of achieving security.<sup>43</sup> It is not the position of this article to evaluate the securitization of foreign aid but to examine the level of securitization that has been attached to port development in the Horn of Africa. As the number of foreign military forces in the region as well as the commercial deals targeting specific regional ports increase, development in the wider

---

<sup>43</sup> Brown, Stephen. Gravingholt, Jörn & Raddatz, Rosalind (2016). *The Securitization of Foreign Aid: Trends, Explanations and Prospects* (eds). Basingstoke, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp. 237–255.

Red Sea region has turned the Horn's coastline into a strategic location for foreign actors and has resulted in an international base race.

This has led to the securitization of the regional ports, with commercial port deals almost acting as antecedents of the construction of foreign military bases.<sup>44</sup> The increasing involvement of foreign countries in Horn's ports has a significant impact on the region, as the substantial flow of foreign funds from investments and rents from military bases gives foreign actors considerable influence over Horn politics. Examples can be found in Somaliland's support of the Saudi-UAE side in Qatar diplomatic crises; Djibouti, officially supported Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and its downgrading of diplomatic relations with Qatar; and Mogadishu's refusal to side against Qatar, in part, is due to its close relationship with Turkey, an ally of Qatar.<sup>45</sup>

## THE SHIFTING BALANCE OF POWER

The view that regionalism should be treated as the critical unit of analysis in international politics gained greater prominence after the Cold War. Defining regionalism, as the level where states are linked together sufficiently tight and that their security cannot be considered separate from one another. Accordingly, Waever and De Wilde (1998), argued that much of the world could be divided into local security complexes.<sup>46</sup> Given the intense security interaction between Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia, the Horn of Africa form a region under this interpretation. The nature of the state in the Horn of Africa is a state security-centric, where the perception of the weakness of rival states is interpreted as leverage for the other side. Do states benefit from the insecurity and political crises of their opponents, particularly regions like the Horn of Africa? Scholarly focus on the regional level in the distribution of power suggests that firstly regional powers need to pose superiority in terms of basic power capabilities compared to their neighbors. These are measured in terms of demographic size, economic capacity, and military competence. There must be inequity in the distribution of power,

---

<sup>44</sup> Willem van den Berg & Jos Meester, (2018). *Port and Power: the securitization of port politics*, Horn of Africa Bulletin. Available at <http://life-peace.org/hab/ports-and-power/>. Accessed on October 17, 2018.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.

<sup>46</sup> Buzan, B., Weaver, O. & de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security – A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rinner Publishers, Inc. pp. 9–17.

allowing the regional power to exert influence on the region. They must have political aspirations to dominate neighbors or at least be the leader in regional matters if domination is not attainable.<sup>47</sup>

In a purely material term, but also relative to its neighbors, Ethiopia has a good claim to be a regional power. First, with a population somewhere close to 100 million, it is demographically much larger than its neighbors. The second point to note is that it is the Horn of Africa's largest and arguably best-equipped military. Additionally, Ethiopia remains by some distance to the region's biggest economy. Thus, the distribution of power capabilities within the Horn of Africa overwhelmingly favors Addis Ababa.<sup>48</sup> A major disadvantage in Ethiopia is its landlocked status where it depended on Djibouti for access to the sea for decades. Therefore, as we have discussed in the previous section, Ethiopia is seeking to diversify its access to regional ports. Thus, Ethiopia's intention to diversify its options is certainly creating a shift of power not only by the hegemonic level but on a lesser scale. Indeed, the regional ports have been transformed into political leverage in countries like Somaliland, Somalia, and Djibouti which are the center states for strategic Horn of Africa waterways.

## CONCLUSION

The concept of foreign military bases and the level of impact on the security of the region is multi-faceted and disregard any single description. What makes the situation in the region more complex is the existence of multiple actors and diversified interests surrounding to the geopolitics of the region. The current conflicts in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly the rift between the Gulf States and the Yemeni War, and the involvement of certain Gulf States in the Horn of Africa region make the security of the region uncertain. On the other hand, the presence of both the Chinese and the United States and their interests in the region creates a vacuum of hostility and competition. It is important to keep in mind that the impact of the Cold War and the legacy of the race for global domination between the United States and the Soviet Union to the Horn of Africa region still remains apparent.

---

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 39.

It is necessary to conclude that the presence of foreign forces throughout the region has a remarkable impact to the determent of insecurity issues in the region such as the efforts against countering the presence of terrorist groups in the region and piracy; yet, many uncertainties surround the future of the security of the region. Based on those risks and security threats associated with the foreign interests, the regional states should: a) establish a strong state foreign policy which aids the interest of their national interest and that of the region at large, rather than assisting realization of foreign interest for currency and other futile advantages at the expenses their people; b) establish strong state institutions with experts on negotiation and diplomacy that would benefit regional states, particularly in the case of Somaliland; and, c) based on the security risks associated with the establishment of foreign military bases, regional states need to negotiate the terms of these conditions more carefully and inclusively. Military bases entail negotiation of two states in the realm of international law through the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) or Status of Force Agreements (SOFA). Thus, agreements entered with other states in terms of leasing a military base plot must be strictly guided by these laws, rather than a few dollars on the expenses of state delegates.

## Effects of Droughts on Pastoralist and Agro-Pastoralist women in Somaliland

*Maria Abdilahi Gaheir*

### ABSTRACT

*Droughts have long been affecting the Somali society, particularly in arid and semi-arid regions. Although these persistent and recurrent droughts have affected all the members of the community in Somaliland, both in urban and rural areas, they have had a rather adverse impact on pastoral and agro-pastoral women. These vulnerable groups of society become victims of changing climate and ecological patterns than any other section of the community as droughts put greater risk on their livelihoods. This study assesses the impact of droughts on Somaliland's pastoralist and agro-pastoralist women. The study has relied on both primary and secondary data. In the primary data, focus group discussions and key informant interviews were employed, while literature related to the subject were also reviewed. The study found that the pastoralist and agro-pastoralist women have struggled against long-lasting problems and difficulties, as most of them, if not all, have lost livestock and crops against the shocks of climate, and witnessed shortage or absence of rainwater and pasture. As a result, their social lives have suffered most and changed for the worst. However, there are no early mitigation measures for the onset of persistent and perilous recurrent droughts. Meanwhile, prolonged droughts continue to reduce the number of herds and crops owned by these hardworking women which significantly diminishes their sole source of income. While the negative impacts of drought are highly gendered, the responses from both the Somaliland Government and civil society organizations are highly holistic and don't give attention to gendered impact. It is essential to make these responses gendered if there is a need to bring about change to the most marginalized parts of society – the women.*

### INTRODUCTION

Somaliland was one of the British Protectorates in Africa before it gained its independence from the United Kingdom on 26 June 1960. It is a semi-

arid<sup>1</sup> region in the Horn of Africa, with a population estimated around 4.5 million, in which 55% and 45% are female and male respectively.<sup>2</sup> Equally important, over 50% of the population is nomadic or semi-nomadic.<sup>3</sup> This makes the country's economy highly dependent on livestock and livestock products as well as agricultural production. Although the country's economy has been shrinking due to several reasons, on the other hand, the recurrence of droughts has extremely weakened the entire economy.

Climate shocks can generally have distressing consequences for assets, capital, and savings. Assets such as livestock and crop serve as more than a safety net for coping with climate shocks. They provide people with a productive resource, nutrition, collateral for credit, and a source of income to meet health and education costs, while also providing security in the event of crop failure. In this regard, their loss increases potential vulnerability. Therefore, it is comprehensible that climate shocks create a distinctive threat to coping strategies. Unlike other challenges and threats to society such as diseases whose impact may be contained in some way and affect certain groups, climate shocks affect every household in society. If all affected households sell their assets to sustain the lives of their families, asset prices can be expected to fall. This brings in damage to their economic capability resulting in weakened coping strategies and reinforcing wider inequalities in the process.<sup>4</sup> Equally important, climate change reduces the capacity of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists to cope with irregular rainfall patterns as many rural livelihoods have adapted to the main rainy seasons. Accordingly, droughts and climate change have profoundly different effects on women and men. Its impact on women is greater than men.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Guleid A. Jama (2016). "Cycle of Droughts: Natural Disaster or Manmade Catastrophe", Center for Policy Analysis, Briefing Paper No. 4, Hargeisa, Somaliland.

<sup>2</sup> Ministry of National Planning and Development (2017). *Somaliland National Development Plan II*. Hargeisa: Ministry of National Planning and Development.

<sup>3</sup> Hartmann, Ingrid and J. Sugulle, Ahmed (2009). *The Impact of Climate Change on Pastoral Societies of Somaliland*. Germany: Heinrich Boell Foundation, pp. 1–62.

<sup>4</sup> UNEP (2018). *Women leaders come together to fight climate change*. Available at <https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/story/women-leaders-come-together-fight-climate-change>. Accessed on June 18, 2018.

<sup>5</sup> Nhamo, Godwell (2014). Addressing women in climate change policies: A focus on the selected east and southern African countries, *Agenda*, 28:3, 156–167.

In Somaliland pastoralists and agro-pastoralists face socio-economic and environmental challenges brought by devastating and frequent droughts that continually threaten the livelihoods of pastoralist and agro-pastoralist women. While both men and women experience droughts, women are the main victims and commonly face higher risks than men. Such instances increase the burdens on women due to the negative impacts of drought and climate change. Traditionally, they are responsible for securing food, fetching firewood, and water for their household by traveling to distant places away from their homes, families, and communities. However, the women and children share a disproportionate part of the consequences of drought as it affects the economy of the pastoral and agro-pastoral society i.e. livestock, livestock products, and agricultural production. It does not only affect the livelihoods of the pastoral and agro-pastoral community but also the livestock and livestock products and agricultural production significantly contribute to the coffers of the national treasury.<sup>6</sup>

The central objective of this study is, therefore, to evaluate the impact of drought on pastoralist and agro-pastoralist women in Somaliland. In this regard, drought, changing climate, land degradation and desertification, and deforestation are the primary causes of the severe problems facing rural society. The effects accumulate and result in social and economic problems that affect the vulnerable section of society. Those problems are mainly caused by poor governance and lack of responsive policies from responsible institutions that protect the interests of disadvantaged communities. Currently, policies are much more leaning towards the wealthy and not quite supportive of the poor in the state of Somaliland.

## DROUGHTS AND GENDERED ECONOMY IN THE RURAL SETTINGS

Indubitably, pastoralism, and agro-pastoralism is an important and subsistent lifestyle in Somaliland. Over 50% of the population practices pastoralism and agro-pastoralism and relies on livestock and livestock products as its source of income.<sup>7</sup> The sole source of livelihood for pastoralists in the production and trading of livestock. But this has never been without its challenges. One of those challenges is the male dominance of the Somali society, where the asset of the family falls in

---

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>7</sup> Kedir Jemal & Nasir M. Ali (2017). *Mitigating Natural Disasters in Somaliland: Policy Options and Strategies*, IPCS Paper, No. 002 (November 2017). Pp. 1–8.



the hands of the male.<sup>8</sup> This has its effect on the families' livelihoods as the male mostly engages in chewing Khat and other substances which mostly drains the small amount of money the family has. However, to overcome this challenge of the domination of men on the family's economy, there are other livelihood schemes in which women groups have access to it an alternative income, including investment in grinding mills, value addition in milk processing, and crop processing into other forms of foods such as grinding grain to make raw flour among others. Indeed, pastoralists' women are almost invariably struggling strained economic conditions even during the mundane periods as they rely on the income from selling milk and periodic retail of livestock herds.

The monopolization of the scarce resources of the family by the male has affected the livelihoods of the family and greatly affected the women and the children who are subjected to malnutrition. However, droughts also aggravate the already worsening situation of women in rural areas. For instance, women do not have the early mitigation measures for the onset of the pervasive and perilous recurrent droughts, as prolonged droughts kill livestock herds and destroy their sole income source, and eventually put them in vulnerable positions. In reality, the extended droughts force some people to sell their livestock which in turn makes them even more vulnerable to the next droughts.<sup>9</sup>

However, the agro-pastoralist women are more permanent than the pure pastoralist women, where the latter rears a manageable number of livestock herds mainly cattle for milking purposes. Also, they are tilling varieties of crops, including stable sustenance and horticulture. This type of social cluster is more likely to get access to information, knowledge, grants, credit, and saving systems as humanitarian workers are always operating in semi-permanent and/or agro-pastoral zones. The combination of these factors enables them to have diversified income sources and a few more foods that are nutritious than the pure pastoralist women have.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> Gardner, Judith & El Bushra, Judy (2004). *Somalia: The Untold Story – the War through the Eyes of Somali Women*. London: Pluto Press.

<sup>9</sup> Abdulkadir G (2017). Assessment of Drought Recurrence in Somaliland: Causes, Impacts, and Mitigations, *Journal for Climatology and Forecasting*, Volume 5, Issue 2. Pp. 1–12.

<sup>10</sup> Interview with former Havoyoco Staff in Hargeisa, Somaliland.

As a result of the droughts, the women in agro-pastoral communities are quite mobilized and possess slightly more resilient strategies than pastoral women when the pasture is depleted and denuded. However, this group affords the fodder for their lactating cattle because of their availability, particularly at the onset of the drought hitherto midterm, depending upon the scale of the drought.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, the agro-pastoral women are more likely to migrate to bigger towns, and then become internally displaced persons in shanty towns and bursting at the seams.

It is customary to recover from the effects of droughts by selling the surviving livestock, livestock products, and agricultural production to fill the gap that has emerged from the changing environment. However, in the most recent years, the people have lost their livestock due to the drought, particularly in the eastern regions of Somaliland. During the 2016 and 2017 droughts, for instance, in the Sanaag region, the family who owned 100 herds was left with only 30 which survived from the drought.<sup>12</sup> It is very difficult for such families to send some of their remaining livestock to the market to save others.

Essentially, environmental difficulties and climate change put the rural areas in a vulnerable position and have a negative impact on the livelihoods of the population.<sup>13</sup> Hence, droughts have drastically affected pastoralist society, especially women. Women are vulnerable than men because they lactate, breastfeed, care, and perform most of the work at a household level. In that sense, they need sufficient nutrition to regain the energy spent on work and maternal responsibilities. However, during the drought and the dry season, the women are unable to receive nutritious food and in turn, whatever the family receives the mother will pass it on to the children rather than themselves. This makes the women the most vulnerable figure within the family and puts their life in danger.<sup>14</sup>

## THE IMPACT OF DROUGHTS ON SOCIAL ASSETS

In most of Africa's drylands, rainfall is generally minimal though it greatly varies in time and space in terms of both inter-annual and inter-

---

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>14</sup> Focus Group Discussion with Arro-Malko agro-pastoralist women in Gabiley, Somaliland.

seasonal scales. As a result of those harsh environments, dryland areas are characterized by a difficult environment that is prone to high agricultural production risk<sup>15</sup>. Somaliland, a semi-arid region in the Horn of Africa is not immune to the climate problems and continued climate variation that affects large parts of the Horn region. Recurrent droughts are looming and remain the major natural disasters that destroy the lives and livelihoods of many citizens in Somaliland. However, despite witnessing the negative impact of Saqar, a tropical cyclone that hit Somaliland in 2018, a decrease in rainfall is considered to be the major driver of the frequent droughts that have significant environmental and economic impacts on the affected areas. In connection to this, the pastoral society is the primary victim of the rainfall shortage which directly affects the bases of their livelihoods.<sup>16</sup>

It appears that the droughts have created multifaceted vulnerabilities that affected the livelihoods of the pastoral and agro-pastoral societies, such as the number of livestock declining drastically because of the recurring droughts which extremely affect the environment. While the lives of the pastoral and agro-pastoral societies have been depending on the products of livestock and agricultural production such as ghee, milk, skin and hide, and crops. As a result of the droughts, the lives of the vulnerable section of the society such as women, children, and elderly persons are immensely affected.<sup>17</sup>

The fact remains, that vulnerability analysis should be linked to mitigation activities to provide insights for understanding the effects of any hazard on the people, livestock, and environment. On the other hand, while the pastoral societies fulfill their nutritious demands from the products they get from their livestock, the changing way of life as a consequence of climate change forces the families to send livestock products to the market to fill the gap that has emerged from the changing environment. As a result, the women who eat last in the families have faced colossal malnutrition and malnourishment.<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup> R. Adano, Wario (2012). “*Pastoralist Resources, Conflict and Climate Change in the Horn of Africa*”. In *Climate Change and Pastoralism: Traditional Coping Mechanisms and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*. Addis Ababa: Eclipse Printing Agency.

<sup>16</sup> Interview with a senior consultant at National Disaster Preparedness and Food Reserve Authority, Hargeisa, Somaliland.

<sup>17</sup> ActionAid (2015). *Drought Needs Assessment, Somaliland*. Somaliland: ActionAid.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

Without a doubt, drought brings more burdens to the women, in particular, as the family moves from one place to another in search of pasture and water. On this occasion, when the men move with some livestock, some others like calves and women are left home, this would increase the workload of the women. Also, the accessibility of water becomes scarce while other resources such as the grazing land face degradation. Therefore, the vulnerability of women becomes apparent. These vulnerabilities are linked to the responsibility of the women to fetch water and collect hay, to name but a few.

It is also observed that as drought hits the pastoralist areas more, there is a trend to move from raising cattle to the camel which is a disadvantage to the women as cattle stay around the household while the camels travel to far places. However, as a result of the severe drought, the milk decreases as women mostly generate income from selling milk, which means less income for the women. Therefore, the women, who are the heads of households, are more vulnerable to the impact that drought might have than any other women since they also try to do the men's role in the community which is mainly taking the livestock from one area to another.

Drought affects every type of assets and capitals which women used to access (not own) jeopardizing the whole family members' survival. Crop yield is reduced and livestock trade can also be reduced during periods of recurrent rain failures. The financial security of women is affected as women are the primary food providers for most families in Somaliland.<sup>19</sup>

This, in turn, made women more vulnerable by adding burden and responsibility which absorb much of their time, energy, and attention. As a result, their final decision for a considerable number of pastoralist women is to drop-out from pastoral livelihood either to sit hopelessly waiting for the hands of the donors and the government or to migrate to the nearest urban centers looking for alternative livelihoods.<sup>20</sup>

On the other hand, the loss of livestock due to droughts made many livelihoods weak and prone by facing socio-economic challenges caused by droughts. Women do not only face financial problems during harsh seasons but potentially face higher rates of domestic violence that put

---

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 10.

women at greater risk of sexual gender-based violence (SGBV) if they leave their localities.<sup>21</sup> In this case, women were unable to fetch food, water for the children, and go to relief centers to collect food aid for survival due to the risks of rape and other related abuses. This means that it is likely that pastoral women and girls walk through forest and mountains to fetch water and firewood and are being exposed to threats including rape and other physical assault. During the humanitarian emergency, for instance, there is often a greater chance the women experience gender-based violence (GBV).<sup>22</sup> Similarly, the agro-pastoral women are also vulnerable to economic exploitation of the track workers who work in vicinities and outskirts surroundings.

Equally important, drought impacts health in many ways and it depends on both the duration and severity of the drought and also the economic and social fabric of the community,<sup>23</sup> in particular to women and girls whose health has been found to decline more than male health in times of food shortages. As the women are in the throes of the drought, they get debilitated and then become susceptible to various diseases because of lack of food and looms over the loss of livestock as well as famine which is inevitable during the drought periods. When there isn't enough food to eat, their nutritional intake is reduced and they often experience increased labor work during a drought, which reduces their physical ability and overall health.<sup>24</sup> This makes women more vulnerable to an illness or diseases because they don't get clean water, adequate food to eat to get energy because of gendered roles and the burden of care for the family falls on them. Also, there is poor sanitation resulting in absence of latrines and clean water, which have negative implications for the health and the wellbeing of the women and children.

---

<sup>21</sup> Pinna, Monica (2017). *Crisis in Somaliland: drought and famine threaten millions*. Available at <https://www.euronews.com/2017/05/11/crisis-in-somaliland-drought-and-famine-threaten-millions>. Accessed on June 15, 2018.

<sup>22</sup> Interview with Candlelight Officer in Burao, Somaliland.

<sup>23</sup> Bifulco, Maurizio & Ranieri, Roberta (2017). Impact of drought on human health, *European Journal of Internal Medicine*, Vol. 46, pp. 1–3.

<sup>24</sup> UN Women Watch (2009). *Women, Gender Equality and Climate Change*. Available at [http://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/climate\\_change/downloads/Women\\_and\\_Climate\\_Change\\_Factsheet.pdf](http://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/climate_change/downloads/Women_and_Climate_Change_Factsheet.pdf). Accessed on June 10 2018.

As a result of drought, the home task of women increases. Thus, the workload and deficiency of food weaken the health of women<sup>25</sup> making them more susceptible to various diseases such as anemia, infectious diseases, cholera or salmonella, malnutrition, and skin disease which can affect their health. The maternal and infant mortality rate of pastoralist and agro-pastoralist women have increased during the droughts in Somaliland, and even if they survive in the initial moment, the health implications will not be easy.

### ADOPTING ENVIRONMENT-FRIENDLY POLICIES FOR A BETTER RURAL SOCIETY

Recurrent droughts have expanded the gender inequalities between men and women, boys and girls, and also increased the drop-out rates of school children. Meanwhile, the pastoralist and agro-pastoralist women remain the most drought-affected section of the society in Somaliland. Nevertheless, the drought challenges persist and the future of the pastoral and agro-pastoral women depends on the intervention from the state institutions that are responsible for the environment and rural development.

Emphasizing this point, pastoralist and agro-pastoralist women do not have the early warning and mitigation measures and mechanisms for the onset of the pervasive and perilous recurrent droughts, while any prolonged droughts perish the huge number of herds and destroyed the crops which are the sole source of income which increases their vulnerability.

In this respect, while the pastoral and agro-pastoral women have struggled with unbearable climate difficulties and shocks, weak economic sources, and social problems that put them in a vulnerable position, it is necessarily important to adopt policies and strategies to overcome the major challenges that face them. However, it is needed to mobilize and build their knowledge of climate variability and its changes, organize them into structural units as cooperatives and associations, establish in diversified livelihood incomes, improve water source availability at communal levels so that the women wouldn't be forced to move a long distance if drought happens, as well as training in horticulture systems.

---

<sup>25</sup> Diletta Carmi (2016). *The Gender Dimensions of Drought in Fedis Woreda District, Ethiopia*. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Moreover, it is important to put in place policies that encourage gender equality with a particular emphasis in rural areas to reduce the vulnerability of women during droughts and famines and focus on the nutrition of breastfeeding and pregnant women to reduce maternal mortality during droughts.

## CONCLUSION

Droughts have been affecting Somaliland for centuries and had a huge impact on individuals and families. However, the drought has deeply affected pastoralist and agro-pastoralist women who are more vulnerable and become victims of climate change than any other section of the society in rural areas. Indeed, the immediate, direct, or indirect impacts of drought on pastoralist and agro-pastoralist women are multidimensional and multifaceted, but several factors have greatly affected the women. The source of livelihood for pastoralists and agro-pastoralist depended on livestock and livestock products. This makes those people sell their livestock, livestock products, and agricultural production to sustain their lives and livelihoods. Due to the frequent droughts, crop production has failed, while the number of herds and flocks dramatically decreased as a result of the severe drought that hit the state.

However, while the Somaliland state is vulnerable in many ways, several issues are considered to be the source of Somaliland's state fragility, including weak institutions in terms of policies, infrastructures, and law enforcement machinery, in particular, at the margins to tackle the changing environment. Since 1991, when Somaliland separated from the rest of Somalia, its successive governments have failed to develop policies and strategies in favor of the environment and pastoral communities on which the livelihoods of the urban people are also dependent. Albeit the lack of those policies, on the other hand, the existing policy implementation is another critical issue that needs particular attention from the decision-makers. However, the urbanization and rural-urban mobility patterns that now prevail throughout much of Somaliland present policymakers with a dilemma. The fact, however, remains that the absence of coherent policies and programs at the national, regional and local levels hamper any efforts to address the environmental challenges faced by the communities both in the rural and in the urban centers. This needs urgent intervention from the state to preserve national security and state survival in the long term.

## ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) is a higher learning and research institution based in and operating within the institutional framework of the University of Hargeisa, Somaliland. The IPCS was established by the University of Hargeisa in collaboration with the Center for Justice and Peacebuilding of the Eastern Mennonite University in the United States in February 2008, in response to the long-recognized call for an in-depth multidisciplinary approach to understanding and addressing the conflict and violence that has engulfed many parts of the Horn of Africa. The mission of the IPCS is to provide interested scholars, institute members, and students with opportunities to engage in intensive study and research on Somaliland and Somali-inhabited regions in the Horn of Africa on an interdisciplinary basis.

## ABOUT THE JOURNAL

The Somaliland Peace and Development Journal (SPDJ) is an annual peer-reviewed academic journal published by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies of the University of Hargeisa. The journal's core mission is to enhance understanding of peace, conflict management, and development through research and publication. In its holistic multidisciplinary approach to research, the journal aims to increase the capacity of people to analyze and better understand the fundamental causes of social, economic, political, and environmental challenges through the facilitation of healthy and intellectual dis-

cymakers inside and outside of Somaliland on several issues related to peace, security, and development. Furthermore, the journal serves as a vehicle for broader dissemination of research findings to inform policymaking. Towards this holistic objective, the journal focuses on the following thematic areas:

- peace and conflict
- governance and security
- geopolitical and geostrategic issues
- migration
- political violence
- inter-clan strife
- education, conflict, and peacebuilding
- cultural learning of policymaking processes
- environmental and climate change
- media and conflict



## THIS ISSUE

### ARTICLES

Post-Conflict State Reconstruction in Somaliland: An African Perspective of Statebuilding Processes

Mohamed Farah Hersi

Interrelations Between Education and Peace in Somaliland: Perceptions from University Students

Zuhur Yasin Ibrahim

Emerging Foreign Bases in the Horn of Africa: A Sign of Hope or a Dilemma in Regional Security

Amran Mohamoud Hassan

Effects of Droughts on Pastoralist and Agro-Pastoralist Women in Somaliland

Maria Abdilahi Gaheir