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- The articles should be original and should not have been published previously, online or in print format.
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- Title: Include a title of not more than 15 words
- Abstract: Include an abstract of not more than 350 words
- Diagrams, figures, maps and other graphic materials: should be placed in the appropriate place in the manuscript and captions should be provided immediately below its figure.

The Journal reserve the right to alter and omit all articles submitted to assure the quality, or reject a paper, even after it has been accepted for publishing if it becomes apparent that there are serious problems challenging the quality and integrity of the Journal.

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GUEST EDITOR'S NOTE

The process of the creation and consolidation of statehood and nationhood in Africa is still in progress. The Weberian benchmark when ascribed to modern states have unbelievable effects on the developmental trajectory of young states most of which are in Africa. One of such benchmarks relates to international recognition of which Somaliland is not- at least at the moment. Such effects- mostly negative include; the inability to formally access foreign direct investment and aid as well as other capital necessary to develop the infrastructure required for a modern state. In an era where democratization seems to be an added requirement for accessing foreign development assistance, Somaliland- one of the most democratic but internationally unrecognized state remains a puzzle. The country has a democratically elected government with several peaceful transitions- a rarity in the continent, freedom of speech and the press and a very resilient population. What explains this puzzling resilience may be the existence of a mixture of indigenous and formal governance system and a clannish social protection mechanism which ensures the smooth functioning of the state. Against this backdrop, the country faces enormous governance challenges typical of African states. This issue of the Somaliland Peace and Development Journal attempts to address some of the challenges.

This issue of the SPDJ attempts to tie together the multi-dimensional links between issues of land conflict, customary law and traditional leaders in conflict resolution, the role of the civil society in the electoral process, urban poverty, youth unemployment and the role of the media- all within the context of a democratic functional state without international recognition.

On the issue of traditional leadership in Somaliland, the articles by Abdi Abokor Yusuf and Nimo Abdi Omar are very instructive. While Abdi Yusuf examines the phenomenon of the proliferation of traditional leaders and the changing roles in contemporary Somaliland, Nimo Omar on the other hand looks at the critical role played by traditional leaders in conflict resolution. Abdi Yusuf argues that, there is a link between the proliferation of traditional leaders in Somaliland and their changing role within the context of new governance systems of democracy, elections and multi-partyism. Nimo Omar's article on its part operationalizes the nexus between traditional systems used in conflict resolution and the modern state apparatus and its role of providing social services for the people. On the whole, these two articles provide the reader with the an intricate understanding of the complexity of an evolving traditional system within the context of a modern state.

On the issues of urban poverty and youth unemployment, the articles by Abdirizak Mohamoud Osman and Muse Abdillahi Muhumed examine the challenges of urban poverty and the link between youth unemployment and security respectively. Abdirizak Osman argues that the causes of urban poverty in Somaliland capital of Hargeisa are multi-dimensional and manifest itself in the form of inadequate basic services and goods such as clean drinking water, nutritious food, lack of hygiene and sanitation, lack of health facilities, etc. The scenario painted here is smacks of the characteristics of an underdeveloped country with the normal challenges of ineffective or non-existent planning for development. He recommends that the government of Somaliland should prepare a comprehensive and inclusive national planning for poverty reduction, employment creation and the promotion of investment in national productive assets. On his part Muse Abdillahi situates the highly unemployed youthful population of Hargeisa as a threat to security. The nexus between youth unemployment and security is well empirically established within the continent of Africa with Somaliland not being an exception. He argues that, nepotism, corruption and unfair job recruitment systems have been the primary causes of youth unemployment in the city. In summary, these two articles address very important areas in peace and security- poverty and youth unemployment and their link to security. It is abundantly clear, from the articles that, the Somaliland nation faces these challenges and the pathway includes harnessing the resources of the country which include human resources and channeling them towards development and the well-being of everyone in the nation.

With regards to the issue of land conflict, Suleiman Ismail Mohamed focuses on urban land conflict in Hargeisa. The rapid expansion of urban centers and the effect of rural–urban migration in developing countries has always created conflicts over land in the major cities. According to Suleiman Mohamed, the major disputes in urban Hargeisa include rights to access, manage, sell, build, lease and generate income in urban land. Such challenges usually emanate from situations where there is the absence of clear institutional mechanisms to address the challenges. The author recommends a constructive and pro-active approach to the settlement of land disputes in Hargeisa.

The role of civil society in the electoral processes in African countries is still under-studied area. The impact of civil society has not come full circle in a continent where democracy takes forward and backward steps at the same time. However, the potential role of civil society in contributing to the integrity of democracy cannot be under-estimated. It is this area that Ifrah Galbedi examines the role of civil society in the electoral process in two decades of democracy in Somaliland. The author argues that, while civil society organizations in Somaliland have played an important role in significantly improving the livelihood of citizens, particularly women, which has an impact on elections, it is rare to find civil society organizations in Somaliland involved

in political activism and legislative reform which are substantive governance issues. The article goes further to examine the challenges of civil society organizations in promoting free, fair and credible elections in Somaliland. The article is very instructive in understanding the challenges faced by civil societies not only in Somaliland but other budding democracies in Africa.

In the same vein, democracy is globally affected by the phenomenon of ‘fake news’ largely based on deliberate misinformation of the electorate. That poses a challenge for democracy in both the developed and underdeveloped countries of the world. On this issue, Kamal Ahmed Ali examines the phenomenon of media deception of the public in Somaliland. He focuses on the manipulation of messaging by prominent politicians and wealthy businessmen to sanitize their image. According to the author, this is made possible by two factors – low academic qualification of media personalities and lack of resources in media outlets. The article recommends a strengthening of professional ethics without which the continued deception by the media may endanger transparency and accountability which are democratic values in Somaliland.

While the articles contained in this issue address multi-dimensional challenges facing Somaliland as a young nation, they provide a vivid picture of the challenges facing most of the countries in Africa. These challenges can be addressed through a deliberate effort to strengthen the institutions of the state in all aspects and not the laser focus on strengthening democratic processes. While Somaliland in particular needs and practice democracy, the ‘bread and butter’ issues of employment, basic health care, education have to be sustainably addressed in the short, medium and long term and some of the articles presented in this issue provide a pathway to addressing some of the challenges.

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ABOUT THIS ISSUE

When Somaliland regained its sovereignty in 1991 following the collapse of the Somali central government, Somaliland has managed to build state institutions which paved the way for a flourishing economy. The state institutions established by Somaliland in the 1990s are functioning today and provide the necessary services to the citizens, including social services such as health and education as well as ensuring the security of its people. Additionally, Somaliland has also managed to reconstruct the economic sources such as ports and airports which houses the nation's customs to generate revenue to run the state. The successful reconstruction of the state economy and the institutions paved the way for the democratization of the state which makes this state as one of the most functioning constitutional democracies in the Muslim world. Success in terms of state building and democratization has never been without challenges, there are diverse challenges facing this nation which needs a particular quality of leadership.

It is understandable that building effective peace, institutions and its maintenance in the aftermath of conflict is not an easy task. In this regard, to recognize how to deal with the challenges is the responsibility of those running the state and needs to be widely scrutinized and analyzed to achieve positive results and preserve the fate and destiny of every citizen living in Somaliland. The contemporary strategies and indigenous approaches utilized by local practitioners in Somaliland such as traditional elders to build peace and rehabilitate a fragile and fractured community, is a success story and lesson that deserves to be taken into account.

Despite this, there are a number of challenges facing this nation, for instance, lack of recognition from the outside world, including its neighbors, lack of job opportunities with the presence of high rates of unemployment, youth bulge, widespread poverty, conflict over scarce resources, including ongoing land disputes both in rural and urban areas are the major challenges and problems confronting this nation and making Somaliland's state institutions remain in limbo. This needs a closer glance from the policy-makers to re-visit state institutions and policies in place to strengthen the institutions to overcome the very fragile situation which the state has remained in for a while.

In the dawn of a deepening globalization and the advancement of science and technology, research with critical thinking and deep analysis, and the necessary tools to question and criticize, engage in collaborative work and open-mindedness about alternative points of view are necessary. The research should produce an empirical and evidence-based research to help decision making circles.

While the social, economic and political problems in Somaliland are multifaceted and disregard any single explanation and logical point of view, this volume carries a number of articles analyzing different social, political, economic and cultural paradigms and problems facing this nation. The changing role of the Somaliland traditional leaders and its proliferation is a very important area of interest which this volume carries, but needs further study and analysis. Not only the traditional leaders' role and customary rule, but also the media and elections are regarded as the central pillar of the nation's road to democracy, but has never been without challenges. However, the media, which has been facing criticisms due to its conduct is another potential area of study. This kind of practice from the media challenged the ethics and had an adverse impact on Somaliland's freedom of speech and expression. Unemployment and poverty also remain another critical challenge that hampers the nation's road to development and prosperity which this volume also discusses.

This volume, which combines a number of issues is an important reference to the policy- and decision makers, the academics, university students and the civil society actors, and anyone who has an interest to understand the challenges facing this great nation and any other African state. However, it is the responsibility of those running the state to reach decisions based on empirical and evidence-research.

Nasir M. Ali
Managing Editor

THE PROLIFERATION OF TRADITIONAL LEADERS IN SOMALILAND: PAST AND PRESENT SITUATIONS

Abdi Abokor Yusuf

ABSTRACT

This study examines the proliferation of the traditional leaders and the political, social and economic changes this brings to Somaliland people. It analyzes the historical and the changing roles of the traditional leaders in the contemporary era. The study argues that the role of the traditional leaders takes a new style of leadership and the new forms of governance such as democracy, elections and multi-party systems influence their decisions. Although, the traditional leaders still keep their traditional delivery of maintaining peace and conflict resolution among the community, but by taking more political roles they need careful collaboration and demarcation in their borderlines with the government. They should respect the rule of law; respect the right of the individuals to vote freely during elections. They need to support the government in the development endeavors, security and peace building initiatives. And above all, they need to understand not working as a gerontocracy form of governance that undermines the role of the state and the government.

INTRODUCTION

Somaliland traditional leaders have historically had an immense importance in shaping Somaliland's political and social life. There is a growing trend of the size of the traditional leaders in Somaliland, the number of recognized Sultans was not more than ten before 1993 and in 2018 they are more than hundred. The constitution that the traditional leaders practice is the Somali customary law (*Xeer Soomaali*). The *Xeer Soomaali* invented in the old days to manage the social, economic and political life of Somali tribes are still in practice, not only in the pastoral settings, but also in the urban dwellings. The Somali traditional system operates under the customary laws – known as *Xeer* in Somali – through which members of a Diya-paying group are obliged to support each other in political and jural responsibilities.¹ It is the responsibility of the elders to oversee that the terms of the *Xeer* are honored.² The Somali traditional leaders used a customary law as guiding regulation for the governance of their clan members.

The practice of customary law is popular and is currently exercised in dispute settlement and arbitration between clan disputes and hostilities. In the urban areas, the modern judiciary system is operated through the courts, but the customs and Sharia laws work in parallel with the formal judiciary system of the state and informally sort out a greater volume of the disputes. Though the formal judicial institutions are operating

and provide services to the citizens, on the other hand, 80% of Somaliland disputes are settled through customary and Sharia laws channels.³ Indeed, customary laws are affiliated with the political institutions of the Somalis, which is based on kinship, with economic activity, culture, individual and collective rights and economic security, all are mediated through clan and sub-clan units. Entitlement to resources, divisions of labor and authority were underpinned by a system of social contract or *Xeer* between and amongst the clans.⁴

In the past, the primary functions of the Somali traditional leaders were conflict resolution, mediation, and peace building among other roles. In the modern era, they sometimes play a political role, for instance, during the British Somaliland Protectorate, when “*Haud and Reserved Area*” were annexed to Ethiopia in 1954, two influential Sultans and popular politicians were organized; Sultan Abdilahi Sultan Diriye, Sultan Abdirahman Sultan Diriye, Michael Mariano, Abdirahman Ali (Dubbe Ali Yare) were sent to the United Kingdom and followed by Bihi Fooley from Ogaden in another tour to the United Nations headquarters. The point of taking the traditional leaders was to support politicians and give the issue its weight to those levels for discussion. This is a clear indication that the role of the traditional leaders was not excluded from the politics, though the existing Somaliland Constitution confines the role of the Guurti⁵ to peace building, conflict resolution and mediation.

Indeed, the role of the traditional leaders prior to the arrival of the colonial powers and post-colonial state was imperative and deserves appreciation. The proliferation and Balkanization of the traditional system of Somaliland is quite discouraging. There is a considerable increase in number since 1991, for instance, the number of the *Sultans* was less than 15 in 1991 and the list of the Sultans is above one hundred in 2016,⁶ which is regularly increasing and nearly 72.5%⁷ of survey respondents, which is 39 of the 60 interviewed stated that their clans celebrated traditional Sultans since 2000, while 17.5% said No, 10% informed that they are not sure and 5 respondents out of the 60 declined to answer. According to some comments of the survey respondents, including intellectuals, university students and other knowledgeable people among the community, this drastic increase could be attributed to an increase of population. But, there are other viable reasons, such as political motivation, the position of Sultans which became a source of power, pride and wealth generation which lead clans compete over establishing their own traditional leader.

There is a change in lifestyle for the traditional leaders who are key players in the formation, keeping and sustaining of peace both in the past and in the present. However, the changing lifestyle of the Somaliland people who mainly lived in the rural areas are nowadays moving to the urban centers which greatly influence their lifestyle. This

change leads the traditional leaders exercise more political role rather than sticking to the traditional norms and conflict resolution, political decisions are now involved, such as the case of Guurti occupying Somaliland's Upper Chamber; they endorse all laws in the country. The socio-political transformations have trickled down into the traditional structures and social bases, leading to politically motivated proliferation of traditional kings and leaders and politically instigated inter-clan disputes. The engagement of the traditional leadership in urban politics made them no more "neutral" to their clan constituencies. This kind of practice weakened and eroded their traditional statuses and legitimacy as super clan authorities.⁸

The proliferation of elders makes it increasingly unclear as to who are the legitimate elders, is a symptom of this crisis. Furthermore, the elders can hardly cope with the demand in terms of the amount of issues they are expected to address, because they lack resources, and knowledge about how modern governance and business sectors work, as well as the rapid social changes that Somalis is undergoing (urbanization, youth bulge, changing culture, and a deepening globalization).⁹ As the consideration of criterion is absent, the number of the traditional leaders increases. This growing increase puts their legitimacy into question. The swift change in the Somaliland's pastoral livelihood in new urban settings brings challenges to those opting to traditional role positions, who not only lacks the resource to govern, but also deprives the respect and prestige that the old days *Sultans* enjoyed.

The central objective of this study is to examine a way of finding a solution for the greatly increasing number of traditional leaders in Somaliland. It identifies the advantages and disadvantages of traditional leaders' increase to the community; and the reasons for the increase in numbers, and how this increase impacts on the community. It further highlights the historical evolution of the traditional leaders and how their role and functions changed over the past quarter of a century. This study argues that though the traditional leaders are important active members in Somaliland people and play an active leadership role in their communities, on the other hand, in most recent years the number of traditional leaders, particularly the *Sultans*¹⁰ are increasing disproportionately; without proper matching to the size of population increase; each sub-clan is making a number of traditional leaders with no restriction, even when the number of the sub-clan is small.

This quantitative increase should be linked to the absence of proper criteria for the formation of this prominent position. Since 1993, the increase is estimated to be more than tenfold. The increase results are poor traditional leadership and dilution of the respect and reputation that people ushered in this traditional leadership position. Therefore, there is a need to develop a criterion for the selection of the *Sultans* as the

criteria that they were formed in the past are no longer effective, particularly in the urban settings, where the core political activities are orchestrated and gives motivation and legitimacy to the creation process.

CONCEPTUAL CLARITY: THE TRADITIONAL LEADER

Traditional leaders are the Somali elders with recognized influence and traditional authority to represent their clansmen; for instance, the *Caaqil*, *Aqil* or *Akil*, *Sultans*, head of the villages or locality and nominees from clan or sub-clan with a formal mandate to represent them in conferences and problem-solving issues.. *Sultan*, *Boqor*, *Ugaas*, *Garad* are the titles named to those figures. The latter is the most greatly expanding group, as they have a broader mandate, they were few before quarter of a century. This high level traditional position claim the leadership of the overall clan they want to represent, but many of them do not have the mandate of the clan they want to represent as they lack the power and wealth to rule.

Due to the resources needed, the traditional leaders always rely on the support of the government, which the leader either exchanges his allegiance as well as that of his clan. The *Aqil* officially recognized by the Ministry of Interior, and paid by the Ministry, while the *Aqil* is accountable to his constituency, which is the *Diya*-paying group. There are other traditional elders that do not have an official title, but assist the *Aqil* in carrying out his duties. Though the *Aqil* is influential in their sub-clans, there are also some very influential individuals who have sub-*Aqil* titles such as *Jawaab Daar*, *Beel-daajiye*, *Nabadoon* and others. Due to the patriarchal culture of Somalis, the traditional leaders are always men. Women are not directly part of the dispute resolution, but they informally pass their ideas through men.

In Somaliland prior to the colonial period, the people were mainly pastoral and with few agro-pastoral. The type of lifestyle was totally traditional nomadic society, clans fighting over water points and animal resources was the primary life supporting source of livelihood. The stronger clans survived and led the rest as the survival of the fittest were the rule of the day. The colonial imposition of artificial boundaries, European judicial systems and centralized government disrupted traditional grazing patterns and authority structures, and consequently the equilibrium of clans and the management of resources.¹¹

The Somaliland traditional leaders supported the colonial administrative system, and the *Aqils* become a fundamental institution of the colonial state. That is why they are still part of the Somaliland's governance system and they are registered in the Ministry of Interior and are paid by the government. In the colonial period, they were the main

source of local power and assisted the colonial administration in peace building and conflict resolution. A local authority's ordinance enacted in 1950 empowered the governor to appoint selected *Aqils* – the salaried headmen who provided a link between District Commissioners and their people.¹² The system paid 15 pounds of the monthly salary that went with the title.

During the colonial administration, the *Sultans* were very few and they were respected and received a special privilege for their leadership, for instance, the *Sultans* had a great discipline of keeping their dignity; and due to the self-esteem of their position they never ate and drank in public teashops. People shook hands with *Sultans*, by taking their arm with *Cumaama* (men head scarf), showing a sign of respect in the earlier days. Indeed, the number of *Sultans* in Somaliland quadrupled as each sub-clan crowned their own traditional leader. This is extremely different from the old days, for instance, during the colonial period, Hargeisa had only three Sultans: Sultan Abdilahi Sultan Diriye, Sultan Abdirahman Sultan Diriye and Sultan Mohamed Sultan Farah¹³. The number of the *Sultans* in other regions such as Togdheer was equal in number to the figures in Hargeisa.

CROWNING TRADITIONAL LEADERS: A GLIMPSE FROM THE PAST TO THE PRESENT

Traditionally, both the *Sultans* and *Aqils* were elected through the clan selection process. The process of identification for the potential candidate was mainly informal and the candidate went through a rigorous selection process; the men of wisdom in the sub-clan identified and selected the nominee. A coronation ceremony was made for the selected traditional leader. During celebration, he was given and showered with milk. To make the elected candidate economically secure, the sub-clan collects and provides financial resources, including camels and horses to the crowned traditional leader. In the survey, the greatest weakness of the traditional leaders were attributed that they are not financially independent 75.8% supported that they are either in a weaker financial position or lacks secure financial support, which lowers their status, 13.8% supported that they are elected by few, while 6.9% stated that they are in favor of their financial supporters among the clan and 3.4% declined to answer.

The new political environment shapes that some new traditional leaders make a self-nomination, pay the crowning ceremony and organize events that they buy the titles by themselves paying everything that were traditionally done by the sub-clan, which results that the process and the title come through self-appointed. This unauthentic process discredits the title and the status of traditional leaders, which some people question and nickname Mr. X is not a genuine traditional leader (Sultan), but is “*Daba-qalooc*”¹⁴ in

Somali or “*Curved tail*” demeaning the title.

The formation of the traditional leaders of the *Diya-paying group*¹⁵ (*Aqils*):

The selection of traditional *Aqils* has changed over the years. In the colonial period, the formation of *Aqils* was based on the number of male heads in the sub-clan, those who reach a certain limit claim to select an *Aqil* and the colonial administrators granted the permission after ensuring that the claim of the sub-clan is valid. The *Aqils* were officially paid by the colonial administration. They worked with the government on security issues and supported the government if one of their sub-clan members or *Diya-paying group* commits a crime. They were the first point of access to give the information of the offender, and the first source to inform his whereabouts as he can receive this information from his clansmen. In Somaliland, they are registered at the Ministry of Interior. They sort out 80% of local conflicts.¹⁶

The criteria for the selection of the *Aqils* were determined by the influential members of the sub-clan. Firstly, they make a proper assessment of the nominee, which is based on his judgment, eloquence, decision making, courage and generosity. The sub-clan or *Diya-paying group*¹⁷ was very proud of selecting *Aqil* as those who have *Aqils* were the numerous group, those who cannot reach the number should join their closest to kinship. Although a clear formula does not exist for the formation of this traditional leadership. However, it comes through inheritance and traditionally it was never solicited by the nominee. It was the choice of the sub-clan who granted the title and recognized the position, which always came through their observation and sometimes somebody who is outside the assembly of the clan were selected.¹⁸

The Ministry of Interior grants the permission of the traditional leaders’ coronation ceremony. The political influence of the politicians from the sub-clan are always respected taking into account the security implications of the action as it can create conflict among the sub-clan if they do not agree the decision of the selection. The qualities that were respected in the past by the clan members are currently compromised or basically never taken into account. In contrary, the virtuous qualities in the past and good leadership qualities are not the basic criteria of selection. In certain scenarios, self-nomination is common and the use of money and bribing influential persons in the sub-clan to get their support has become the talk of the day and the “*Daba-qalooc*” traditional leaders are increasing in number and now exist in greater representation.

Haji Abdikarim Hussein Yusuf, also known as Haji Abdi Warabe, is an influential elder and currently a member of the executive committee of the Somaliland Upper House of Guurti. Haji Abdi is known for his eloquence and unwavering voice in communicating

his decisions to address conflicts and create peace among conflicting groups. He was one of the traditional leaders that organized the popular Borama Conference in 1993. Haji Abdi stated that he inherited this traditional leadership from his elder brother in 1940, after his brother passed away. Haji Abdi is a traditional chief or “*Aqil*” of his sub-clan. In an interview with the Academy for Peace and Development he explains how he became the *Aqil* of his sub-clan, and cites it as follows: “My elder brother passed away in 1940 and I was nominated by our clan as his successor. This followed the Somali tradition that when either your father or your elder brother passes away, you will be nominated as his successor by clan elders. I initially refused the offer and only accepted once the clan agreed to abide by three conditions: a) to protect and keep the peace, b) to accept the government’s rulings; and, c) not to be envious or jealous of what other clans have. I was consequently inaugurated as the chief (*Aqil*) of my sub-clan”.¹⁹

According to an interview with the director general of the Ministry of Interior by one of the local media ²⁰on August 19, 2016 stated that the existing number of *Aqils* recorded by the Ministry of Interior is as high as 2138, in which 1138 of them are paid and the rest in the waiting list. Indeed, the role of the traditional leaders is getting more politicized. In connection to this, Somaliland experiments a new form of modern governance and conduct elections with a multi-party system. Still, this popular democratization process relies on the influence of the traditional leaders. During the elections the traditional leaders work as bandwagon for the support of the competing candidates. The support given to the Kulmiye Party by two popular *Sultans* of certain clans in 2017 Somaliland presidential election in Burao on October 2017 to support the party’s candidate Mr. Muse Bihi Abdi is good indication of this involvement²¹ The role of the traditional leaders is not declining in the face of the modern democratization process and is anticipated that it will not shrink in the foreseeable future. In contrary, the proliferation of *Sultans*, *Boqors*, and *Garads* solely crowned for politically motivated intentions became the norm of the day.

Due to the importance of the seat of the traditional elder in the eyes of the politicians and the public, it is believed that the *Sultans* could link support and sympathy during elections. In recent times, the tough competition between the clans and support to political parties for the top seat partly stimulate the crowning of the traditional leaders, which is often a politically motivated agenda. In a survey²² conducted in 2016 for 60 interviewees, the reasons of the growing traditional leaders, 18.9% supported that the post of the traditional leadership became a position of prestige, which brings fame and wealth, so it attracts many people to run for it, while 9.4% attributed the issue to the demand of the growing population. However, the involvement of the traditional leaders in the government affairs and politics undermines their integrity.²³

The increasing number of traditional leaders clearly indicates that the status of the traditional leader is gradually getting more politicized. Many people in Somaliland believe that the proliferation of traditional leaders, particularly the *Sultans* is continuously defaming the respect and honor the wider communities ushered on that seat in the past. Moreover, if the trend goes on, as it is today, the role of the supreme traditional *Sultans* will be discounted to positions as low as *Aqils* – the head of the Diya-paying group; the members of the same clan who collectively pay compensation together. In the survey, answering on the disadvantages of traditional *Sultans*, 77.6% of the respondents informed that they become politicized and sometimes act as mediocre rather than peace makers.

Traditionally, the selection and identification of the one who is going to be a traditional *Sultan* were very strict. The men of wisdom among the clan chose the candidate in his absence, without his prior knowledge that he will be crowned for the *Sultan*. It was shame if one appoints himself and runs for the seat, and was never being granted in that mechanism compared to what happens in modern days. In the past, to shortlist the potential candidates, the sub-clan leaders participated an assembly and those possessing the right characteristics, including generosity, patience, courage, and justice were shortlisted. During the coronation ceremony, the guest speakers at the event, reminded the new traditional leader the factors that loses his authority as poor decision making, unjust, and being stingy. Translated in Somali as: “*Saddex baa madaxnimo kaa qaada: a) guddoon jilicsan, b) gar weecsan, iyo, c) gacan gudhan*”.²⁴

The traditional leaders historically enjoyed great respect and privilege and some people believe that the urbanization and change in the Somali nomadic lifestyle compel the traditional leaders to change with the tide. 77.6% of the survey respondents stated that the *Sultans* become politicized and sometimes act as mediocre rather than peace makers, while 20.7% of the respondents supported that some *Sultans* are spoilers, but still a great majority of the clan members love them, not only those who elected them.

PROSPECTS FOR STABLE TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP

The increasing number of the traditional leaders will be likely to continue in the near future due to the absence of regulations to manage the formation of the traditional leader in this modern era. The situation needs to be carefully assessed on a case by case basis. There is a great assignment for the government in power to reconstitute the creation of the traditional leadership. Particularly, the continuation of the existing trend will demean the position of traditional leaders, which is a useful leadership position in the community. The government needs to reassess its policy on this issue and to bring new criteria respecting population increase and the need for this position to keep the dignity

of the community leadership positions.

Somaliland's future success in negotiating the very significant challenges ahead is likely to require the continuation of the hybrid of tradition and political 'modernity' that has been evolving to the present time.²⁵ This is not necessarily important to have a proliferation of traditional leaders taking the existing upward trend, but to have a reasonable increase in the number of traditional leaders.

CONCLUSION

In the view of the public, there is a concern in the proliferation of the traditional leaders; particularly *Sultans*, which risks the authenticity of their traditional leadership status. There is a great need to exercise a concerted effort to find a solution to the selection of the modern traditional leaders. The existing anarchy on a selection of traditional leaders results in unacceptable self-nominations by greedy and politicized candidates that want to grasp the title of traditional leadership through unfair means. The creation of common criteria to select the traditional leaders and reviewing the existing one is highly desired.

The government is trying to restrict the process, but the absence of regulation on the subject and close to anarchy system currently in place brings excessive freedom that abuses and manipulates the smooth flow of the traditional leadership development. There is great need to bring regulations for the establishment of the modern traditional leaders (proper criteria) to restrict "*Daba-qalooc*" *Sultans* who takes advantage of the weak governance systems and institutions.

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16 Ibid., 2.

17 A sub-clan that collectively pay together the compensation, in case of death or injury is called a dia paying group

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THE SOMALI CUSTOMARY LAW AND TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP NEXUS CONFLICT RESOLUTION: EXPERIENCE FROM SOMALILAND

Nimo Abdi Omar

ABSTRACT

This article examines the traditional leaders in Somaliland and their role in building peace and the state. The study questions if the traditional system existing in Somaliland is a tool for conflict resolution as used before or a dilemma on governance and endeavors to strengthen state institutions to provide social services and security to the citizens in general. The study doesn't undermine the positive role of the traditional leaders within the Somali society has been organized for centuries in clan line structure in which every and each clan has its own leader, literally called '*Chief Aqil*' and basically fabricates the bonds between the adjacent and neighboring clans. The study employed both primary and secondary data in which were analyzed qualitatively. The study argues that the current hybrid system existing in Somaliland cannot bring good governance and development, unless the traditional elders abandon the politics, thus produce stable and good governance, which in return brings legitimate, socially inclusive, respect human rights based on the rule of law and the division of power which are imperative in modern state institutions.

INTRODUCTION

Adewumi and Egwurube define traditional leaders as “a group of rulers or tribal leaders occupying communal political leadership positions sanctified by cultural mores and values, and enjoying the legitimacy of particular communities to direct their affairs and their basis of legitimacy is therefore tradition, which includes the whole range of inherited culture and way of life; a people's history; moral and social values and the traditional institutions which survive to serve those values”. Indeed, traditional leaders play an important role in conflict resolution and peace building processes in any society, including those living in Africa, a tradition-dominated continent.

In the Somali society, the traditional leaders are important and respected. Due to this respect, they play a vital role in conflict resolution, especially conflicts between clans through “*Xeer*” – unwritten code of conduct or social contract and a traditional law agreed upon by the clans in each area and depended on the deliberation of elders who gather to resolve specific problems within a clan or between clans. Traditional elders are thus regarded as peacemakers, as they resolve conflicts, reduce tensions between communities, restore trust and harmonies relations between clans, and increase positive interactions among different groups.¹

The traditional leaders are important not only in conflict resolution and peace building, but also in the state building processes in Somaliland since 1991. However, the role of the traditional leaders in Somaliland has changed since the democratization processes of the state in 2002. This change could be linked with a friction between the two systems in which Somaliland amalgamated together, the modern governance structure and the traditional and customary institutions. This could be linked to this developing world and these roles have changed to a significant degree and cannot be exercised as a result of the dramatic social transformation and changes that have resulted from the introduction of modern governance and administrative system.

This study, therefore, critically examines whether the two systems are mutually inclusive or exclusive. The study addresses the overall problem or the benefit that traditional leaders have on the governance institutions in Somaliland. The study addresses the overall problem or the benefit that traditional leaders have in the governance in Somaliland.

A GLIMPSE TO THE TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS

The word tradition refers to “*old*”. According to Hobsbawm and Ranger, the term is defined as “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past”.² The traditional institutions have an effect on the social, cultural, economic and political lives of Africans, particularly in the rural areas. Traditional leadership occupies an important place in the African lifestyle as it preserves culture, traditions, customs and values of the African people, while also representing the early forms of societal organization and governance. In the political role, the traditional institutions during the pre-colonial era was quite clear, since law and order were maintained through a normative system that was part of the general social structure, though the system was not sophisticated, the machinery of government was organized enough to manage the affairs, resolve tension and administer justice in the society. Also, the traditional institutions were controlled by certain unwritten laws which ensure the security of institutions. This implies that, traditional rulers had a positive impact on the evolution of political, economic and social institutions in which they had dominant control.³

Prior to the colonial rule, the chiefs enjoyed recognized authority over the people they represent. Traditional political systems may have differed from one structure to another; chiefs may have been challenged by a contender for their titles at times and fight arose over jurisdiction, but the system itself stood intact and inviolate. That has

changed since the introduction of a modern political system and the years of foreign rule in Africa. Indeed, African countries have had their traditional chieftaincy systems superimposed on the modern political system. The two political systems, the modern and the traditional, appear to be on parallel tracks.

Traditional chiefs still enjoy considerable respect in their own sphere, but it is a modern political leaders who control today's western form of governance existing into the continent. In Africa, the institution of traditional leadership is one of the oldest institutions of governance.⁴ Traditions and other customs practiced by the Africans and non-Africans placed a great responsibility on traditional leaders to look after the best interests of their communities. Certainly, traditional institutions in African states were well established in pre-colonial times. But, the arrival of the colonial powers in Africa posed critical challenges against the tradition and customary rules which in return impacted on the post-colonial states.⁵

In the African context, leadership has been viewed as individuals' predisposition to serve their families, their peers, and their communities. Traditionally, African leaders played three roles: political, social and religious roles. In their role of political leadership, leaders were public administrators while in their role of social leadership; they settled social conflicts among followers. Furthermore, in their role of religious leaders, they were priests whose role were serviced to the gods. Although three leaderships resided in the caring and protective hands of the African continent's leaders, this seemed to be no conflict of roles in traditional African society.⁶

The British colonial system in Africa relied on traditional governance structures to facilitate indirect rule and institutionalized a system of traditional leadership that did not previously exist. Additionally, the British did not always follow customary mechanisms of selecting traditional leaders, removing those who were uncooperative and supporting those who were compliant. Leaders not eligible for the position by lineage were appointed, often without seeking approval from councilors or elders. This use of traditional governance structures to further indirect rule continued during the colonial times, with the government bestowing more power on traditional leaders than they had previously held.⁷

TRADITIONAL LEADERS IN THE SOMALI CONTEXT

The Somali society lives in a vast semi-arid or arid environment in the Horn of Africa suitable for traditional animal husbandry. The people share a common experience shaped by decades of colonial rule, a common language, religion and culture. Historically, complex linkage between the pervasive clan-based political culture, economic production

dominated by traditional animal husbandry, and judicial institutions characterized the pre-colonial Somali pastoral society.⁸

In the olden days, the Somali society engaged in effective traditional governance. This traditional system works to serve the communities in preventing conflicts, facilitating resource sharing and allocation, and the provision of the rule of law through the traditional customary laws. This traditional system of governance has its own rules and regulations which consist of a set of contractual agreements, called *Xeer*. The Somalis survived by practicing this traditional system which in reality saved from many problems. The Somali society trusts the traditional governance because the mechanisms rooted in the traditional governance and the *Xeer* is indigenous and every Somali can claim its rightful ownership.⁹

The traditional leaders are not only engaging in conflict resolutions between clans, but also have been a tool in creating relative stable structures of governance and security in post-1991. Somali Traditional leaders are the only leaders that their decisions work probably. Traditional leaders are often more legitimate than the modern state in the Somali context, because Somalis are a clan based society and traditional institutions basically designate clan leaders in which every clan believes its leader as no one else.¹⁰

The clan system in which the Somali society operates is the most important constituent social factor among the pastoralist Somalis. I.M Lewis argues that the segmented clan system remains the bedrock foundation of the pastoral Somali society and ‘clannishness’ – the primacy of clan interests – is its natural divisive reflection on the political level.¹¹

Though the Somali traditional leaders play an imperative role in building peace within the society, on the other hand, the *Xeer* (customary law) is a traditional contractual agreement applicable in the social grid of the clan and the sub clan structure that constitute the Somali society. The customary rule has shaped and influenced by the Islamic Sharia law.¹² Every dispute or conflict happens between clans or between society were resolved by *Xeer*. This *Xeer* has also been accepted within the clan members in which they do agree and accept it as a binding rule. A case in point of sharing resources like grazing and water points between clans in which the *Xeer* implies how this recourse is shared.¹³

The *Xeer* also is the safeguard of social cohesion litigation and carried out within the framework of this goal. The fundamental aspects of *Xeer* are directly related to human survival. According to Andre Le Sage, the principles of the *Xeer* are: mostly conflicts occurring between Somali society their root causes are the use of natural resources and that is common in pastoral areas. These conflicts continue to be settled by the customary institution of conflict resolution using the principles of *Xeer*. Among the Somalis

customary institutions have more acceptability and legitimacy when it comes to conflict resolution. In the Somali customary law (*Xeer*), religious leaders play a vital role in conflict resolution and ceasing hostility. Women and youth have no role in conflict resolution. Because both of them are not allowed to come the tree and participate the negotiations.¹⁴

One important aspect of *Xeer* is that the individual is not responsible for his action or the crime he committed, but Somalis used a collective system which also means that there is no individual punishment for the executor. *Xeer* suggests that the all Diya paying group are responsible for their individual action, this causes increasing the rate of crimes such as killing and physical injury because everybody knows that his clan will pay the *Mag* (blood compensation) and he will not be punished. Traditionally conflicts were solved by clan elders. The accepted mode of conflict resolution was purely a reserve of elders with moral authority to intervene among warring factions and bring peace. Somali society believes traditional leaders and the *Xeer* as a central figure in the management of conflict mediation and disputes, because traditional leaders are a part of the administration system. Therefore, they form an important part of Somali culture. *Xeer* and traditional leaders' help community keep control over the outcome of the dispute.¹⁵

The Somali customary law has many challenges, some of these challenges are: *Xeer* is not written, the number of elders who are experts of the *Xeer* are decreasing from time to time. There is a propensity of favoring the so-called modern institutions by the younger generation, a shift is occurring in urban areas, from traditional to modern institutions for conflict resolution. There is no practical means of enforcing their decisions if one party fails to comply with it.¹⁶ Although *Xeer* have these challenges as Somali society is anchored to the clan system, the legitimacy of the *Xeer* and traditional institutions remain as intact as it is; still *Xeer* is a more powerful tool than any constitution of modern government because Somalis believed *Xeer* and traditional elders than any other institution.¹⁷

TRADITIONAL LEADERS IN SOMALILAND

Somalis have increasingly reverted to their traditional structures because of the failure of the central government to build a functioning structure that serves all of the public without the marginalization of any citizen. In this sense, the reliance on traditional norms and rules can be relatively rational; there is no better alternative because Somali society doesn't have other substitute for the *Xeer* and the tradition because there is no government or other rules, the only thing that Somalis have is the tradition in the side of governing. However, the main function of Somali traditional leaders (settling disputes

between and within the clans based on *Xeer*), has since the collapse of State been under constant pressure as they adopted in the very difficult new circumstances of the conflict, lack of rule of law and a rapidly changing socio-economic environment.¹⁸

In Somaliland, the traditional leaders were the only instrument that didn't collapse, and provided the only protection people could get, for example, the armed movement, the Somali National Movement (SNM) depended upon the traditional elders because the elders gave moral support for the SNM and also financial support which was the backbones of the successes of SNM and made it seem natural that the establishment of the new state of Somaliland was largely driven by both the SNM and the elders, the Guurti. Therefore, Somaliland was founded on a series of grassroots-based peace conferences called *Shir Beeleedyo* from 1991 to 1997.¹⁹

The elders played a vital role at that time; including disarmament, and held reconciliation for the people of Somaliland. At that time, elders played important role which politicians, scholars couldn't do; they return peace in the country and provide governance including peace and order. Somaliland wouldn't reach this progress without traditional leaders. To elaborate the point further, the elders play an important role in the peace building processes in Somaliland and are the only body that mediates the conflicts in Somaliland; for example, when the political parties and the government have disputes, the elders are the ones who solve these disputes. The peace and stability that Somaliland enjoys was brought about by elders and without them Somaliland become similar as the south-central Somalia. Government especially courts use the traditional leaders, especially *Aqils* in the cases of killings, because the court don't know more deeply for the clans and how they pay blood compensation and also the previous cases that clans have for murder issues.²⁰

Traditional leaders are an important pillar for the peace of Somaliland because the Somaliland system is not powerful like developed countries. So traditional leaders, especially Guurti are the peacekeepers and they built the peace existing in Somaliland for their hands, maintain the order and manage conflicts. The duty of the Guurti is to keep peace, culture, religion and also mediate conflicts, when conflict happen between the government and the parliament, the Guurti is the only actors that resolve this conflict by using the Somali customary law.

The legitimacy of the Guurti is based on its clan representation and the trust the population has vested in its political conflict resolution capacities. However, as the older members have died their sons have taken over, and many seats in the house are thus currently held by individuals who have inherited the seat or been politically appointed (by the president), rather than people selected through a process of local clan

consensus. Interestingly, women are not allowed to be a member of the Guurti, because they are not allowed to become elders in the traditional system".²¹

Traditional system in Somaliland seems better at producing outcomes that guard social security than the state system. The respondents emphasized that Somaliland cannot warrant the traditional leaders, especially in the case of peace and security because the Somaliland government is not enough strong and can't manage the disputes between the clans, so in this time the elders are the necessary unit for the peace and the security of Somaliland.

One may argue that the liberal democracy can't work in Somaliland because the people don't trust the term, but rather trusted the traditional system and believed that the democracy is against their Muslim values enshrined in the Islamic religion. Furthermore, the clan has more effect among the Somali people in general and Somaliland society in particular. Therefore, one may conclude that democracy and clan don't work together.

CONCLUSION

This study examined the role of the traditional leaders in conflict resolution, peace and state building processes in Somaliland. It questioned the role of the traditional leaders in the post-democratization period of Somaliland, since most of the traditional leaders engaged in politics by allying the politicians who are leading the political parties established in post-2001 referendum on the constitution. The traditional leaders can't be labeled as a negative on the state and political structures of the state, but and without doubt, they have been active or the precursor of the state's stabilization processes in the 1990s.

The traditional elders played imperative roles such as state and peace building processes as well as the reconciliations that have taken place in the country. This reconciliation has had both political and social reconciliation which is a process that brings people together and tries to fix cracks in social relationships, allows and encourages forgiveness by conflict, and which at the same time cultivates trust among the society.

However, though Somaliland claims as being a democratic state which built all the institutions required for a democratic state like holding fair and free elections, which are unique in this continent raged by civil wars and military coups, still the traditional elders are working and they are involving the politics of the country which is contrary to their mandate which is reconciling and mediating the clans who are in a state of conflict. So the democratization process in Somaliland faces challenges in which the traditional leaders are one of the critical challenges that face the state's infant democracy.

In Somaliland, the elders were involved in establishing governments, which only functions owing to an extensive interaction with the traditional authorities. The strength of both these governmental formations is their hybrid construction linking modern and traditional forms of governance. Today the traditional authorities themselves emphasize that they can't stand alone in the long run, and need a functioning government to ensure that their *Xeer* (or a state law endorsed by them) is enforced.

The reason that traditional leaders are still involved the politics is, because the leaders of the modern state or the politicians are not committed, the lack of committed leaders is one of the main challenges of a democratic state working in Somaliland. So as Somaliland leaders are not committed the country would not reach development.

The current hybrid system existing in Somaliland did not reach Somaliland for good governance and development if Somaliland went to develop and reach good governance the traditional elders must be out of the politics, also a stable and good governance must also be legitimate, socially inclusive, respect human rights, based on the rule of law and the division of powers, which all in theory are related to modern governmental institutions.

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CHALLENGES OF URBAN LAND CONFLICTS IN SOMALILAND: THE CASE OF HARGEISA

Suleiman Ismail Mohamed

ABSTRACT

The land administration in urban areas in Somaliland remains weak following the war with the Somalia's military regime which ravaged the major cities and the subsequent breakup of the responsible institutions for land governorship in 1988–1991. Certainly, the relation between land-use and land ownership, and the redistribution of land ownership in urban areas has largely disappeared from the political debate over the past twenty plus years in Somaliland. This study has shown that the current land disputes between Somaliland landlords in urban areas illustrate the type of problems which arise due to the skyrocketing prices of land selling among citizens on one hand, and the capacity of the state institutions to officially sanction such practices by which is not present on the other. Overall, while the capacity of the state authorities to govern the land is not the same as the capacity to invest, it can streamline, plan land-use and/or control, procedure and making better use of publicly owned land. The central objective of this study is to assess, evaluate and examine the current situation and practices on land ownership, the possible implementation of the land reform policies at local, regional, and national levels with a particular emphasis on Hargeisa, the nation's capital, and its implications for the economies both local and national authorities and the society at the grassroots', while the need for Somaliland to continue reforming its urban land policies is necessarily important. The study relied both primary and secondary data, and were analyzed it qualitatively.

INTRODUCTION

Every society and nation around the world has their unique problems and challenges. Somaliland is not an exception and is struggling to overcome many difficulties ranging from minor to major conflicts. As a reviving country, Somaliland is generally dealing with problems related to natural resources allocation, clan based systems, tribal problems, social challenges, economic obstacles and political complications.¹ Certainly, conflict over land is a main cause of contemporary insecurity in the major cities of Somaliland. Generally, disputes involved in land are an open disagreement between two parties over the title deeds of land and the existence of different interests of the rights to access, manage, sell, build, lease, or generate income. Obviously, conflicts can be seen as destructive, but there are many cases that conflicts lead to positive change. In common sense, if conflicts are mitigated early enough and transformed in a positive way where the disputing parties reach win-win solutions; it leads to a constructive and

lasting change for the benefit of all. Land conflicts are not different and can be mitigated if proper resolution mechanisms are used. It is therefore important to deal with land conflicts in a constructive manner, instead of ignoring them or simply trying to stop them.

The collapse of Somali central government in 1991 led to the breakdown of all institutional and social structures and the appropriation of land and water resources by illegal means. During this period, refugees from Somaliland living in Ethiopia camps started to return to the country. Without a major rehabilitation plan, refugees managed to reach and settle in the major cities and seized public as well as privately owned lands.² This has generated ongoing ownership claims between the settlers and those who were claiming to own the land before the war. Consequently, land conflicts became persistent in most of the major cities in Somaliland and last till date. This drastic change in land management led to the development and production of several land related laws by Somaliland parliament such as law No. 17/2001 – the main law governing the urban land in Somaliland. An amendment was made to this law in 2008. Under this law, a committee consisting of 7 members from the different ministries and the local council was established to oversee land dispute cases and make decisions. It was also given the Supreme Court to receive appeals on these decisions. Moreover, the Ministry of Interior was assigned the responsibility to manage the allowances of this committee and also supervise their work and decisions.³ Although the committee was functioning up to 2017, the central government abolished and dismissed the members of this committee in June 2017 due to mishandling of land cases and unfair judgments.⁴ No new committees were appointed since then.

LAND CONFLICTS IN HARGEISA

The population of Somaliland is estimated around 3.5 million people. Maroodi-Jeh region is the most populous region in the country with an estimated population of one million plus people.⁵ Although national census was not carried out, Hargeisa is estimated to over 900,000 inhabitants.⁶ From the time when the war with Said Barre ended in 1991, Hargeisa was relatively peaceful. Although conflicts occurred in the city late in 1994, Hargeisa has largely remained peaceful since then. Peace and stability have resulted in steady economic growth, based on livestock trade and remittances from the large Somaliland community in the diaspora. The city has largely been rebuilt and water, electricity and telecommunication infrastructures as well as social services such as education and medical care were re-established.⁷ However, due to the weakness of the state to lead and fund the development agendas in the country, most of these initiatives were taken over by private individuals, communities and the growing Somaliland business class.⁸ Furthermore, as the capital of Somaliland, Hargeisa became

the political and economic hub of the country, hosting the largest population and having business relations with Ethiopia and Djibouti.

The emerging economic and employment opportunities in Hargeisa have led to the extensive increase of people and rapid urbanization of the city which created a shortage of space, plots, housing and infrastructure. Since then, government institutions have become weak and unable to maintain order with ineffective land management systems worsened by the unclear land ownership and the rising real estate market, leading to rampant land grabbing and overlapping ownership claims. These challenges made Hargeisa city to have the highest urban land conflict rate in the country.⁹ In recent years, disputes related to land are causing most of the violent incidents that happen in Hargeisa.

This study is therefore, sets out to the assessment of the root causes and consequences, identification of major actor and challenges hindering to lasting solutions for land conflicts in Hargeisa. The research employed four major questions about the root causes, consequences, actors and resolutions of land conflicts. Methodologically, the study adopted qualitative method of research and applied non-probability sampling. Besides, the study employed data collection techniques like desk-review, key informant interviews and focus group discussions. The overall respondents reached were 49 (37 participants for FDGs and 12 interviews). The research was conducted in Hargeisa city and focused only Koodbuur and Ga'an Libah Districts. These two districts are deliberately selected because of their frequent land conflicts.

THE ROOT CAUSES OF LAND CONFLICT

Land is a form of resource endowed by God to the human being. Land has no cost of production and is considered as one of the most valuable assets that a person acquires. Urban land in the major cities of Somaliland is known to be expensive. Hargeisa is the most expensive compared to other cities in Somaliland.¹⁰ In recent years, land has become a valuable investment for the business people, diaspora and a major income-generating factor for the owners.¹¹ One of the research respondents who recently purchased a plot of land in Hargeisa said that, "Land has become the first property a person can own. If the person does not own a land in Hargeisa, it is very difficult to live and survive in this large city.

Consequently, cases related to land conflict had become rampant in the major cities of Somaliland. A research conducted by the Academy for Peace and Development in 2008 states that urbanization increases 8% every year in the large cities and that urban land conflicts affect around one third of the Somaliland population who live in the large cities. The research also states that Hargeisa has the highest level of land conflicts when

compared to other cities in Somaliland because of the rapid urbanization and the large number of rural migration.

When asked, respondents emphasized that it is very important to discuss conflicts related to land, because Land conflict needs to be addressed and publicly debated as it is considered as one of the main factors destabilizing the security in the urban areas. Land conflict is also important to discuss because disputes over land hinders investments from both internal and external investors who could have settled and improved the economy of the country.

WAYS OF OWNING LAND IN HARGEISA

In the 1970s, the Somali government issued a law stating that all land belongs to the state and would be administered by the government. Since then, allocation and distribution of land was the sole responsibility of the central government. Following the collapse of the central government of Somalia in 1991 and Somaliland's declaration as a separate state from the rest of the country, illegal land grabbing became a major problem in Somaliland. Currently, all the land in the country is in the hands of individuals who claim ownership. To find out how people acquire ownership of land in Hargeisa, a group of respondents were asked the possible ways that a person can own a land in Hargeisa. Interviewees and FGDs participants shared different ways as categorized below:

Purchase of land from one private owner to another or from government to a private person is the most common form of owning land in the city. Land has different prices determined by location, access to water, roads, market and transportation. Depending on the financial capability, a person can buy a plot equivalent to what he can pay and obtain ownership from the local government in a legal way. Furthermore, inheritance of land is the second most known form a person can own land in Hargeisa. Under the Islamic Sharia, successors have the right to take their share when one of their close relative dies. Through this form, people are able to gain land and legally transfer ownership.

Illegal grabbing is another way of obtaining land in Hargeisa. It relates when certain individuals claim ownership of a large area of land as their own farms. With the support of the local government authorities, these land-grabbers are recognized as the right owners of these lands, regardless whether the land in question is suitable for farming (mountains, hills and rocky areas are claimed as farms) or else. Through this means, landlords in Hargeisa got the title deeds for their lands. Alternatively, returnees from the refugee camps grabbed large patches of public and private land due to the absence of strong government and governing laws. As a result, the land in Hargeisa went into the hands of very few people.

Land can also be provided by the local government and thus ownership is obtained. Currently, land in Hargeisa is administered by the local government that manages the land allocated for public purposes. This land is given to certain individuals in three forms: as a gift: this is very rare and specific to a few persons. The reason for giving is considered as personal relationship with the Mayor and one of the local councils. Since the person is legally given the land, and the land consequently transformed for his ownership, the land becomes his property. The second method is that land is given as a compensation for debt to a business person who made transactions with the local government. Thirdly, the land is given by the local government when resettling Internally Displaced Persons (returnees from the refugee camps who occupied public land and roads) to new settlements where they can live and stay. When relocated, IDP families are given plots of land and title documents stating their ownership.

CAUSES OF LAND CONFLICTS IN HARGEISA

Conflict caused by unclear boundary between two adjacent plots of land is the prime cause of land disputes in Hargeisa. The city has huge agricultural lands which are recently planned to be new settlements. Since these farms cover large areas and have different boundaries to different adjacent farms, it always causes boundary disputes between the land owners. On the other hand, conflicts can arise from messy plans caused by the local government geometers who craft different maps and surveys regarding directions and sizes of roads as well as borders to two adjacent plots/lands. This causes conflict between the landlords who disagree over the directions of the roads or the border of their lands.

Mismanagement of inherited land is the second highest cause of land conflicts in Hargeisa. In Islam, inheritance is a means of transferring property ownership from the deceased to a close relative. Land is one of the properties common for inheritance. Inheritance has a comprehensive guideline under the Islamic jurisprudence and it is applied in the Somaliland courts. Conflict over inheritance occurs, as stated by the research participants, if the assets are not divided according to Sharia law or delayed in several years due to the unwillingness of the successors or the absence of some of them. This is one of the most difficult conflicts to be solved as stated by one respondent: "If land properties are not divided on time for the successors, it will cause suspicion between them; thinking that one or several persons among them are taking larger shares or benefiting from it. I have seen that such conflicts continue for longer periods and the conflicted property extends to disputants' own property because parties might argue it originated from the original assets".

It is also noted that women suffer most of the time when it comes to land inheritance

because of the culturally rooted belief that women belong to their husbands' families, and thus, lose their identity as a member of the family. Although the Article 8 of the Constitution of Somaliland (Equality of Citizens) states that, "All citizens of Somaliland shall enjoy equal rights and obligations before the law, and shall not be accorded precedence on grounds of color, clan, birth, language, gender, property, status, opinion, etc."¹² This research shows that women are victims of robbery and mostly lose their right to inherit due to these principles. When asked why women do not go to the courts to claim their rights, it was shared that most of the time women try to preserve a family relationship or lack financial means to proceed formal litigation which entails expenditures of opening a case in the court, advocate fees, transportation etc.

Conflict caused by multiple sales of the same land is also ranked as the third highest cause of the disputes. This occurs when two or more persons claim to be legal owners of the same piece of land, since they bought it from the original owner. This happens when the landlords who own the new settlements illegally sell their lands to different people. If one of the owners' questions why his/her land was sold to another person, the landlord will compensate and give another plot which may still belong to another individual. This complicates the issue further, long time and endless conflict between multiple parties who are demanding the ownership of the same land. The illegal sellers also end up imprisoned or their properties sold by the court to compensate to the buyers.

The absence of land ownership documents was cited as the fourth cause of the conflicts. Lack of documentation happens when two parties dispute over the ownership of land without any proof of ownership. The disputants only claim that they own the land and that they lost their title deeds during the civil war. Sometimes, one or both sides of the conflicting groups forge documents to proof their ownership. The local government, which was supposed to have all the documentation had lost archives during the civil war and could not retrieve any document. Conflicts of this kind are settled through swearing or witnesses. But, most of the time, it ends up in a prolonged court cases.

ACTORS IN LAND CONFLICT

Since land conflict is rampant and the persons involved are diverse with different roles, there are different categories of people who play an active role in the conflicts. In general, motivation of these actors to involve in land conflicts are due to economic reasons; investment, bribes or creating the property.

Geometers in the local government are crucial actors when it comes to land conflict. The geometers/surveyors have the mandate to plan, check and advice ownership of the land. They are responsible to confirm the size as stated in the ownership document of the

land and if it corresponds to the master plan of the area. They are also required to check the roads and directions of the land or plots. What happens is that they misappropriate communal land intentionally, giving out the land allocated for roads to specific persons, thus, causing the resistance of the neighboring inhabitants because roads are common property to the community. Likewise, geometers are the mastermind of authorizing ownership documents of the same plot of land to several persons which ultimately causes conflict. This is common because all the disputants may have legal documents.

The skyrocketing prices of land attracted business people and the Somaliland Diaspora who uses the land as a source of investment. These business people buy huge land from different persons, including landlords, local government staff and the Ministry of Public Works. Since most of these people are not selling lands according to the existing policies, it causes frequent conflicts. For example, the Ministry of Public Works sells the public land in Hargeisa to several big business persons without following the government bidding process. On the other hand, public property land is occupied by refugee returnees' who have been living there for the last 20 years. When the buyers try to vacate the land, the occupants start reacting with the only option available to them - violence, since they do not have the financial means to go to the court or power to pressure the government. Thus, land buyers are important actors in land conflicts.

On the other hand, since most of the landlords in Hargeisa do not have the ownership documents showing their land and the map of their property, border conflicts arise between them and the owners of the adjacent land. Landlords are also known to sell their land multiple times, causing conflict between the buyers. Landlords are also recognized to conspire with the geometers in the local government to misappropriate lands allocated for public purposes such as schools, health centers, police station, roads, playgrounds and the like.

Courts also play a crucial role in solving land conflicts. Courts are where some of the disputants seek solutions regarding the conflicted land. Although judges follow laws and policies, they are considered to lengthen the process of decision making, causing some cases to be in the court for almost a decade. Almost 50% of the research participants believe that this is due to corruption. While the other 50% believe this is due to the lack of documentation for disputing parties and the fact that the judicial system allows appeal to different levels of the courts for the same case.

Finally, occupiers of public land are the poorest and most vulnerable part of the society in Hargeisa. Most of those people are returnees' from the refugee camps in Ethiopia since the early 1990s. When they returned, they did not have a place to settle and live, and therefore, sought and occupied public places like government offices, roads, and

playgrounds. They built temporary structures and huts to survive. These returnees' have been there for a long time without the approval of the government and when the government tries to reclaim ownership or give to other people, it is difficult to get rid of them. This causes violent demonstrations and clashes.

CONSEQUENCES AND CHALLENGES OF LAND CONFLICT IN HARGEISA

Land conflicts in Hargeisa have many effects on the community. This is what the respondents categorized: death, financial loss, damage of property, displacement of the conflicting parties and neighbors, social consequences, especially between the relatives, clan-based conflicts and the weakened government role due the lack of implementation of the court decision. The challenges hindering the lasting solution to conflicts over land are many, but, bribery, weak government enforcement, lack of documentation, the absence of clear laws are core elements that negatively affect progress towards resolving land disputes in Hargeisa.

Land conflicts have major consequences on the residents of Hargeisa and the overall security of the city. It causes death, financial loss, damage of properties, displacement of households and social problems and it breaks relationships and interactions of the community which come to an end. In terms of development, the conflict hampers investment at both local and international levels. When it comes to land conflict resolution, Somali customary law is seen as the most effective method of conflict resolution because it is easier and saves time. Although people involved in land conflict perceive it as a complicated, expensive and long-term assignment, courts and local councils are another alternative in resolving land conflicts in Hargeisa.

CONCLUSION

There is high demand for land in Hargeisa. The inability of the government to administer the land and to regulate prices is the driving factor of land conflicts in Hargeisa. Also, unclear boundaries between adjacent landlords, inheritance problems, lack of documentation and multiple sales of land to different persons are the causes of land conflicts in Hargeisa. Effective policies and laws, clear ownership, decrease of land demand and appropriate division of inheritance can minimize land conflict cases. Major actors of land conflict in Hargeisa who are most of the time involved in land dispute are said to be geometers (surveyors) in the local government, land buyers, landlords, the court, and occupiers of public land.

Thus, it is recommended that, due to the complex factors and the prolonged resolution of land conflict cases, strong institutions and administrative divisions should handle

dispute cases responsibly. This can be a catalyst for the government to enforce legal decisions, take the overall ownership of land and to reclaim public lands in the hands of the people. To make the land dispute committees in the local governments and courts more transparent and accountable and to avoid mishandling of judgments, it is recommended that the mediators, arbitrators, and judges be adequately compensated, so that they can show strong commitment to resolve land issues and properly follow existing policies and laws. On the other hand, staff in the local government plays an important role in fueling the conflict because of lack of expertise or worst still, deliberately. Thus, it is recommended that a committee should be created to authorize and plan urban land according to the district plans. Staff should be capacitated to perform their duties in a proper manner. Although some policies of Urban Land Management exist, they have their own gaps. Clarity and description of roles and responsibilities between the different functions of the government are missing. Thus, it is important that Law No. 17 should be revised to assign clearer roles and responsibilities to the local government and the Ministry of Public Works.

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THE SOMALILAND MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC DECEPTION

Kamal Ahmed Ali

ABSTRACT

When Somaliland reclaimed its sovereignty in 1991, it took steps to have vibrant media, which took part in state and peace building efforts. A strong and vibrant media sector is seen as an important resource for national development and social demobilization efforts. Indeed, though considerable progress has been achieved in the expansion of media in Somaliland, yet significant challenges to media both state-owned and independent remain to be addressed. In recent years, there has been growing criticisms of the conduct of the mass media in Somaliland. This criticism is multifaceted – economic, political, and ethical – and is grounded mostly in the facts concerning the conduct of the media. In nearly twenty years plus, the media have enjoyed editorial independence; self-censoring, and their first and foremost responsibility remained in avoiding public and private disappointments. But, has never materialized this opportunity in which most African media if not all have never experienced. This failure could be linked to the absence of professional ethics, objective reporting and social responsibility with defined critical thinking principles. The absence of objective reporting and truth are regarded as the most challenging factors on the Somaliland freedom of speech and expression. Therefore, the media people neither have professionalism nor the knowledge to exercise media tasks. The central objective of this study is therefore, to examine the conditions of the Somaliland media and how the media deceive the public by dumping news which are contrary to the interests of the public at large. The study mainly relied on primary and secondary data includes individual interviews and discussions with the media people, politicians, academicians, and the public at large, while relevant literatures from books, journals, policy documents, among others were reviewed. The study suggests the necessity for addressing the challenges facing the media and the need for urgent legal, policy and institutional reforms to improve the level of Somaliland media, thus maintain the trust between the media for one hand, and the state and the public for the other.

INTRODUCTION

In today's world, the media is the best weapon in the battle to win the hearts and minds of the public. Newscasts play a crucial role in determining the local politics, economy, commercial and financial issues, developmental programs, security, international wars, and foreign policies and in every aspect of the state's important issues, which were once determined behind closed doors of the decision makers' offices. Presently, neither bureaucracies of the political parties, nor the elected representatives and leaders have

the power to successfully handle national issues, as usual, without the assistance of the media. The media shape and crystallize public opinion¹, and as such they really deserve to be considered as the Fourth Estate, a term attributed to Edmund Burke.²

The separation of Somaliland from the rest of Somalia in 1991 restored the long-missing basic freedoms and ushered a new era of freedom of the press. The declaration of Somaliland was a precursor of a proliferation of media. Dozens of independent newspapers were authorized to operate. Radio Hargeysa was rehabilitated and private independent television channels aired. But with this, public opinion of Somaliland's media is constantly being debated on the capacity of the media outlets and the professionalism of journalists. This leads to some people arguing about the quality of the media contents. But what is more, is that political discourse in Somaliland is still heavily characterized by rhetoric rumors and innuendo, to which the media often contributes.³

Certainly, media deception is an international phenomenon which is documented in many studies including books, academic journal and newspaper articles. The focus is usually discussing and deeply arguing about the different dimensions of public deception by the media in today's world. Edward L. Bernays, whom the New York Times referred as the "father of public relations and opinion leader in making" is one of the first few people to explore media manipulation and how it affects public opinion.⁴ In his point of view, this is necessary in society, because the true ruling powers of any country are those who manipulate the public opinion, calling them as invisible government, and ruling the whole life of the society. In Somaliland, for the last quarter of a century, dozens of different media outlets were the source of news and information for Somaliland community, who were interestingly following the media, enjoying to exercise their rights of freedom of expression. This came with a feeling of excitement as they have never dreamed of getting the pleasure of freedom before, because of the authoritarian regime which had ruled the country for two decades. The collapse of the Barre Regime in 1991 was followed by a proliferation of the independent media in Somaliland. Beginning with mimeographed newsletters in the major towns, and latter press printers were installed in Hargeisa and Berbera in 1993.⁵

This study attempts to better understand the kind of relationship between the media and those in power, and how they use media as a tool of public deception. As a conclusion, it enlightens how Somaliland media is manipulated by business gurus and politicians, to the extent that those with political power or wealth use the media as a tool of public deception. It explores how the financial challenges faced by Somaliland media might contribute to the economy and politics of domination of the media, and comes up with some recommendations for a better future of Somaliland media. The aim of this, is to

promote the public understanding of the role of the media in their political, economic and social aspects of life, and to draw attention to the international concern on media manipulation.

CONCEPTUAL CLARITY: MEDIA PUBLIC DECEPTION

At first glance, it is important to delineate what exactly do we mean by the term public deception. The term is described as any act, or statement intended to deceive the public for the benefit of a particular individual, group or organization. It is to intentionally misinform or give the truth partially for the purpose of leading the public to a specific perception or understanding, to engineer public opinion or to gain a support for a political issue, party, government or individual. Furthermore, to gain business' achievements, which is to create or increase a market for a special product or company or build reputations. There are some primary factors which motivate public deception; for instance, avoiding to harm a partner, or to help enhance or maintain his/her self-esteem, to enhance or protect their reputation, and limit relationship harm, as well as to avoid conflict.⁶

In understanding the power of the media's deception of the public one may need to know the influence media have on public opinion formation and attention. This leads us to the theory of Agenda-setting coined in 1972 by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, in their study on the quadrennial 1968, United States' Presidential election. McCombs and Shaw studied the relations between what 100 residents of Chapel Hill city believe were the most important issues of the elections and what the media was reporting to be the most important issues. They found that the media determines public opinion.⁷

Given the emphasis on the above argument, Walter Lipmann (1889–1974) American Progressive Journalist, writer and public philosopher, wrote his book on 'Public Opinion' in 1922 in which he presented the journalistic power to shape public opinion. Lipmann argues that people cannot form a truly public opinion by their own means, but always it is the production of a third party, which is the media. Lipmann a veteran journalist said for journalists, news and truth are different, which means that news doesn't necessarily need to be all the truth all the time, but just to discover facts and make a picture of reality.

The hypothesis which seems obvious is that news and truth are not the same thing and must be clearly distinguished. The function of news is to report an event; the function of truth is to bring to light the hidden facts, to set them into relation with each other, and to make a picture of reality on which men can act. Only at the point, where social conditions take recognizable and measurable shape, do the body of truth and the body of

news coincides. That is a comparatively small part of the whole field of human interest.⁸

In this regard, Lippmann argues that the picture in our head is very different from the picture of the outside world and the problem is that we cannot get it, since they are so vastly and complicated to see them as they are. Thus, according to his point of view; the reality is always missed by our mind, because the picture in our mind which makes the public opinion is usually framed and mapped by the journalists, who do not give us the true picture. “The pictures that are acted upon by groups of people, or by individuals acting in the name of groups, are Public Opinion with capital letters”.⁹

It seems obvious that Bovitz, Druckman and Lupia have somehow supported Lippmann’s argument on the difference in the picture in our heads and the one in the outside world. In their research on media guidance on public opinion; they described how media owners may sometimes prefer to publish content, on their own wish. Indeed, reporters and editors may have career concerns – reporters want to be published – and along with the owner of the news organization may also have ideological preferences that differ from those of the public. The media have an influence if a report changes the public’s action, and the media leads public opinion either because of career concerns of reporters and editors or the ideological preferences of the owner.¹⁰ This article argues that the media, mainly practice the power to influence public opinion for the interest of two groups in the community: the business and political classes. This argument supports the view that the media have always shaped and mapped public opinion as discussed in the available and reliable literature.

MEDIA DECEPTION: A SOMALILAND OUTLOOK

Somaliland media editorials and contents are determined by the financial interests of the outlets. The business relations with the companies, which for example advertise their business in the media, or sometimes common interest among the media and the other businesses, control the media contents and pave the way for the business to use media as a public deception tool. J Potter (2010) explained how the economy influences media by stating that the media industries have developed some general economic strategies over the years that make them successful at playing the economic game and achieving their goals. Furthering this argument, Potter presented three major strategies of media outlets, which they put forward and showed that they are business oriented: a) to get the greatest possible profit, b) to construct audiences and to minimize the risk. Almost all mass media are profit-oriented enterprises as a business; and, c) they are run to make as large profit as possible.

One can never downplay the role and interest of the business people to the public at large. Indeed, the business community understands that it necessarily needs to have good relations with the public as a whole, because it considers the public in general as their potential consumers. They also keep in mind that the modern society understands business as a desire of getting good service or competing products from their suppliers. Business struggles to win the market competition, and that compels them to constantly increase their market demands, which on its part will increase the profit, market shares, and sales volume.

Indeed, the media has two main revenue sources: the sales or subscription income and the businesses, which advertise their products and services in the media to strengthen their market. The last is the most important income source for media outlets. The business advertisements published in media are the major source of income for media outlets so it would not be surprised to see the profit-oriented media biasing their editorials on the benefit of advertisers. And knowing this, large business public relations departments advertise their contents on almost all the media outlets in Somaliland. Hamilton (2011) testifies that media bias their contents to benefit from the advertisement. The failure of news outlets to earn revenues from the value of better voting decisions means that news programs or products that focus on the hard news will be under-produced.¹¹

Having monitored Somaliland media contents and their effects on the public, this article argues that Somaliland government, political parties, and independent politicians, use the media to build their public relations strong, to gain popularity and to get support for political agendas. Somaliland media also release news events about clan politics, the movements of politicians from one party to another, and the minor activities of businessmen. Rather than publish in-depth analysis and reports reading between the lines of these events.


Media support a particular political party or a government program or agenda for achieving special privileges; just like it happened during the confronting arguments, about Somaliland government concession of Berbera Port to Dubai Ports World in 2016. The government used the media in return of money, to create a momentum for this project.¹² Many people, including Somaliland Members of Parliament, considered the concession agreement as impossible to accept. But after a relentless propaganda campaign through the media and bribing some legislators, the government managed to pass the project through the Parliament and to ease the tension of the people against the project.¹³

The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 says everyone has the right to receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless

of frontiers. Somaliland press freedom among many other civil and political rights is considered, which contributed much to the democratic processes of the country. To realize this process, the media played a fairly vital role in social and political awareness, raising accountability and good governance, through feeding the public with information about their public interests, and through educating them that their elected government is accountable to them. This is a culture they never practice before, due to the long-serving military government which was critically against the birth of any kind of independent media except the state-run media.

Though the Somaliland media has its own challenges, the media contributed to the accountability of the government and empowered the civic education. It also acts as a medium of communication between the society on one hand, the politicians, the public and the private institutions on the other hand. Analyzing the issue further, the media informs the community, by providing national and international news items, educational articles, social events and enhancing public awareness. Performing this important role, the media in Somaliland gained a good reputation and achieved audiences, which gave them the power to influence social and political attitudes. However, the power of the media encouraged the political class and business community, both to influence the media newscasts to the benefit of their public relations and reputation. Indeed, there are factors which contribute their part the vulnerability of the media, these include: financial interests, political privilege, and media incompetence, to name but a few.

Figure 1: Somaliland Media Deception of the Public



Source: Survey conducted by Kamal Ahmed Ali, 2016

CONCLUSION

The Somaliland media has a love-hate relationship with the Somaliland politicians, which led many newspapers to face harassments from those running the state at different times. On the other hand, their contribution both to the state and peace building processes as well as democratization was crucial and deserves appreciation. But, the media itself have never been without challenges both from within the media themselves and from outside. These challenges include: low level of education, lack of professional integrity and discipline as well as institutional weaknesses that emanate at least from two compatible fronts: inadequate training programs and the absence of effective policies that may perhaps regulate the media.

Without doubt, the middle-class businesses and large companies with the two business streams, products or services, know that to cover their deficiency and shortcomings and to protect their reputation, they are compelled to reach the public and influence their perceptions and attitudes. This could only be possible by using the media.

On the other hand, the political class in Somaliland makes a great effort to build relations with the media. Aiming to create an environment which allows them, to use the media as a tool of public deception. They do this by promising advantages for the owners or editors, giving money, or other political privileges. The politicians successfully manipulate the media and control their newscast, to stop broadcasting or publishing any content, they consider being against their popularity or damages their public relations.

This article reveals that one of the main priorities of any politician or large business in Somaliland is to manipulate the media, because they perceive that, to control what would go into the public, could give them the infinite power to manage and control the national resources or the market respectively. Thus, the study proves that there is a correlation between the media, public deception and the businessmen and politicians.

The related literature found in this field, shows that media deception is a big challenge against good governance and accountability. So this article has every reason to argue that, Somaliland media's avoidance of publishing any newscast, which may be against the interests of the businesses or the politicians they are in relations with, had negatively impacted the public perception. This has also weakened the ability to evaluate the products and services provided by the companies and the public determinations towards politicians and public officers. More coarsely, media deceive the public attitude towards the crucial political issues in Somaliland. By reporting prejudiced newscasts, avoiding publishing facts about it, or not fulfilling.

Their role of investigating or commentating the facts in between the lines is missing or in reality absent. The issues which the study underlines as the least covered or biased reported items are Somaliland–Somalia talks, Somaliland recognition efforts, Somaliland’s international diplomatic status, good governance, and transparency. Indeed, lack of resources and skills, made the media vulnerable, as a result they are used (especially journalists) to delude the public. This article highlights the financial interests, political privilege and media incompetence as the three main factors which contribute to this media vulnerability to manipulation.

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TWO DECADES OF DEMOCRACY IN SOMALILAND: THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Ifrah M. Abdi Galbedi

ABSTRACT

Civil society organizations in Somaliland have mushroomed since 1991 and have made an important contribution to the relief and rehabilitation efforts throughout the country, particularly in the provision of social services and the empowerment of disadvantaged groups in the society. Many of these civil society organizations have contributed significantly to improving the lives of a large number of people, particularly women, children and other vulnerable groups by supporting a range of essential services that the state has failed to provide. Presently, many Somaliland civil society organizations are engaged in democratization and good governance issues. However, it is rare to witness a civic organization that is involved in political activism, or lobbying for legislative reform. This article examines the notion of the civil society in the Somaliland context and their roles in the democratization processes. Moreover, the article specifically discusses major involvements and challenges of the civil society in promoting free and fair electoral processes.

INTRODUCTION

The idea of civil society is central to any discussion of democratization since it raises central issues about the role of social forces in defining, controlling and legitimating state power.¹ In development debates, it is argued that the growth of civil society, in its modern form can play a crucial political role not merely by undermining authoritarian government and contributing to the establishment and maintenance of democratic polity, but also by improving the quality of governance within that polity.² According to Diamond (1994) civil society is thought to play different roles at different stages of the democratization processes. Most political analysts distinguish between democratic transition and democratic consolidation. In democratic transitions, civil society is thought to play a major role in mobilizing the necessary pressure for political change.³ Civil society is also considered to play a key role in checking abuses of state power, preventing the resumption of excessive power by authoritarian governments and encouraging wider citizen participation and public scrutiny of the state.⁴ This paper seeks to discuss the role of the civil society in promoting democracy in Somaliland by supporting fair and free electoral processes by analyzing existing literature on the theme and in-depth interviews with some key civil society members whose work engages or involves mainly issues related to democracy. The article is divided into three parts. The first is conceptualizing the concept of civil society. The second part narrates the history

of the civil society within Somaliland peace and state building endeavors. The final part demonstrates the roles played by different civil society actors in the electoral processes in Somaliland.

CONCEPTUALIZING THE TERM: CIVIL SOCIETY

Despite the fact that the term civil society has existed since early times, the term as an intellectual construct gained clarity with the introduction of modernity in the western world during the 17th century. Many events like the growth of the institutions of private property, spread of urbanization, replacement of the despotic state by the liberal state, etc., contributed immensely to the definition of the term ‘civil society’. However, it is the rise of capitalism that led to a clearer distinction between political and non-political and thus prepared the ground for the emergence of civil society as a separate and independent domain.⁵

Cohen and Arato (1992) define the term civil society as a ‘space’ independent from the state and the market, while Van Til (1988, 2000) equated it with voluntary sector and argued that non-governmental organizations do not adequately represent the reality of civil society. Thus, suggests that it should be seen as an ‘operational space’ between the public and the private. Therefore, within the context of this article, civil society would include different types of organizations such as non-governmental organizations, community groups, women’s organizations, professional associations, self-help groups, trade unions and advocacy groups. According to Diamond (1994) civil society is thought to play different roles at different stages of the democratization processes. Most political analysts distinguish between democratic transition and democratic consolidation. In democratic transitions, civil society is thought to play a major role in mobilizing pressure for political change. Organized social groups such as students, women’s groups, farmers’ organizations, NGOs, trade unions, religious groups, professional organizations, the media, think tanks and human rights organizations are ‘a crucial source of democratic change’.⁶

HISTORICAL SETTING AND THE RISE OF SOMALILAND CIVIL SOCIETY

Within the Somaliland context, the term “*civil society*” is more or less associated with different groups, including the ‘traditional’ institutions such as elders’ committees, welfare organizations, community-based organizations, professional associations, Islamic charities, milk-associations and transport cooperatives. There are few organizations formed around issues, such as the rights of women, children, the disabled and minorities.⁷

The rise of the civil society in Somaliland was instigated in 1981 during the formation of the Somali National Movement.⁸ At that time, traditional elders were considered part of the civil society and they launched efforts aiming at mobilizing support for the movement both inside and outside of Somaliland. It was during the civil war period when Somaliland people turned back to their elders as a source of knowledge and experience. Elders were sought to restore stability after experiencing the tragic failure of the state ‘*modern governance system*’ and the breakdown into warlords, turmoil and uncertainty.⁹ The Academy for Peace and Development (2002)¹⁰ included women Organizations and Unions as part of the civil society. Following the Somali civil war, the economic activities of women have expanded, increasing their hard work both domestically and in the market. They have shown a high degree of patience and self-sacrifice which allowed them to become “principal economic actors”.

Women’s organizations have made an important contribution from 1991 onwards to the relief and rehabilitation efforts throughout Somaliland, particularly in the provision of social services and the empowerment of disadvantaged groups in society especially women. Many of these organizations have contributed significantly to improving the lives of a large number of women and other vulnerable groups, by supporting a range of essential services like basic education, health, economic empowerment, civic rights, and political participation.

Another realm which falls under the work of the women’s organization is peace-building and conflict prevention. NAGAAD Women Network, which is one of the leading women’s organizations in Somaliland was launched during the third National Peace Conference in Hargeisa in 1996 to deliberate on ways to bring to an end the civil war that had broken out in Somaliland in 1994.

In his paper, Mohamed Sheikh Abdillahi argued that:

Following the secession, traditional clan-based institutions of elders, combined with fledgling governmental and non-governmental organizations, began to take responsibility for governance, security and reconstruction at community and national level. As well as implementing projects, they have been advocates of assistance for the different regions and active in peace and reconciliation efforts, providing logistical, secretarial and moral support for peace conferences. Women’s organizations, in particular promoted peace and reconciliation efforts in 1992 and 1993.¹¹

Discussions around different types of civil society in Somaliland will certainly come across the term ‘NGO’ or Non-Governmental organization. Indigenous Somali NGOs

appeared first in the early 1980s, in the wake of the international aid agencies that rushed in to help with the huge influx of Ethiopian refugees into Somalia as a result of the 1977–78 Ogaden War. As the international agencies began to withdraw, local NGOs increased rapidly in number. As the 1980s progressed, the majority was still based in Mogadishu.¹² However, the emergence of the NGOs in Somaliland began during the 1990s following the collapse of the Barre regime; barely, a handful of “self-help” projects were allowed to function as ad hoc initiatives since the military regime has discouraged the formation of independent organizations.¹³

The years after 1991 marked an increase in the number of the civil society organizations with approximately 600 local NGOs in 2009.¹⁴ These organizations were getting funds from both the International NGOs (INGOs) and United Nations Agencies in providing relief and humanitarian aid to various communities across Somaliland. Over the years, nearly 1,800 local and 104 international NGOs registered with the Ministry of National Planning and Development. In addition, there are 21 UN agencies currently working in the country.¹⁵

SOMALILAND ELECTORAL PROCESSES AND CIVIL SOCIETY INTERVENTIONS

In modern democracies, elections are considered to be an essential component in advancing democratization. However, the challenge of establishing elections in a multi-party democracy is particularly acute in a traditional nomadic society based on a highly decentralized kinship structure made up of various clans. Nevertheless, Somaliland people believe that their elections are an affirmation of a democratization process that was started with a constitutional referendum in 2001 and followed by two local council elections in 2002 and 2012, three Presidential elections in 2003, 2010, and 2017, and finally one Parliamentarian election in 2005.

In all the elections that were conducted in Somaliland, there was an entity that was charged with overseeing the overall process of the election; the National Electoral Commission (NEC). The Commission is an independent body created to administer and organize elections and was set up under the Presidential and Local Council Elections Law (Law no: 20/2001). It consists of seven members.¹⁶

Another main stakeholder in the electoral process is the civil society with their critical and diverse roles. Somaliland civil society has always worked closely and in partnership with the NEC, a few non-government organizations (NGOs), and intellectually-oriented organizations (research centers) which carry out studies and research on various issues of public concern regarding democracy. The civil society also provides civic dialogue forums and spaces as a way to support NEC in implementing election related activities,

such as voter education, training and deployment of conflict resolution agents, local monitors and observers.

ELECTION-RELATED ADVOCACY

Since, the existing electoral legal frameworks are not in favor of promoting women's and minorities group participation in the decision-making process, there are NGOs that advocate specifically for certain groups or issues, such as those that work to enhance women's roles in the electoral process. Their involvement has been seen as a step in the right direction, but they are struggling to translate their demands into concrete political action. There are active organizations such as the Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Consortium of Somaliland Non-Governmental Organizations (COSONGO), and Somaliland Non-State Actors Forum (SONSAF) which have played an important role in advancing public dialogue about the national democratization process. In addition to that, NAGAAD Network, which is a network for Somaliland women's organizations made several attempts to pass legislation on affirmative action for women and marginalized groups through the Parliament in July 2007.¹⁷

During the 2010 and 2012 presidential and local elections respectively, the representation of women and marginalized groups became a major concern for the local organizations who advocate for the right of the two. They campaigned hard to include provisions in the electoral law that would improve the chances of women and marginalized groups to gain greater representation in the 2012 local councils. To push further, women's groups led by NGAAD Network pressured the House of Representatives to amend the electoral law to introduce a quota for women and marginalized groups to ensure their fair representation in the new House of Representatives. However, the *Guurti* members made it clear that they are against the quota based on article 22 in the constitution, which state that: every citizen who fulfills the requirements of the law shall have the right to be elected (to an office) and to vote.¹⁸

SUPPORTING THE VOTER REGISTRATION

Somaliland's inefficient electoral process is one of the major obstacles to democratization. Accurate, transparent, effective, trusted, and accepted voter registration plays a critical role in delivering free, credible, and peaceful elections. However, voter registration is a highly complex process composed of financial, technical, and political commitments.¹⁹ Due to the lack of resources and technical knowledge, the voter registration process was not deployed in the 2002, 2003, and 2005 elections. The absence of this important instrument had a negative impact on the credibility and integrity of these elections and led to a highly charged and tensed political environment.

October 11, 2007 was a landmark day as Somaliland's political parties finally agreed on a voter registration schedule as well as new dates for the 2010 and 2012 local and presidential elections respectively. However, NEC faced challenges in developing a realistic system for the registration of eligible voters or an equivalent process. These challenges were mainly the insufficient human resources, time and funding to implement voter registration before the elections. Moreover, there is no reliable census and national identification database and most of the people are nomads.

To overcome that, NEC established a local NGO consortium that consisted of seven members from the major networks and institutions that worked with NEC as an advisory board. The board was mandated to select the appropriate local organizations to conduct voter education during the display period of voter registration cards and in monitoring the performance of these organizations. The group was also helpful in selecting, training and deploying 600 individuals from the civil societies to mediate in electoral disputes outside the polling stations during the voter registration display period and the polling day. Furthermore, member organizations of this consortium trained and fielded about 800 local election observers in the 2010 presidential elections.

CIVIC EDUCATION TRAININGS

Lack of civic education programmes prior to the elections and the high illiteracy rate of Somaliland people led to voting irregularities. The public and party officials had difficulty adhering to the standard 'democratic rules' and there was considerable double-voting and ballot stuffing. Moreover, many citizens did not have a broad understanding of their political and civic rights, the electoral process and the concept of free and fair elections.²⁰ Another element in the electoral process is a continuous civic education programme. This is because well-informed citizens are an essential part of any democratic system. One of the main problems a new democratic society faces is ensuring that all citizens are well-informed and truly understand the democratic system. Progress has been made through successive elections since 2002 to educate Somaliland citizens on their role in the democratic process and the civil society has played a major role in the civic education campaign. They deployed various creative means to reach the rural areas and nomadic people.

Some of the local organizations such as the Academy for Peace and Development (APD) were showing documentaries and educational audio-visual materials, while the Horn of Africa Voluntary Youth Committee (HAVAYOCO) conducted circus shows to educate the people living in rural areas on civic education issues. NAGAAD Network and Somaliland National Youth Umbrella (SONYO) also made tremendous amount of

effort to educate the most illiterate segment of the society, which are the women and the marginalized groups, on their civic rights and duties.

REDUCING CONFLICT DYNAMICS AND MEDIATION ROLE

Civic organizations, people from the business community and religious groups spearheaded a number of mediation efforts during the electoral crisis to resolve some of the political disagreements. For example, in August 2007, a mediation committee consisting of APD members, two famous poets, three prominent religious figures and four well-respected intellectuals stepped into mediate disagreements among the three political parties, the Guurti and the government over the formation of a new NEC and were able to resolve the issue.²¹ Furthermore, during the 2010 presidential election, the Social Research and Development Institute (SORADI) was sub-contracted to provide training to 600 respected community leaders to intervene in any conflicts that could occur inside or outside polling stations on the Election Day.²²

MONITORING

The Electoral Monitoring Committee (EMC) is an independent body of locally-respected people, mostly from the civil society, business community, and traditional elders, which was established for breaches of electoral codes and laws and making known of complaints publicly where necessary. Their remit gave them no statutory power beyond making their findings public, and they were required to refer uncertified concerns to the NEC who have the power to discipline those in breach of the regulations.

FACING CHALLENGES

Despite the involvement of certain civic organizations in the electoral process in different capacities, they lack the power base to put pressure on the government, and political parties adhere to the terms of the agreement or face the pressure from the government and other groups. One explanation for that is that civic organizations are outward looking, but not inward looking, meaning that they are more accountable and connected to their donors than the locals they claim to represent. Their lack of effective internal democratic governance and transparency puts them in a moral dilemma to ask the government and the political parties to be democratic and transparent.²³

There are also arguments that the civil society organizations are only limited to voter and civic educations and they explained that the government and NEC are encouraging the participation of the civil society in other activities instead of advocacy and capacity building. Civil societies are also fragmented in terms of issues regarding fair and free

elections due to clan affiliations.

Not only those challenges, but also there are other challenges include lack of sustainable funding, limited local fundraising, insufficient human and financial resources to deal with issues regarding the good governance and democracy due to the burden of donor-driven agendas.

CONCLUSION

Elections provide an important opportunity to advance democratization and encourage political liberalization in the world; hence, the political transition of Somaliland demanded a shift from a clan-based power sharing system to a constitutional government based on western style multi-party democracy. The country has so far held three rounds of elections: local council, presidential and legislative elections.

A multi-party electoral system introduces the perception of “winners” and “losers” in contrast with the more inclusive system of clan representation. There were the risks of post-election disputes escalating into violent conflict due to the weakness of the other institutions like the judiciary that typically manage political conflict in democratic societies.

The role of civil society in elections often takes the form of support for the institutional processes of a democratic election as well as the more substantive development of a democratic electorate. Civil society does, however, have a role to play in capacity building and advocacy, supporting NEC in promoting a peaceful electoral environment through the process of voter registration, awareness and civic education campaigns. As a point of conclusion, civil society in Somaliland continues to suffer from the burden of the donor driven-agenda, and they are unable to shift from project implementation to being active politically in lobbying for legislative reforms that will translate the public demands into concrete change towards a more democratic Somaliland nation.

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URBAN POVERTY IN SOMALILAND: THE CASE OF STATE HOUSE AREA
IN HARGEISA

Abdirizak Mohamoud Osman

ABSTRACT

Somaliland, like any other Sub-Saharan Africa remains amongst the poorest nations in the world with a Gross Domestic Product per capita of \$499.8 according to the World Bank ahead of Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Niger. The purpose of this study is aimed to analyze urban poverty in Somaliland. Both primary and secondary data were used; the primary data were obtained from field activity results of a questionnaire distributed to 97 randomly selected respondents in the study area. The secondary data were taken from different published assessments and reports from reputable global institutions. Descriptive statistics and econometric model were used to analyze the data. According to the results of this study, urban poverty in Somaliland is multi-dimensional; it manifests itself in the form of inadequate basic services and goods such as lack of clean water, nutritious food, lack of hygiene and sanitation, lack of health facilities, lower standard houses without lighting, unemployment, poorly paid wage. The combinations of these problems deteriorate and worsen the living conditions of the urban poor in Somaliland. Urban poverty is determined by consumption expenditure, household size, education level of the head of the household, access to health facilities and status of unemployment in the study area. Therefore, this implies the necessity of intervention and preparation of comprehensive and inclusive national planning: reduction of poverty, employment creation, investment in education (vocational and training) and health, introduction of poor friendly public utilities, promotion of investment in national productive assets, and institutionalization of local community support systems (local charity).

INTRODUCTION

Poverty is a multi-dimensional problem. It is a phenomenon with composite reasons¹ and consequences.² Quantitative measures are the most common approaches used to measure poverty; the income or consumption based definitions of poverty are widely used throughout the literature. This approach judges whether a household can afford to purchase a basic basket of goods at a given point in time.³ 'Poor' is counted as those who fall below an income and consumption level or 'poverty line'.⁴ The other approaches include the Basic Needs Approach, the Capabilities Approach, and the Human Development Approach (HDA), Human Development Index (HDI); which is a composite measure of three dimensions of human development: life expectancy, educational attainment and standard of living, measured by income in terms of its purchasing power parity.

Whatever the definition of poverty, its problems remain unsolved and found everywhere

in the world, the nations of the world experience one or several kinds of poverty; what varies is the extent and the kind of poverty people find themselves in. Poverty is an obvious and devastatingly concentrated in the least developed parts of the globe. East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa host the largest poor population of the world. Incidents of poverty in Africa remain a serious problem, despite low levels of poverty on the continent recently.⁵

The analysis of urban poverty is different from the general poverty and it necessitates additional techniques for dealing with the urban lifestyle specific characteristics of commoditization, over population, accidents, social fragmentations, crime and violence. Urban poverty focuses on the durational part of individual and household poverty level rather than the average or aggregate poverty level of the population.⁶ Though there is no single approach in carrying out urban poverty measurements, there are some common ones, the money-metric income or consumption based approach to assess whether an individual or household can afford to purchase a basic basket of goods on average food, shelter, water, clothing, transport.

Somaliland is badly affected by many types of poverty. Somaliland Household and Enterprise Survey have considered poor for those individuals who earn less than a dollar (\$1) per day. The survey also entails that 37 percent of rural and 30 percent of the urban population are poor.⁷ Somaliland is amongst the poorest nations in the World, with a Gross Domestic Product per capita of \$499.8 ahead of Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Niger.⁸ Urbanization is higher than ever and urban poverty is aggravated by the increasing number of population. A World Bank study has shown that for every four people living in urban areas in Somaliland more than one is living in poverty.⁹ Indeed, there is no empirical studies have been done on urban poverty in Somaliland; but, this study is conducted with a main objective of analyzing urban poverty in the study area and poses two basic questions aiming to identify the major dimensions of poverty and assess the determinants of poverty in the urban community in Somaliland. The research underlying this paper sets out to contribute to an improved understanding of scope, dimensions, and factors affecting poverty among urban poor communities in Somaliland.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Four approaches are vastly used to define poverty— monetary, capability, exclusion and participatory approaches. Certainly, poverty has many faces, the issue is not only monetary, but also a composite range of deprivation in the areas of education, health, jobs occupation, safety and security, nutrition, housing and assets, among others is necessary to underline.¹⁰ Setting a poverty line, this approach is rooted in the economic principles of welfare.¹¹ It is frequently defined in connection to the achievement with basic needs. On the other hand, the inability to achieve basic needs reflects poverty. The minimum level of utility that is necessary to escape poverty stated in the welfare consistent poverty line is the cost of a bundle of “basic consumption needs”, given by

the vector of utility-compensated demands at the reference level of utility defining who is poor in the welfare space. The poverty line is an important tool for identifying who is poor “A monetary poverty line is the minimum amount of money considered necessary to lead a non-impooverished life”. Any individual whose income level fell below the poverty line are identified as a poor.¹²

The limitation of income approach for representing the well being of individuals has been a central message for developing the capability approach. In this perspective, poverty is redefined as fundamental inadequacies of capabilities not an inadequacy of income or consumption. Capability approaches include the Human Development Index (HDI) and Multi-dimensional Poverty Index (MPI) of the United Nations Development Programme in assessing the progress of society.¹³

Income poverty and capability poverty are correlated, as the income of the individual or the society increases then followed by capability. For instance, as the family income or earning rises the expenditure on education, health care, nutritious food, and freedom of choice all rise. On the other hand, improvements in basic education and health care can give the opportunity to achieve and generate an income to escape from income poverty. Therefore, as one increases the other follows. Since poverty is multi-faceted and multi-dimensional, it is valuable to build a model of poverty determination by considering the various theories of poverty.

EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

Poverty is one of the world’s most critical and pressing contemporary issues. The world does not lack resources to tackle poverty, but, there is a lack of political and institutional will to overcome the problem.¹⁴ In fact, extreme poverty kills and costs the lives of people. It is a global problem and the inability of an individual or society to achieve a ‘minimum level of well-being’. In 2003, the World Bank reported that approximately 1.1 billion people globally lived on less than \$1 per day, and nearly 2.7 billion or half of all those living in low- and middle-income countries lived on less than \$2 per day. This number fell to approximately 2.2 billion people in the year 2015.

By 2003, 56% of Sub-Saharan Africans were living under the poverty line. The percentage of Sub-Saharan poor has declined to 40% by 2015.¹⁵ Some studies argue that poverty is concentrated in the Southern and Eastern parts of Africa. At the same time, the population growth in Africa remains continuously expanding at an alarming rate and as a result the number of poor people has increased to more than 100 million.¹⁶

Discussions on urban poverty and urbanization of poverty have been growing over the last 20 years, urbanization plays an important role in poverty reduction, but on the other hand share of urban poverty is rising.¹⁷ Urban poverty is viewed as a multi-dimensional issue linked to low levels of income and consumption, and other poor conditions related to employment, housing, health care, education and even a person’s place in public

networks. The UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) has stated that 881 million people or 30% of developing countries' urban populations lives in slums under impoverished circumstances.¹⁸

In connection to this, the Somaliland poverty rate was first estimated using Somaliland Household Survey (SHS) in 2013. The study has shown that Somaliland poverty in urban and rural settled areas was approximately 30% and 37% respectively. Using income and consumption approaches of measuring poverty; more than 1 in 4 people in urban and more than 1 in 3 people in rural areas are living in poverty. The monthly income required to meet the basic needs of a household in urban and rural Somaliland was estimated to be 207,300 and 180,900 Somaliland Shillings equivalent to \$0.98 and \$0.86 per adult respectively. Anyone who receives an income level less than this amount is recognized as a poor.¹⁹

Certainly, poverty in Somaliland is multi-dimensional. Female headed families are common in Somaliland, particularly in urban areas, and these households are more likely to be poor than households headed by men. This highlights linkages between gender and poverty. Gender inequality in access to formal education is found among poor people in Somaliland, girls schooling age are less likely than boys.²⁰

A study by Mohamed (2017)²¹ on Measurement and Determinants of Urban Poverty in Case of Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNPR) in Ethiopia stated that marital status, family size, total dependency, educational level, saving habits, and source of energy are determinants of poverty and statistically significant variables. Yonas A. et al (2012)²² argue that in Ethiopia, households with a history of past poverty persist to recognize themselves as poor even if they achieve better material acquisition and consumption level.

METHODOLOGY

This study was conducted in the State House area in Hargeisa, a city with an estimated population of over 800,000.²³ Both primary and secondary data were used; the primary data were collected through questionnaires distributed to 97 randomly selected respondents drawn from urban poor in the study area by using simple random sampling technique. The secondary data were collected from different published works: books, journals, archives of institutions, and etc.

In sampling and sample size determination, a two stage sampling procedure was used in this study. First, the State House IDP area was identified and purposefully selected based on the area's potential and availability of urban poor in the city. In the second stage, a probability sampling method was used to select the sample household randomly. Out of 3,000 households in the villages, 97 were selected by using simple random sampling; the sample size was determined by using sample size determination table based on (Yamana, 1967) formula with 10% precision level.²⁴

In the data analysis, descriptive statistics and econometric model were used to analyze the data. Descriptive measures such as means, percentages, ratios, and standard deviations are presented in tabular and graphical forms. In the econometric section, logistic regression model was used to analyze the determinants of poverty in the study area.

In the context of this study, the definition of variables and hypothesis are needed. Therefore, a number of socio-economic factors are found to have different effects on urban poverty. The study examined factors expected to have an influence on urban poverty in Somaliland. These are as following:

Education: It is a continuous variable measured in number of schooling years. It is a proxy of human capital and is expected to negatively relate urban poverty; the higher the schooling grade attained by an individual, the better the opportunities for attaining better jobs and the vice versa. Mohamed (2017)²⁵ found that education of the household head is negatively and statistically significantly related to urban poverty at 1 percent precision level.

Household size: This variable is continuous; it is hypothesized that large size households are more likely to fall into the poor category than those with lesser size. Most of empirical studies reported that household size is positively associated with poverty. Mohamed (2017) and Araya (2010) both reported significant and positive effects on household size on poverty.

Consumption expenditure: This is a continuous variable; it is hypothesized to have a negative correlation between consumption expenditure and poverty. As the consumption expenditure increases the probability of households falling under the poor category falls.

Age of the head: It is continuously variable measured in a number of years. The variable is hypothesized to negatively affect poverty; as the age of the head of the household increases welfare rises. More human capital (education and/or working experience) is accumulated, thus, reduces poverty or the likelihood to be poor.²⁶

Marital status: It is a categorical variable which has economic implication on household income level. A number of studies have recommended that single headed households are more likely to escape from poverty than married. In this study, it is hypothesized that marital status has an indeterminate effect on poverty. Araya (2010) found a significant and negative effect of marital status on poverty.

Gender of household head: It is a dummy variable and takes the value of 1 if the head of the household is male otherwise 0. The variable is expected to negatively relate to poverty. In addition to this, Esubalew (2006)²⁷ found the probability that a household will be poor when headed by females is significant at 95 confidences interval

Unemployment: It is a dummy variable and takes the value of 1 if the head of the family is unemployed, otherwise it assumes 0; Unemployment is expected to positively correlate with poverty. According to Rachel M., et al. (1997) there is a positive correlation between unemployment rate and the extent of poverty in urban areas.²⁸

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

This section deals with the analysis of the findings of the research from the field. It begins with an emphasis on the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the households in the study area

Socio-Economic and Demographic Characteristics

Table 1: Socio-Economic and Demographic Characteristics of the Households in the Study Area

Variable	Frc	Percent	Mean	Sdv	Min	Max
Sex						
Female	54	44.32				
Male	43	55.68				
Total	97	100				
Household Size			6.17	2.89	1	20
Age Group			42.62	1.25	20	6
Employment Status						
Employed	77	79.38				
Unemployed	20	20.62				
Total	97	100				
Daily Income	77			31,725.50	10,000	
Daily Consumption	77			18,408.99	10,000	


Source: Survey conducted by the author, 2016

The major socio-economic and demographic variables include the sex, age, employment status, daily consumption and expenditure of the residents in the study area. Out of 97 respondents, 44.32% were male and 55.68% were female. The reason for this is that women are most often found in the homes due to their responsibilities to take care of the home and children. Men most often go out for jobs or for any other affair necessary to maintain the sustenance of their families. Considering the family size, the study indicated that 50% of households have family members of 6-10 individuals; 46% of households have 1-5 individuals, the remaining 4% constitute households with family members greater than 10 individuals. Mean age of respondents are found to be 42.62 years, with minimum and maximum ages of 20 and 76 respectively.

In terms of the marital status, the study showed that the majority of the respondents

in the study area are married (79.38%); widowed and single were 9.28% and 7.22% respectively. Divorce and separate statuses were least significant among the respondents in the village.

FIGURE 1: MARITAL STATUS OF THE STUDY AREA RESIDENTS



Source: Survey conducted by the author, 2016

The output of employment reveals that 79.4% were employed in non-permanent daily jobs where as 20.6% does not have jobs at all. Employment is associated to the income and consumption expenditure of households; the level of consumption by the consumer depends on the level of disposable income. Decent jobs are ones that provide better payments, job security and safety in the working environment. The daily earnings of urban poor are approximately 49,000 Somaliland Shillings (SLSh) equivalent to 6.28 US Dollar (using August, 2016 Somaliland to Dollar Exchange rate \$1:7,800 SLSh). The average earning of poor employed person in urban Somaliland is dollar 1.04. Previous findings¹ state that the amount of daily income needed for an adult to meet his/her basic needs is dollar 0.95. The finding of this research can be matched to earlier findings when it is adjusted to the inflation rate.

Food and related consumer goods such as water and energy have a significant share in the consumption expenditure of the residents in the study area. Food, water and energy for cooking (charcoal) are the basic expenditure items. More than 90% of the residents stated that food expenditure is the most frequently paid item, followed by water and cooking energy. The mean daily consumption expenditure (food and related) of the households is approximately 40,000 SLSh equivalent to USD 5.13 during the study. The average share of an individual from a normal household is only USD 0.85. The findings fall below the Somaliland income poverty line necessary to meet the basic needs.²

The unemployed in the study area maintain their living through support from relatives (30%), remittance (30%), rent (5%), livestock (25%) and charity (10%). The findings match with already existing beliefs of supporting the poor and relatives.

Educational Attainment and Access to Education of urban poor in the Study Area


Table 2: Educational Attainment and Access to Education

Variable	Frequency	Percent
Access to Education by Children		
Yes	65	67.01
No	32	32.99
Total	97	100
School Grade		
Primary	22	33.85
Intermediate	22	33.85
Secondary	21	32.30
Total	65	100

Source: Survey conducted by the author, 2016

An educated father or mother will probably have an educated child compared to an uneducated father or mother. 67% of children have an access to education; while 33% doesn't have access at all. In addition, school children usually attend free public primary education. In 2010, Somaliland government announced free public primary education for all school age children immediately after the election.³ But the schools lack major educational facilities and staff. According a joint research by the Ministry of Planning and the World Bank in 2015, 35% of urban people in Somaliland have no an access to formal education. Merging the two findings shows the existence of some improvements on the part of accessibility due to the free primary education program since 2010. A majority of the children have attended either primary or intermediate school 67%, the remaining 33% have attended secondary level education. Primary and intermediate school children also attend at least one formal or informal Quranic school known as *Madarasa*. Not all those who had access to education completed the desired level of education in the school. Approximately 45% of them dropped out from the schools earlier to intermediate or secondary school level. As figure 4 has shown.

Figure 2: School Children Dropouts



Source: Survey conducted by the author, 2016

NUTRITION, HEALTH AND HOUSING STATUS PROFILE OF URBAN POOR IN THE STUDY AREA

Attaining the minimum level of nutrition for sustaining a healthy life is a fundamental human right for every individual. Development scholars argue that Health is among the most important conditions of human life and a significant element of human capabilities.⁴ Better nutrition and balanced diet is a basic element in attaining better health and hence better life.

Variable	Frequency	Percent
Food shortages		
Yes	38	39.17
No	59	60.83
Total	97	100
Means of Survival During Food Shortages		
Loan	13	32.5
Support from relatives	11	27.5
Support from neighbors	8	20
Street begging	8	20
Total	40	100
Access to Health facilities		
Yes	37	38.15
No	60	61.85
Total	97	100
Hygienic and Sanitary Problem		
Yes	71	73.2
No	26	26.8
Total	97	100
House Type		
Brick	9	9.28
Masonry	5	5.15
Somali traditional house	28	28.87
Iron sheet	47	48.45
Cottage	8	8.25
Total	97	100
House Ownership Status		
Own house	73	75.26
Rent house	16	26.49
Not rent, Relative House	8	8.25
Total	97	100

Table 3 shows that approximately 40% of the residents in the study area faced at least one month of food shortages for the last twelve months. Loan, support from relatives, neighbors and street begging were the most significant means of survival for those people during food shortages.

In regards the health facility accessibility, 38.15% have an access to a public health facility; whereas 61.85% do not have. The public health centers in the village are lacking the major health equipments, medicines, drugs and staff. Few services such as delivery, minor injuries and distribution of nutrients to children suffering from malnutrition children are the only available services. 73.2% of the residents complain about hygiene or sanitary related problems the major hygiene and sanitary problems identified in this research are lack of solid waste disposal, lack of latrines, lack of sewerage and overpopulation.

Out of the total population living in the study area, less than 15% live in brick/masonry houses. This shows the extent of poverty and the prevalence of poor living conditions of the urban poor in Somaliland. 75.26% of the residents in the area owned the houses in which they live; 16.49% live in rented houses and 8.25% live in houses owned by others (no rent paid).

Security is a major component of the services provided by Somaliland government to its people; 61.85% of the respondents stated they do not have any government service. The remaining 38.15% stated that they have a government service of at least one kind. Several types of minor insecurities are most often felt in the village; approximately 59% of the residents in the area complain about theft, followed by intimidation (28.20%) and minor violence (13.82%). Other basic government services such as education, health, sewerages and utilities are least available; 55.7% and 48.5% have no access to clean water and power supply respectively.

DETERMINANTS OF POVERTY

The study has employed binary logistic regression model to identify the major determinants of poverty in the study area. Examination of the Log it estimates demonstrates that eight predictor variables were regressed. The coefficients for five variables were found statistically significant at 10 and 1 percent levels respectively. The log of consumption expenditure, household size, education level of the head of the household, access to health facility and status of unemployment are the significant variables.

Variable	Marginal effect	Standard error
Lnconsumexp	-0.288 *	0.150
Gender	0.137	0.143
Household size	0.030*	0.025
Education Level of HHH	-0.093*	0.057
Age of Household Head	0.008	0.006
Unemployment	0.462***	0.069
Access to Health	-0.227*	0.120
Marital Status	-0.102	0.122
Observation	97	
LR Chi ² (8)	14.47	
Prob > chi ²	0.0704	

Table 6: Marginal Effect after log it for analyzing urban poverty
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Source: Survey conducted by the author; 2016

Log of consumption expenditure: The result in logistic regression model in this study has indicated that the coefficient of the log of consumption expenditure is negatively related to poverty and significant at the 10 percent level. The implication of this reflects an increase in consumption expenditure by one unit decreases the probability of household falling into poverty reduces by 2.8 percent.

Household size: Another determinant of poverty in the study area is household size. The sign is as expected and statistically significant at 10 percent. The rise in the household size by one individual increases the likelihood of the household falling into the poor category by 0.3 percent. Similar research (2017) finds a similar result indicating positive effects of family on poverty.⁵

Education: As shown in the results in the above table, the coefficient for education of the household head is negatively associated to poverty and statistically significant at 10 percent precision level. The increase of the education of the head of the household head by one year, results decreasing probability of household to fall into poverty by 0.93 percent. This may be so due to the fact that educated people would have better opportunities to get employment with good income and perform business activities.

Unemployment: As expected, the result of this variable is positively related to poverty. The coefficient of unemployment indicates that unemployment is positively and significantly related (affects) poverty at 1 percent level. As the head of the family falls under unemployment status the probability that his/her family will fall into the poor category increases by 4.6 percent. Indeed, there is positive correlation between unemployment rate and the extent of poverty in urban areas.⁶ In fact, access to health

facility: As can be seen from the logistic regression output, access to health facility reduces that probability of the household falling into poverty by 2.7 percent.

CONCLUSION

In Somaliland, poverty is observed as a multi-faceted social and economic problem. The basic needs approach is found to be the most appropriate one for measuring poverty. The poverty in Somaliland and other parts of the developing nations lack access to basic needs: inadequate basic services and goods such as lack of clean water, nutritious food, lack of hygiene and sanitation, lack of basic health facilities, lower standard houses without lighting, unemployment, and poorly paid wages. The combination of these problems deteriorates and worsens the living conditions of the urban poor in Somaliland.

Several dimensions of poverty are worth to mention; most of the basic needs are missing or lacked in the area. Food, shelter, education, health and provision of utilities are all least available and inaccessible to the urban poor in Somaliland. Approximately, 40% of the residents in the study area face food shortages for a period of one month in the last twelve months. Shelter one of the most important basic human needs, is found in low standards. The majority of the urban poor live under houses made from iron sheets or Somali traditional houses made from a combination of several items such as thick sticks, worn-out clothes, cartons and plastics. These types of houses are very vulnerable to risks, including fire and storms. There are no separate rooms for the boys and girls or adults and children. The problem is still found in the education and health sectors, both are less available or accessible; more than 32% of the children do not attend schools. More than 60% of the residents in the village have no access to a health facility. Utilities provision is also found rarely in the area. Over half of the population does not get clean water and power supply.

Out of eight explanatory variables for determining the factors affecting urban poverty in the study area, five of them are found with significant effect at different levels. The log of consumption expenditure, household size, education level of the head of the household, access to health facilities and status of unemployment are the significant variables.

To overcome the above mentioned problems, the attention of concerned bodies via intervention and preparation of comprehensive and inclusive national planning to reduce poverty, promotion of employment creation structures, introduction of income generating activities, investment on education (vocations and training) and health, introduction of poor friendly public utilities, promotion of investment in national productive assets and institutionalization of local community support systems (local charity) is required.

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YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT AND SECURITY IN HARGEISA

Muse Abdilahi Muhumed

ABSTRACT

Youth represent a very vital organ in any society. They are not only the future of Somaliland, but also a major stakeholder and useful resource in the nation-building. However, it has been suggested that a large rate of youth unemployment makes more countries unstable in general, and thus more prone to armed conflict. The main purpose of this article is to analyze the nexus between youth unemployment and state security in Somaliland. Both primary and secondary data are used in the study. The study is purely qualitative and generated the required information in order to achieve its objectives. A non-probability sampling method was used which was relevant to the researcher's judgement to collect the required data since the list of the unemployed youth in Hargeisa is unknown. The main data collection instruments were key informant interviews and observation. The findings of this study found from 20 respondents selected on purposefully comprising of the unemployed, employed youth as well as the concerned institutions. Results show that corruption, nepotism and unfair job recruitment systems are the factors causing youth unemployment in Hargeisa. The study proposes the enforcement of meritocracy policy that could at least tackle the challenges of unemployment and can also be a solution to the predicament of youth unemployment in the Hargeisa.

INTRODUCTION

In many countries in the world, youth unemployment and security matters are being debated around the globe and has become a challenging policy issue for many countries since unemployment directly affects the security. The problems of youth unemployment are now a global issue and it is dealt with the states at any level of their development. A study in Nigeria shows that there is a negative relationship between youth unemployment and security. However, the pressing unemployment in Nigeria forced many of its youth to join the anti-government movements and later became an existing implication for the stability of the country. In this case, security could be the condition or feeling safe from harm or danger, protection and preservation of core values, and the absence of threat to acquire values.¹

According to Somaliland Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2014)², there are no official statistical data regarding the current youth population in Somaliland, but the latest assessment of unemployment rate indicates that 75% of Somaliland people are

unemployed. According to this data, 30 % of the unemployed are females while 20% are young males, but the remaining rate of 15% are adults. The assessment noted that Hargeisa which is the capital city of Somaliland has been constrained by high levels of unemployed youth and especially university graduates.

According to (ILO, 2017)³, youth has been defined as approximately 40 percent of total unemployed persons worldwide, although they account for only one quarter of the total working age population. In Somaliland, the last labour force survey conducted in 2012⁴ confirms that 13% of graduates in urban centers and 7% graduates in rural areas are unemployed both in Hargeisa, Borama and Burao. The survey underlined that there were the smallest number of graduates in this period as there had been few universities in place. At the moment, Somaliland universities have more than doubled with increasing numbers of graduates while the limited job opportunities causing frustration and hopeless for the graduates since they have no good practical skills. This has made them to take a decision of taking risky cross-border migrations.

The study on the nexus between youth unemployment and security was carried out using both primary and secondary sources. In the secondary data, literature reviews concerned with this topic were conducted and therefore relies on concrete and evidence-based facts. The most important data collection methods in this study were the primary data through key interviews and observation which have been analyzed qualitatively.

The study interviewed 20 participants selected on purpose because the locations of the participants were unknown. Describing the youth unemployment and security in Hargeisa, the researcher interviewed with 9 unemployed youth, 7 employed youth and 4 participants from the concerned institutions whose responsibility is to deal with unemployment matters. During this process, an interview schedule was used which contained open-ended questions that enabled the participants to share detailed information.

This study aims to bring the attention of the people and the government on the youth unemployment and security in Hargeisa. This has made the author to be motivated after being observed many youth detained for gang and robbery actions. The youth who mostly commit crimes against the state have been confirmed to be the unemployed in Hargeisa. For this purpose, the study endeavors to suggest the urgent interventions that need intentionally to be included by all sectors of the society and the government in order to come up with strategies to deal with youth unemployment.

CONCEPTUALIZING TWO CONCEPTS: UNEMPLOYMENT AND SECURITY

Youth unemployment and state security are two important subjects that are debated today in the world. It is known that the concept of unemployment dates from the end of the 19th century and is closely associated with the rise of industrialized wage economies. Persons without work indiscriminately are described as unemployed regardless of any reason. However, the definition of youth, perhaps changes with circumstances, especially with the changes in demographic, financial, economic and socio-cultural settings. Currently, youth are one of the greatest resources any nation could be proud of, not only are they legitimately regarded as the future leaders, young people are potentially and actually the vital resources worth of investment by a country as well as the valued possession for national development and they are the center of reconstruction and sustainable development of any nation.

The relationship between youth unemployment and security has been identified as a debatable issue in Hargeisa by the study respondents and this is the reason for Somaliland to have a tradition of prioritizing security over the other functions of the state in Somaliland. Unemployment in any form is a drag on the economy and society which undercuts productivity, spending, and investment, exploiting national growth and hence unemployment contributes to inequality and encourages social tension.⁵ In the meantime, ILO unemployment rate includes unemployed people, who are not searching for work because they are discouraged, that is, they have lost all hope of finding a job. In this case, the jobless youth is defined as the ratio, neither of those who are neither employed nor in the labour force. This includes all youth who are not in school and not looking for a job.

Another measure of joblessness is the ratios of youth who are not in school and do not hold jobs, whether or not they are looking for jobs. This ratio includes the ILO unemployed as well as discouraged workers who are not in the education system.⁶ Hence, in the past two decades, the discussion and the debate on youth unemployment have increased more than ever before. Governments, the private sector and the international organizations continued to have major concerns towards the youth unemployment problem.⁷

Security can be economic security, social security, political security and territorial security. According to (Afolabi, 2013)⁸, security is generally based on fear of definite and potential attacks on public authorities, persons and properties. The nature and concept of national security may vary from one state to the other. Like other contested concepts, the term contains an ideological element which provides empirical irrelevant evidence as a means of resolving the debate.⁹ On the other hand, the term security

has demonstrated controversies in relation to its conceptualization; but its simplest explanation should be initially characterized as the freedom from threats, anxiety, danger or political coercion. But, the political thinkers have described the term as one of those common sense, pre-defined terms in the international relations orthodoxy that appears to be simple until examined with a critical eye.¹⁰

In most fragile situations, if not all, states face an apparent dilemma caused by youth unemployment and have an impact on the family unity, level of poverty and its results in different social problems like gangs, robbers, civil war, violence, breakup of families and alcoholism due to hopelessness. It is accompanied by bad occupational prospects and impending economic deprivation, placing the well-being of a future family at risk.¹¹ For this purpose, the rate of youth unemployment and its effects on security is a good example for the frustration theory which leads to aggression and be can be seen in the youth unemployment due to the youth population are feeling that they are getting less than what they deserve from the government, most of them resort to stealing, terrorism, kidnapping and other gang crimes.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT AND SECURITY IN HARGEISA

According to the interviewees, there was a high increase in crime rates in Hargeisa in the past months. Many youth are arrested for robbery and gang acts due to their involvement in crimes against the state. In 2016, many youth was detained by police for robbing the citizens during the night. Some of those youth have proved to be graduated from the local universities. Therefore, the high level of crime rate weakens the security of the city and poses threat to lives and properties.

The National Crime Rate Report, published by Somaliland police in 2016 highlighted that crime rate increased 2% compared to the previous years. The police stated that 18,559 cases were recorded this year, whereas in 2015 it was 18,089. The police underlined that this has been greatly contributed by the youth unemployment in Somaliland, which has damaged the security integrity of the nation.¹²

In addition to that, youth violence is the most visible on youth based urban crimes and violence in Somaliland. Youth violence was stated as the most prevalent and feared criminal activity in Hargeisa. The majority of violent incidents being witnessed were the crimes committed by the unemployed youth who then faced apprehensions. Moreover, the youth aged between the age of 18 and 25 are also perceived to be responsible for committing the crimes of robbery, gang rapes and looting the materials from the people

walking in the streets during the night, which forced many people to leave the market before the sunset as it has been a security challenge for them.¹³

The study found out that some of the most visible crimes that have affected the security of Somaliland are included by the gang crimes, illegal migration, robbery and burglary. The study found that youth violence can be committed by individuals or groups, but most of the respondents stated that youth crimes are committed by gang groups. The participants have shown serious concern over recent gang rape incidents in Hargeisa. This was followed by a huge illegal migration where many youth are departing the country to abroad seeking a better living condition.

One perceived reason that came up quite often is that when youth are addicted to Khat and other drugs and are unemployed, they would do everything possible to get money to support their habit, even committing crimes. Last but not least, the participants in the study concluded that youth unemployment is a current concern to the Somaliland government due to the high increase of the crime rates and confrontations among the citizens and the police, which is completely a negative relationship to the state security and if not addressed well, the situation would be worsened.

THE FACTORS THAT CAUSE YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT IN HARGEISA

Hargeisa is facing a worsening youth unemployment crisis. Young graduates in Hargeisa are three times more likely to be unemployed than those get jobs by nepotism. The respondents stated that factors causing youth unemployment in Hargeisa included: nepotism, tribalism poor educational system, depending on foreign products, lack of transparent recruitment process, lack of good governance and high population of youth. Youth unemployment is generally viewed as important policy issues in many countries, regardless of their stage and development. Failing to successfully integrate youth into the labor market has broader consequences for Somaliland at large.

Generally, nepotism is believed to be one of the major contributors of the youth unemployment in Somaliland. This was the most frequent response overall, though bearing in mind that it was emphasized much more in the key interviews and observations reflected from the participants. Accordingly, respondents frequently pointed out that they see a strong relationship between nepotism and youth unemployment, which aggravates the situation of state security in the country. It has also been observed that poor education has itself been a considerable dynamic in the advancement of youth unemployment. Mostly, the education system at the lower levels in Somaliland is mostly theoretical and do not adequately prepare the youth to earn a living and offer solutions for employment.

Education is supposed to substantially increase skills that would help young people gain employment and support younger ones to generate economic growth.

Tribalism was stated as one of the serious challenges to many youth and other society in the employment opportunities. It has mainly affected the job opportunities and the recruitment process. Despite the fact that many believed that communities in Somaliland are, in general, a homogeneous people with one religion, culture and language, but the serious social decay that impacted them is the tribalism. The respondents identified that tribalism has been a selfish exercise intended to deny or deprive others who are not of the same tribe of their rights and access to opportunities for many youth. But tribalism is still a major problem in the country, particularly for the youth who are benefitted by politicians seeking a support through clan identity, nepotism and clan favoritism which are common during the times of elections where the tribalism goes to its peak.

In the meantime, lack of transparency in the recruitment process is said to be one of the current causes of youth unemployment, however, the system of employment in Somaliland particularly government and private sectors is mostly based on nepotism, clan based, and favoritism and there is no system that provides for youth employment, fresh job seeker and this discourages more youth to give up searching for work. According to the ground stories from various stakeholders in the fight against youth unemployment all blamed the government for lack of political will to address this economic disease.

The rural-urban migration has also been highlighted to have increased in Somaliland due to the youth unemployment. Rural-urban migration during the study was mentioned as a major cause for youth unemployment in particular as all people are continually moving into major cities, for instance, Hargeisa which accommodates over thousands of youth graduates coming the regional cities since Somaliland has obtained a peaceful situation for the past 25 years which became an opportunity for many people to migrate to urban centers of Somaliland.

CONSEQUENCES OF YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT IN HARGEISA

There are a lot of consequences of youth unemployment in Somaliland in general and Hargeisa in particular. Illegal migration and brain drain of country's young educated people, tribalism creation of urban gangsters; reduced level of confidence and self-esteem and Health problems including mental health problems were all identified as consequences of youth unemployment in Hargeisa. The study revealed that gangs and those addicted drugs are increasing in Hargeisa due to the discouraging level of youth

unemployment. The high rate of youth unemployment in Hargeisa is considered the main factor that encourages youth to commit crimes against the state.

The consequences of youth violence and the burden on the social and cultural spheres, and security sector in Hargeisa remain significant. Additionally, youth crime is the second most prevalent factor causing physical harm to young people in Hargeisa aged 15 to 30 years. However, the number of young men engaging in violence increases every year.¹⁴ Gangs of young men in Hargeisa are far more likely than youth not involved in gangs being both victims and perpetrators of violence, the dangers of gang membership go far beyond crime and violence. Gang-involved youth are more likely to engage in substance abuse and high-risk group sexual behavior and consequentially to experience a wide range of potential long-term health and social consequences, which in turn also adversely affect their local communities in Hargeisa.

The unemployment among the youth in Hargeisa leads to reduced levels of happiness and mental health problems as well as economic, cultural and social isolation where by many youth could be seen to have faced depression and mental problem as underlined by the respondents.

OVERCOMING CHALLENGES AND WAYS FORWARD

Despite the development made by Somaliland, there are many challenges facing the unemployed youth in Hargeisa as viewed by the interviewed participants and officials from the concerned institutions. The study revealed that youth make up the majority of the society, but they are completely excluded from the state opportunities and the processes of decision making even though these very decisions determine their future. It is important to note that the absence of basic economic infrastructure and the lack of social services which exacerbates the existing unemployment among the young generation, 70 % of youth in Somaliland are unemployed.

The major challenges being faced by the youth currently can be stated as the high unemployment and limited career opportunities, limited funding for youth empowerment, inadequate productive engagement, for example, limited facilities and spaces for sports and recreation, cultural barriers leading to poor political participation and representation, legal barriers limiting youth democratic participation in the political parties, illegal migration (tahriib), and addiction to drugs including Khat and other habitual actions which are negatively destroying the values of the youth in Hargeisa. On the other hand, the study has made emphasis that youth graduates have the opportunity to establish their own businesses instead of waiting to be hired by a company or other

offices, but establishing entrepreneurship or small business, by the youth requires to be invested by the government or by the private business, while many have said that the only opportunity for them is to create job opportunities rather than relying on the private sectors in collaboration with government of Somaliland.

CONCLUSION

Unemployment is still an enormous dilemma in Somaliland in general and Hargeisa in particular, which accommodates the largest number of unemployed youth from all the regions of the country. Thus the study found out that youth unemployment is still persisting in Hargeisa. The study discussed the relationship between youth unemployment and state security. It examined some of the major factors which contributed to youth unemployment, its consequences, challenges and opportunities for the unemployed youth in Hargeisa. It has also been underlined that there is a gap between the available opportunities in the market and the qualification which mismatch in higher institutions. Most of the young graduates have general or theoretical knowledge that have little relevance in the actual tasks they encounter in the market.

The government should set up youth employment strategy and substantially increase funding for technical resources for youth empowerment that can be used to develop youth skills and experience that enable them to match with available jobs in the market. Corruption, nepotism and tribalism should be eliminated in order to prevent youth unemployment. Additionally, more employment should be created in rural areas for the seasonal unemployment people. However, the development of the rural areas may stop the migration of the rural people in the urban areas which puts burden on the urban centers.

Reducing the level of youth unemployment in Hargeisa, the study counsels that there is a need to of rehabilitation and establishment of Vocational Training centers in Hargeisa. Finally, the article recommends that encouragement of local and foreign investments; nationalism, youth encouragement and behavior change initiatives are required. Regarding the issue of unemployed youth, the study calls for further research on the existing gaps of vocational training and other relevant skills in the country.

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ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) is a higher learning and research institution based in and operating within the institutional framework of the University of Hargeisa, Somaliland. The IPCS was established in February 2008 by the University of Hargeisa in collaboration with the Center for Justice and Peacebuilding of the Eastern Mennonite University in the United States, in response to the long-recognized call for an in-depth multidisciplinary approach to understanding and addressing the conflict and violence that has engulfed many parts of the Horn of Africa. The mission of the IPCS is to provide interested scholars, institute members and students with opportunities to engage in intensive study and research on Somaliland and Somali-inhabited regions in the Horn of Africa on an interdisciplinary basis.

ABOUT THE JOURNAL

The Somaliland Peace and Development Journal (SPDJ) is an annual peer-reviewed academic journal published by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies of the University of Hargeisa. The journal's core mission is to enhance understanding of peace, conflict management and development through research and publication. In its holistic multidisciplinary approach to research, the journal aims to increase the capacity of the people to analyze and better understand the fundamental causes of social, economic, political and environmental challenges through the facilitation of healthy and intellectual discussion. Towards this goal, the journal fosters the dialogue between academics, practitioners and policymakers inside and outside of Somaliland on a number of issues related to peace, security and development. Furthermore, the journal serves as a vehicle for broader dissemination of research findings to inform policymaking. Towards this holistic objective, the journal focuses on the following thematic areas:

- peace and conflict
- governance and security
- geopolitical and geostrategic issues
- migration
- political violence
- inter-clan strife
- education, conflict and peacebuilding
- cultural learning of policymaking processes
- environmental and climate change
- media and conflict

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